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This thesis aimed to investigate the nature of theory of mind (ToM) and its
relationship to language and executive function (EF) in children with autistic
spectrum disorders (ASD) and children with moderate learning difficulties (MLD). A
total of 188 children (70 with ASD, 118 with MLD) were tested over five studies.
Study 1 looked at the relationship between language and ToM tasks, whilst study 2
investigated the relationship between EF and ToM in those who failed false belief
tasks. Study 3 was a training study of EF and ToM, looking for direct and indirect
effects of intervention. Study 4 investigated the performance on advanced tests of
ToM of children with ASD who passed false belief tasks, and finally study 5 looked at
the relationship between teacher ratings of real life behaviour of ToM and EF and
performance on experimental tasks.
Impairments in ToM were more common and pervasive in children with
ASD as compared to those with MLD. However, some individuals with ASD did
pass ToM tasks, and there was evidence that these children had a superior
understanding of mental states across a range of tasks and in real life. There was also
some suggestion that failing a ToM task for a child with MLD may not be entirely
spurious. Language, in particular grammar, was strongly related to ToM task
performance in ASD, suggesting that it may be important developmentally as well as
online. EF was found to be unrelated to ToM in individuals with ASD or MLD who
failed FB tasks, although training children in cognitive flexibility improved their ToM
performance at follow-up.
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CHAFFER 1
AN INTRODUCTION TO AUTISM ANI) TOM
The first chapter of this thesis provides an introduction to autistic spectrum
disorders, a brief description of three major cognitive theories of autism and an
overview of current research into theory of mind, both in normal development and in
autism.
In 1943, Kanner described a group of children who had a puzzling
combination of symptoms - an obsessive desire for sameness, echolalia, lack of social
responsiveness, oversensitivity to stimuli and restricted interests, combined with a
good memory and a seemingly good cognitive potential (Kanner, 1943). His was the
first description of autism as a disorder, and his description is strikingly similar to
what is understood by 'autism' today. Autism, according to both ICD-1O (WHO,
1993) and DSM-IV (APA, 1994) diagnostic criteria, is characterised by early (evident
before the age of 3) and persistent impairment in social interaction, communication
and imagination, with restricted and repetitive interests and activities. The deficits in
socialisation, communication and imagination are known as the 'triad of
impairments'(Wing & Gould, 1979). Wing and Gould also introduced the concept of
an autistic spectrum, on which autism falls, along with other pervasive developmental
disorders such as Asperger's Syndrome and pervasive developmental disorder-not
otherwise specified (PDD-NOS). Throughout this thesis, the term autistic spectrum
disorder (ASD) will be used to refer to groups of children who have a diagnosis of
either autism, Asperger's Syndrome or an autistic spectrum disorder.
The autistic spectrum includes all levels of intellectual ability, ranging from
severely impaired individuals who never learn to speak, through to very high-
functioning people capable of obtaining university degrees and more. Pervasive
developmental disorders affect approximately 60 per 10,000 children (Baird et al.,
2000; Chakrabarti & Fombonne, 2001). Precise estimates differ according to the
recency of the study (with more recent studies finding a higher prevalence), the age
group studied, and whether the study relies on diagnostic records or uses more active
ascertainment. Recent estimates are substantially higher than had been previously
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thought and appear to be on the increase (Powell et a!., 2000), but whether this is due
solely to increased awareness and changes in diagnostic practice or whether it is also
due to a genuine increase in prevalence is not known.
Although autism is defined behaviourally, it is a biological disorder and is
considered to be one of the most heritable developmental disorders, with estimates of
heritability exceeding 90% (Bailey et al., 1995). Levels of concordance between
monozygotic twins range between 60 and 80%, and the risk of a sibling of a child
with autism themselves having an ASD is between 3 and 6% (Bailey et al., 1995;
Rutter, Silberg, O'Connor, & Simonoff, 1999). The pattern of heritability makes it
clear that autism is not a single gene disorder, but instead is likely to be caused by a
small number of interacting genes, perhaps combined with some environmental insult
(since the concordance rate amongst monozygotic twins is not 100%; (Gillberg &
Coleman, 2001). It is not clear which environmental events (e.g. drugs or viruses)
could be significant and there is little evidence to date.
Autism is far more prevalent in males than in females, and this discrepancy
becomes more pronounced at the high-ability end of the spectrum (Wing, 1981). The
reason for this male bias is not known. It is possible that the current diagnostic
criteria may identify ASDs more successfully in men than in women, or that more
severe brain involvement is necessary for a female to appear to have an ASD.
The biological basis of autism is now widely accepted (Gillberg & Coleman,
2001). This is, however, a relatively recent development. Bettelheim (1956)
suggested that children became autistic as a result of an unloving environment - the
'refrigerator mother' theory. This idea was highly influential at the time in forming
professionals' attitudes and the treatment of autism. It is now clear that children can
be badly neglected and mistreated and yet not become autistic (Clarke & Clarke,
1976). However, studies of Romanian adoptees (who were severely deprived in the
early years of life) have shown a subgroup of those who were kept in institutions for
2-3 years do display some autistic traits in early and middle childhood, including less
pretend play and fewer references to mental states than a control group (Kreppner,
O'Connor, Dunn, & Andersen-Wood, 1999). However, these cases of severe
institutionalised sensory and emotional deprivation are quite distinct from the normal
range of parenting experienced by children, and appear to result in a form of quasi-
autism with a different course, in which the symptoms are somewhat attenuated as the
child grows up.
13
Psychological theories of autism
Whilst autism is clearly a biological disorder and is described on a behavioural
level, cognition links these two levels of explanation and is crucial both in
understanding the behaviour of individuals with ASD and in pinpointing potential
areas of the brain in which abnormalities may be found, thereby providing pointers as
to which genes might be involved. There are several current cognitive theories of
autism that will be outlined in brief. This is not an exhaustive review of all theories of
autism, but rather a selective discussion of those that may be relevant to the
experimental questions and research reported in this thesis. The theories discussed
broadly fall into two types, social theories (e.g. theory of mind) and non-social
theories (e.g. executive function and central coherence). There are other theories of
autism, such as Hobson (2002), who suggests that the core deficit in autism is in
interpersonal relationships, which in turn leads to difficulties such as theory of mind
deficits. However, these are not relevant to the studies in this thesis and will not be
discussed. Theory of mind (ToM) will be the main focus of this thesis, and as such
will be discussed last and in the greatest detail.
Executive Function
Executive Function (EF) is an umbrella term for higher order cognitive
function, covering inhibitory control, set shifting and flexibility, planning and
working memory. The inflexible and repetitive behaviour seen in many children with
ASD, and the similarity in some cases to the behaviour seen in patients with frontal
lobe dysfunction, led researchers to investigate their executive functioning. A wide
range of studies (e.g. Hughes & Russell, 1993; Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994;
McEvoy, Rogers, & Pennington, 1993; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991) have
found that children with autism show deficits in tests of EF when compared to
typically developing (TD) controls, particularly on tasks of set shifting and flexibility
(Ozonoff, 1997), but also on tasks of planning and fluency (Sergeant, Geurts, &
Oosterlaan, 2002). Some researchers have proposed that executive function deficits
may be the primary deficit in ASD, and thus account for difficulties seen in other
areas (Ozonoff et al., 1991; Russell, 199Th). However, it is not clear whether such
difficulties can discriminate between children with ASD and other groups with
developmental disorders such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD),
and therefore whether the deficits are specific to autism (Sergeant Ct al., 2002). The
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majority of studies looking at EF deficits in clinical groups such as those with ASD or
ADHD compare a single clinical group to controls rather than comparing between
clinical groups. There is some evidence from a single study that children with autism
perform worse on a test of flexibility and set shifting (the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test, WCST; (Heaton, 1981) than do children with AD}{D (Ozonoff & Jensen,
1999), whilst both clinical groups perform worse than controls on this task across a
range of studies (Sergeant et al., 2002). However, there is also evidence that young
children with ASD do not have EF problems, which make claims that EF is the
primary deficit in autism problematic (Griffith, Pennington, Wehner, & Rogers,
1999). This area needs further investigation, to see if there is a specific profile of EF
wealcnesses in ASD, as opposed to other clinical disorders, and to see whether it is
plausible that this could be the primary deficit. Executive function, and its
relationship to theory of mind, will be discussed further in chapter 4.
Weak Central Coherence
Anecdotal accounts of children with autism often refer to their ability to notice
tiny changes in the environment, and to repeat verbatim long stretches of dialogue
from videos; whilst appearing not to understand either what they are saying or the
underlying gist of the story. Frith (1989) proposed that these features of autism are
part of a tendency towards detail focused processing. Typically developing children
and adults have a strong tendency to extract a global meaning from information - so-
called 'central coherence' - for example remembering the gist of a story whilst
forgetting the details. Frith (1989) suggests that this fundamental feature of
information processing is disturbed in autism, and that this could account for some of
the 'islets of ability' seen in autism, particularly in those with savant skills. Shah and
Frith found that individuals with autism showed highly superior performance on the
Embedded Figures Test, (which requires the participant to pick out hidden figures
from a picture) and also showed superior performance on the Block Design task (Shah
& Frith, 1983; Shah & Frith, 1993), both tasks in which local, rather than global,
processing might be advantageous. Weak central coherence is proposed to be a
cognitive style, more prevalent in people with ASD, just as a tendency towards strong
central coherence is more prevalent in normal individuals. The tendency towards this
cognitive style predicts a pattern of cognitive strengths and weaknesses, as opposed to
the ToM and EF theories, which suggest only weaknesses. However, it is not clear
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what mechanism might underlie this local bias. Alternative explanations for the
characteristic pattern of strengths and weaknesses seen in autism have included
enhanced perceptual functioning (Mottron & Burack, 2001) or a reduced ability to
generalise (Plaisted, 2001).
Theory of Mind
Between the ages of 3 and 4 years, ID children become able to pass simple
tests of ToM - assessing their ability to attribute thoughts and beliefs in order to
predict and explain behaviour. Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) proposed that
the deficits in socialisation, communication and pretend play seen in autism could be
the results of a failure to develop this understanding of mental states or 'mindreading'.
This theory is the main focus of this thesis, and as such research in this area will be
discussed in detail below. First, the study of ToM in autism will be placed in context
through a discussion of ToM research in normal development. Following that, ToM
research will be discussed specifically with reference to ASD, and the implications of
the postulated ToM deficit in ASD will be discussed. Throughout this text the terms
'ToM', 'mentalising' and 'understanding of mind' will be used to refer to the ability
to attribute independent mental states such as beliefs.
Theory of Mind: a general introduction
The concept of a 'theory of mind' was first introduced by Premack (Premack
& Woodruff, 1978) with reference to chimpanzees. By a ToM, Premack meant the
ability to represent mental states - and in the context of chimpanzees this was
postulated to be an innate cognitive mechanism, rather than any sort of conscious
'theory'. Work with young TD children followed, using a test which has now become
standard and which will be referred to throughout this text as the 'unexpected
transfer' false belief (FB) task. In one well-known variation of this task (Baron-
Cohen et a!., 1985), a protagonist (Sally) puts a marble into a basket and leaves the
room. Mother character (Anne) moves the marble from the basket into a box whilst
Sally is absent. Sally then returns, and the child is asked where Sally will look for her
marble. Wimmer and Perner (1983) found that whilst most TD 3-year-olds failed
simple tasks of this type, almost all 4-year-olds could pass, indicating that they could
distinguish between the protagonist's (mistaken) belief and the reality. Another
frequently used FB task (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986; Perner, Leekam, &
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Wimmer, 1987) will be referred to as the 'deceptive box' task throughout this text. In
this task the child is shown a familiar box (for example a Smarties box) and is asked
what the box contains. Typically children reply 'Smarties'. The box is then opened
and they are shown that it actually contains a pencil. The box is closed again and they
are asked 'If your friend came in, what would he think was in the box?' (the other FB
question). They are then also sometimes asked 'Before I opened the box, what did
you think was inside? (the self FB question). Both these tasks test the representation
of mental states by requiring the child to attribute a belief that is different to their
present belief, and indeed to reality.
There has been much debate over what it means for a young child to either
pass or fail a FB task (e.g. Bloom & German, 2000), with many researchers arguing
that casting 3-year-olds as lacking ToM ignores the social sophistication that they
demonstrate through speech (where they can contrast mental states well before their
fourth birthday; Bartsch and Wellman, 1995), pretend play (Leslie, 1987), and
prosocial behaviour (where 2-year-olds are known to show empathy; Zabn-Waxler,
Robinson and Emde, 1992). Some authors have argued that FB tasks place demands
(for example executive, or linguistic) on the child that have nothing to do with having
or lacking a ToM, but which account for the failure of most 3-year-olds (Hughes &
Russell, 1993; Siegal & Beattie, 1991). Task manipulations such as asking the child
where the protagonist will look first have enabled children younger than 4 years to
pass these tests (Siegal & Beattie, 1991). However, a recent meta-analysis of FB tasks
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) found that even with these task manipulations,
children younger than 3 overwhelmingly still fail, and that the improvement seen is
generally due to their performance moving from being at below chance to chance
level - not very strong evidence of the ability to attribute independent mental states.
Weliman et al. (2001) found that the improvement in performance on FB tasks
between the ages of 3 and 4 is consistently seen across a wide range of studies. Whilst
it is indisputable that 3-year-olds and even 2-year-olds have some awareness of other
people's mental states, it also seems that in most cases they genuinely do fail to
attribute false belief in standard tasks. Explaining this apparent discrepancy between
real life behaviour and experimental performance has been a major challenge for
researchers investigating ToM in TD children.
Over the past 20 years the development of ToM has received a great deal of
attention from researchers (see Flavell, 1999 for a review), so much so that it is
17
beyond the scope of the present chapter to conduct an exhaustive summary. I will
briefly outline the main theories of how a TD child might acquire a ToM, and will
then go on to discuss ToM research in autism.
Theories of how a child acquires a ToM fall into two broad types, domain-
specific and domain-general. The domain-specific theories postulate that specific
advances in a child's social understanding allow them to develop a ToM (as distinct
from general cognitive advances), whilst the domain-general theories suggest that
there is nothing special about a ToM, but that general cognitive advances allow a
child to pass FB tasks and presumably to gain an understanding of minds. The main
domain-specific theories are simulation theory, modularity theory and the 'child as
scientist' theory. This last theory could be put into either the domain-specific or
domain-general group, since it postulates that the child uses domain-general
mechanisms (those of theory formation) to develop a domain-specific theory of mind.
The difference between passing FB tasks and actually having a 'theory of
mind' is an important one to keep in mind - other theories, not reviewed here (but
discussed later in this thesis), propose explanations for why a child might fail FB
tasks, but do not address the development of the underlying understanding of mind.
Domain-specific theories
Simulation theory (e.g. Harris, 1992) suggests that children can use their own
minds as models for understanding others, and in particular for making predictions
about what others will think and do. We know what we would do in a particular set
of circumstances, and we are able to project that onto others, as if we were re-running
our own system offline. Some argue this involves an introspective access to our own
mental states (Harris, 1992), whilst others argue that it is a more automatic non-
conscious process (Gordon, 1986). Harris suggests that the simulation processes are
set in motion by inbuilt mechanisms for establishing joint attention and a joint
emotional stance. The ability to model other's behaviour has been proposed to
develop in young children through role-taking (for example through pretend play).
Harris (1992) argues that some forms of simulation are more complex than others, and
in particular that running a simulation which requires imagining beliefs that run
counter to the child's own (i.e. a false belief) is complex and requires imaginative
flexibility, lack of which prevents younger children from passing FB tasks. Harris's
account in particular would predict that children should be able to report on their own
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mental states before they can reflect on others'. There is little evidence for this.
Wimmer, Hogrefe and Perner (1988) found that there was no difference in the age at
which a child became able to predict another's FB and the age at which they could
recall their own. Harris counters this by claiming that recalling past beliefs which the
child now knows to be false involves the same imaginative construction of a counter-
factual state as predicting another's belief. However, work by Flavell and colleagues
(Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995, 2000; Flavell, Green, Flavell, & Grossman, 1997)
appears to show that access to and certain aspects of an awareness of one's own
mental states (for example, the ability to report on one's own stream of
consciousness) arrives surprisingly late (certainly after the age of 5), even when there
is no conflict between the belief state and reality.
Modularity theorists suggest that a 'theory of mind mechanism', perhaps a
module, or series of connected modules, have an innate basis in the brain, and that
neurological maturation accounts for the transition seen between the ages of 3 and 4.
Leslie (Leslie & Roth, 1994; Leslie, 1994) suggests three domain-specific
mechanisms, which mature in succession. The first, called Theory of Body (ToBy)
develops very early, in the first year. It allows infants to recognise that agents are
able to move on their own. This is as opposed to non-agents, which must be acted
upon. The next mechanism, called ToM Mechanism system 1 (ToMM 1) deals with
intentionality of agents, i.e. recognising that agents act upon intentions such as
desires. This, Leslie suggests, matures later in the first year. The final mechanism,
ToMM system 2 (ToMM2) develops during the second year of life and allows the
child to represent propositional attitudes such as pretending that, believing that or
thinking that, termed M-representations by Leslie. This is obviously much earlier
than the age at which TD children pass tests of FB. Leslie then postulates that
difficulties with another, non-ToM mechanism, the selection processor (which he
defines as a general executive function required in many situations to inhibit salient
but unwanted responses) cause 3-year-olds to fail FB tasks, rather than difficulties in
mentalising. Maturation of the selection processor allows 4-year-olds to demonstrate
their M-representational ability.
Baron-Cohen (1995) also suggests a set of innate modular mechanisms. He
suggests that the earliest building blocks for ToM that the infant possesses are the
Intentionality Detector (ID), which allows the child to interpret actions in a goal-
oriented way, and the Eye-Direction Detector (EDD) which detects the presence of
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eyes, computes what the eyes are directed towards, and then infers that if another
organism's eyes are directed at something then that organism sees that thing. Both ID
and EDD allow dyadic representations only - they represent a relation between two
objects, the agent and an object, or the agent and self. In order to share an experience
with another person, a triadic representation is necessary, and for this another module
- the Shared-Attention Mechanism (SAM) - is necessary. This uses information
about another agent's perceptual state - for example information detected through
EDD, to compare that perceptual state with the child's own perceptual state, and thus
to share attention. The final mechanism, the ToM Mechanism (T0MM) is necessary
for the child to represent epistemic mental states (as opposed to the volitional or
perceptual mental states which the other three mechanisms allow) such as pretending,
thinking, believing and knowing. It also ties together all the different mental-state
concepts into one coherent understanding.
These modular explanations do not completely discount the role of experience,
however, they postulate that the mechanisms for a ToM are innate, and whilst
experience may be necessary to trigger the operation of the mechanisms, it will not
determine their nature. This contrasts with the 'child as scientist' view (e.g. Gopnik
& Wellman, 1994) which argues that children's knowledge about the mind goes
through a number of theoretical stages, each of which is superseded by a new theory
when evidence and experience lead the child to reject the earlier theory as inadequate.
As stated above, this theory could be classed as either domain-specific or domain-
general, since the processes which enable a child to acquire a ToM are postulated to
be domain-general, whilst the final product (the 'theory of mind') is domain-specific.
The child is postulated to have a succession of theories, each of which is replaced by a
new theory as counter-evidence is collected. In elucidating how a child might come
to develop ToM, Bartsch and Weilman (1995) describe a three-step developmental
sequence. The first stage (at age 2) is a 'desire psychology', which they suggest
involves a mentalistic but non-representational view of the mind. The child
understands that people have inner experiences connected to objects (e.g. wanting
them or seeing them) but does not understand that people mentally represent objects
as being a certain way. The next stage, at around age 3, is heralded by the child
beginning to talk about beliefs and thoughts as well as desires, and involves an
understanding that mental representations exist which can be false or true, and can
differ between people. However, despite this understanding children continue to
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explain actions by desires rather than beliefs. Bartsch and Weliman term this a
'desire-belief psychology'. At around the age of 4, children begin to understand that
people's thoughts and beliefs, as well as their desires, influence their actions, and thus
they acquire a 'belief-desire psychology'. Experience is therefore crucially important
in children's ToM development in providing young children with information that
cannot be accounted for by their present theoiy, and that will therefore eventually lead
to conceptual change. In its strongest form, the 'child as scientist' theory does not
postulate any innate mechanism, and therefore presumably children with autism
would be assumed to have general difficulties in theory-formation, or lack the
necessary experience to form their theory, as the explanation for their difficulties in
ToM. However, the question must be asked, if there is no innate basis for the
understanding of mind, then why do all TD children come up with the same theory
and within the same time frame, despite great variation in experience, ability and
culture (Avis & Harris, 1991)? If we assume that there is an underlying innate basis
on which the theory is formed (as in fact recent versions of the 'child as scientist'
theory do (Gopnik, Capps, & Meltzoff, 2000), then the account begins to blur more
with a modular approach, and the theory loses some of its distinctiveness. Gopmk,
Capps and Meltzoff (2000) argue that their account differs from modular accounts
because the innate 'theory' they suggest is hard-wired in the brain is a starting point,
rather than the final architecture of theory of mind, and because they interpret Fodor
(1983) as stating that information from other cognitive systems cannot be used in the
construction of modular representations. However, as Coitheart (1999) points out,
many of the modular theories of ToM do not take a strong Fodorian approach and
allow for the role of experience in forming ToM development - indeed, given the
evidence of delay from those with perceptual deficits (e.g. deaf children of hearing
parents; Peterson and Siegal, 1995), it is hard to maintain an alternative stance.
It seems, then, that the latest forms of all three of these theories postulate an
innate, specialised system that underpins the development of a ToM. The theories
vary on when this innate system becomes important, and how sophisticated they
suggest it is, and how much interaction between this system and the environment is
necessary in order to form a fully functioning ToM.
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Domain-general theories
More domain-general theories argue that young children's failure on FB tasks
is the result of limitations in general information processing. So for example, the
Cognitive Complicity and Control (CCC) theory (Frye, Zelazo, & Burack, 1998; Frye,
Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto, & Frye, 1996; Zelazo, Burack,
Boseovski, Jacques, & Frye, 2001) argues that passing a FB task reflects the 4-year-
old's new ability to use embedded rule based reasoning, meaning reasoning with a
setting condition, an antecedent and then a consequence. They base this argument on
the observed relationship between the Dimensional Change Card Sort task (DCCS; in
which the child is required to sort cards using an f-f-then rule structure) and
performance on FB tasks. For example, in the DCCS a child is required to sort
coloured cards according to either shape (the Shape game) or colour (the Colour
game). The reasoning structure, according to Frye et al., therefore goes like this: If
we are playing the Shape game and If the card is a triangle, Then place in left hand
box. Frye et al (1995) suggest that a FB task can be described in the same form as
follows: IfSally If looking for marble Then will look here. However, Pemer (Perner,
Stummer, & Lang, 1999) suggests that the FB scenario could just as easily be cast as:
If Sally is looking for her marble Then will look here - only an f .then reasoning
structure which 3-year-olds can easily master. In addition, whether this logical
reasoning structure also applies in everyday understanding of minds is less evident.
De Villiers (De Villiers, 2000) argues that a ToM comes about as a result of
linguistic gains, specifically complement syntax (e.g. 'he thinks that the horse is in the
garden', where 'the horse is in the garden' may be true or false without affecting the
truth value of the whole sentence). She uses evidence from deaf children of hearing
parents - who typically do not pass FB tasks until much later than TD children and
who have impoverished access to language in their early years - to support this. This
account is in principle domain-general, since linguistic gains rather than specific gains
in ToM lead to a child passing FB tasks. However, in practice complement syntax
only applies to mental state and communication verbs in English, and so the claim is
not testable in other domains. It is also not clear whether this account is one which
explains competence in understanding other minds in every day life, or just in ToM
tasks. To my knowledge, the evidence for ToM competence (or not) in the every day
life of deaf FB failers has not been examined. It is also possible that deaf children
have delayed ToM due to their relatively impoverished social environment, in
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particular the lack of access to conversation (Peterson & Siegal, 1995; Woolfe, Want,
& Siegal, 2002) - deaf children of hearing parents are likely to miss out on a huge
amount of communication in their early years.
Perner (Perner & Lang, 1999, 2000) argues that ToM is in fact an integral part
of executive functioning, and that the child comes to understand the representational
nature of the mind through learning to inhibit executive actions, which he argues
requires the child to understand the existence of causal schemata. Understanding the
existence of these schemata as entities that make one act in a certain way is to
understand them as representations with causal power, and Perner argues that this
understanding of representation is what makes it possible for a child to represent
mental states such as thoughts and beliefs. Therefore the development of ToM is not
a domain-specific achievement, but in fact part of a wider cognitive leap in
understanding. This, like Zelazo's (1996; 2001) theory, accounts for children with
autism's observed difficulties in both EF and ToM, and the relationship between the
two seen in young TD children (see chapter 4).
Others (as I have discussed above) have argued that the executive demands of
FB tasks cause failure (Hughes & Russell, 1993), or that the way the question is asked
causes young children to misunderstand (Siegal & Beattie, 1991). These claims will
not be discussed in any detail here (although they will be discussed in chapters 2 and
4), as they do not make predictions about the development of a genuine understanding
of mind, only about passing FB tasks, and therefore still leave open the question of
how an understanding of mind, rather than the ability to pass FB tasks, develops. In
addition, research by Hughes (1 998a) and the Weliman et al. (2001) meta-analysis
suggest that it is unlikely that these task-specific factors can account for the transition
in performance on ToM seen between the ages of three and four.
The relationship between a ToM and other cognitive domains is an area of
growing interest. Some of the theories as to the relationship between ToM, language
and EF have been touched upon above. These, along with other alternatives, will be
discussed in detail in chapters 2 and 4, and investigated in studies 1, 2 and 3.
Understanding the relationship between ToM, EF and language may give us important
insights into the way that the understanding of mind develops. This is particularly
relevant in children with ASD, who have well documented difficulties in ToM.
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Autism and ToM
Investigations into the understanding of mind in children with autism date
back to Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith's (1985) seminal paper, which found that 80%
of children with autism failed simple 'unexpected transfer' FB tasks, as compared to
fewer than 20% of verbal age matched controls (who had Down Syndrome). In the
seventeen years since then a large number of studies, using a wide range of tasks,
have assessed the understanding of minds in children with autism (see Baron-Cohen,
2001 for a review). These tasks have included tests of deception, tests of recognising
mental state terms and of recognising the functions of the brain, as well as more
complex tests such as 2" order FB tests (in which the participant is asked 'what does
John think that Mary thinks?), stories about complex mental states, and identifying
mental states from the expression in the eyes. Although there have been exceptions
(Bowler, 1992; Charman & Lynggaard, 1998; see Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, &
Solomonica-Levi, 1998 for a meta-analysis), the great majority of studies have found
a deficit in the understanding of mind in children with autism when compared to
verbal-age matched controls (Baron-Cohen, 2001). The evidence to date suggests that
children with autism specifically lack the ability to meta-represent and so are unable
to attribute mental states or propositional attitudes, whilst being able to understand
non-representational states such as wanting and seeing.
How can the various theories of ToM deal with this proposed deficit in
autism? It is perhaps most straightforward for modularity theorists such as Leslie or
Baron-Cohen, who argue that children with autism have a specific deficit in the ToM
mechanism - in Leslie's account in ToMM2 , and in Baron-Cohen's account in the
Shared Attention Mechanism (SAM) and as a secondary effect in ToMM. Simulation
theorists (e.g. Harris, 1992) argue that children with autism may lack the innate
mechanism that enables joint attention to be established, and from which simulation
processes are postulated to start. However, as Harris himself points out, this cannot
explain the selective difficulties that children with autism have with representational
mental states, as opposed to volitional or perceptual mental states such as seeing and
wanting. A strong 'child as scientist' account, which postulates no innate basis for a
ToM would have to predict general difficulties in theory forming in autism, one result
of which is the lack of a ToM. However, in fact recent accounts which address the
ToM deficit in autism from a theory building perspective postulate an innate starting
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state 'theoiy' which children are born with and which allows them to makes
predictions, interpret and maybe even explain what they see around them (Gopnik Ct
a!., 2000). The child then builds on this innate theory to develop a fully functioning
representational ToM by the age of 4, and the child with autism either lacks this
innate theory, or has a radically different theory. However, as discussed briefly
above, the innate 'theory' in account does not appear to differ so much from a neo-
Fodorian module as outlined by Coitheart (1999; in which the fundamental property
of a module is simply domain specificity). After all, the development of a module for
reading (for example) requires substantial external input before it is functional, but
this in itself is not a reason for declaring something non-modular. There is no
apparent reason why the innate 'theory' that Gopnik et al (2000) suggest underlies
ToM development should not be called a module in the sense meant by Coltheart
(1999), and once we accept the existence of an innate module underlying theory
development this view and that of the modularity theorists draw closer together.
Since simulation theorists also postulate an innate basis for ToM de.velopment (Harris,
1992), there is some level of agreement amongst all these theories that ToM has a
innate basis and it is this innate basis which is impaired in ASD.
Other domain-general theories predict that children with ASD's difficulties in
ToM will inevitably be associated with difficulties which would show up in other
tests - in the case of the CCC, the problems would be in rule-based reasoning (Zelazo
et al., 2001), whilst in De Villiers' (2000) account language difficulties would be
inevitably associated with deficits in ToM. Perner's (Pemer et a!., 1999) account
would predict general difficulties in meta-representation, not just in the representation
of mental states. The implication of all of these is that the deficit seen in autism is not
in fact specific to ToM, but is indicative of more pervasive cognitive difficulties.
There is some evidence that this is not the case - for example, Leekam and Pemer
(1991) found that children with autism did not have deficits on a test of physical,
rather than mental, representations.
The ToM theory of autism has been highly influential over the last 17 years.
On a descriptive level, it can account for many of the difficulties seen in ASD. We
make sense of the social world we inhabit in terms of mental states, and a lack of an
ability to conceptualise those mental states will lead to profound difficulties in
socialisation and communication. The possible link between a ToM deficit and these
difficulties is perhaps easiest to conceptualise in the case of communication deficits,
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which are evident even in those individuals with ASD who appear to have very good
language skills. Individuals with ASD are prone to taking people literally - for
example, when asked on the phone 'Can you get your mum?' a child with autism may
well answer 'Yes' and put the phone down! A TD child will understand very early on
that the question in fact is a request to get their mother, rather that a question about
their capability to do so. However, in order for the child to understand this it is
necessary for them to understand the intention that is the mental state behind the
question, rather than taking the words at face value. There is plenty of experimental
as well as anecdotal evidence that individuals with ASD have difficulty understanding
non-literal or figurative speech (Happé, 1993, 1994; Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegal,
1995). It is not hard to see how such profound difficulties in communication will lead
to difficulties in social interactions: without recourse to mental states in order to
explain actions and motivations, other people's behaviour will seem chaotic and
senseless to the individual with ASD. In addition, a lack of understanding of mental
states may directly cause problems in socialisation, since children who have no
understanding of other's minds will not seek to share attention or enjoyment, and will
have poor understanding of emotions.
The ToM theory of autism has enabled researchers and professionals to predict
very precisely the behaviours that children with autism will have difficulties with (e.g.
understanding complex emotions, attributing representational mental states) and those
on which they will be unimpaired, such as understanding simple emotion and
attributing non-representational mental states (Baron-Cohen, Spitz, & Cross, 1993). It
has also provided a starting point for examining possible brain abnormalities by
functional neuroimaging, and for identifying areas of the brain that may be
compromised in autism (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et a!., 2000; Happé et al.,
1996). This, in conjunction with bottom-up molecular genetic investigations, may in
the long term lead to the identification of specific genes that are important in the
aetiology of autism.
On a more practical level, the theory has led to the development of tools for
early screening such as the Checklist for Autism in Toddlers (CHAT: Baird et al.,
2000; Baron-Cohen, Allen, & Gillberg, 1992; Charman, Baron-Cohen, Baird et a!.,
2001), which has had some success in identifying 18 month old children who will go
on to be diagnosed with autism. It has also lead to the development of intervention
programmes that target difficulties in ToM (Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin, & Hill,
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1996, 1997; MacGregor, Whiten, & Blackburn, 1998; Swettenham, 1996; see
Swettenham, 2000 for a review; Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez, & Walsh, 1996),
often by identifying those areas that children with autism have difficulties with (e.g.
understanding mental representations) and exploiting areas in which they are
unimpaired (e.g. understanding physical representations). No other theory of autism
has had so much influence in both research and clinical practice. Despite this, there
are aspects of autism which a ToM deficit cannot account for, in particular repetitive
behaviour, and the uneven cognitive profile and 'islets of ability' often seen in people
with autism.
Specificity and universality
Perhaps surprisingly for a theory that has had so much influence on the field, it
is not clear whether the ToM deficit is specific to autism, nor whether it is universal to
all children with autism. Certainly individuals with autism are not the only group to
demonstrate difficulties with ToM tasks. There is evidence for ToM task failure in
deaf children of hearing parents (De Villiers, 2000; Peterson & Siegal, 1995), blind
children (Minter, Hobson, & Bishop, 1998; Peterson, Peterson, & Webb, 2000),
people with schizophrenia (Corcoran, 2000) and stroke patients (Happé, Brownell, &
Winner, 1999). However, the real life social and communication deficits seen in these
groups are different from those in autism in that they tend to be less severe (often
resolving with time) and either acquired (in the case of schizophrenia and stroke
patients) or due to impoverished perceptual input (in the case of deaf and blind
children).
There have also been some studies that have found deficits in performance on
ToM tasks in children or adults with non-autistic moderate learning difficulties
(Ashcroft, Jervis, & Roberts, 1999; Zelazo et al., 1996). The case of children with
moderate learning difficulties (MLD) may be more relevant to the issue of specificity
of the ToM deficit in autism, since it is very unlikely that these children have an
acquired deficit in ToM, and they have no perceptual problems that would lead us to
predict a ToM delay. They may be generally intellectually delayed, but we would still
expect them to pass FB tasks at the same developmental level as do other, TD
children. Children with MLD typically do not demonstrate the profound social and
communication deficits seen in ASD, and therefore any evidence for ToM deficits in
this group would call into question the role of ToM as a causal factor underlying key
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diagnostic features seen in autism. Yirmiya et a!. (1998), in a meta-analysis of 40
studies of ToM performance (using standard FB tasks) in individuals with autism,
MLD and TD children, found that individuals with autism differed significantly (in
that more of them failed ToM tasks) from both those with MLD and TD young
children. They also found that individuals with MLD differed significantly from TD
children, and concluded that it is not the specificity, but the severity of the ToM
deficit that is unique to autism. However, their data say nothing about the severity of
the deficit in individual children, but rather addresses the pervasiveness of ToM task
failure in children with autism, MLD and ID children. It therefore remains unclear
whether ToM deficits differ in their degree of severity between children with ASD
and those with MLD. Studies 2 and 3 of this thesis use a range of ToM tasks to look
at the severity of any ToM deficit in children with MLD and ASD who fail FB tasks,
whilst study 5 uses teacher ratings of everyday behaviour to examine the same issue.
The specificity hypothesis will also be tested in Study 1, where performance on 3
different FB tasks and the relationship of that performance to language will be
assessed in a large sample of children with MLD or ASD.
It would be a mistake to equate failing a FB task with the lack of a ToM, and
in particular with deficits in an innate 'ToM mechanism', or an inability to form M-
representations. Children may fail these tests for a variety of reasons.
Developmentally, for example, a lack of communicative input might delay the
performance of deaf children, since it appears that there is no fundamental reason why
being deaf should impair a child's ToM, and indeed deaf children of deaf signing
parents are not delayed. (Peterson & Siegal, 1995; Woolfe et al., 2002). Online,
difficulties in flexibility and set shifting, or in language comprehension, may account
for the poor performance of some children with MLD on the tasks. Weliman et al.
(2001) suggest that whilst such problems cannot account for the leap in performance
on ToM tasks seen between the ages of 3 and 4 in typical development, they may
account for individual differences in performance between those ages - so, for
example, a child with very good cognitive flexibility may be able to pass FB tasks at 3
years 6 months, whilst a child with poorer flexibility might not pass until the age of 4
years. This may also be the case in children with MLD. In chapters 5 and 7 of this
thesis, the nature of failure on ToM tasks in children with MLD and ASD is
investigated. A theme throughout this thesis will be the comparison of children with
MLD who fail FB tasks with children with ASD who fail, and the comparison of
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children with MLD who pass FB tasks with those with ASD who pass. In this way,
differences in the profile of the two groups can be identified, possible strategies
investigated and the specificity of the ToM deficit tested.
The universality of the ToM deficit within ASD is also disputed. A proportion
of children with autism pass first order ToM tasks - the proportion varies across
studies, but ranges between 15 and 55% (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Frith, Happé,
& Siddons, 1994; Happé, 1994; Ozonoff et al., 1991). Some individuals with
Asperger's Syndrome or high functioning autism even pass more advanced 2 order
ToM tasks (Bowler, 1992; Ozonoff et al., 1991). However, they continue to show
many of the social and communication problems associated with ASD. How, then,
can it be argued that ToM is a fundamental deficit in ASD, and that many of the
diagnostic features of autism in fact stem from this deficit?
One possibility is that the ToM task success of some individuals with ASD is
due to chance or to simple strategies which do not reflect any true social insight
(Frith, Morton, & Leslie, 1991). Alternatively, it is possible that some individuals
have genuinely better social insight, and that their superior task performance reflects
this (Frith et al., 1994; Happé, 1993, 1994). It is the case that children with ASD who
pass FB tasks do, in some cases at least, appear to differ from those who do not. For
example, Happé (1995) showed that children with autism who passed first order ToM
tasks had a much higher verbal ability than TD children or children with MLD. Frith,
Happé and Siddons (1994) found that some children who passed FB tasks also
performed significantly better on teacher ratings of everyday behaviour thought to
require a ToM, whilst Happé (1994) found that children with ASD who passed FB
tasks were better able to attribute mental states to story characters in short vignettes
than were children who failed. There is some debate over how children with ASD
who pass FB tests, perform well on other tests of ToM, and even demonstrate better
real life performance on ratings of ToM competence in everyday life may be
achieving this. The existence of such individuals could be taken to suggest that ToM
is not, after all, a fundamental deficit in ASD, or that it is possible to develop
compensatory mechanisms for dealing with (innate?) problems in ToM. Tager-
Flusberg (2002) suggests that language could play a vital role here in allowing some
able children with ASD to construct an alternative route to the understanding of
minds. In this thesis, Study 1 (Chapter 3) investigates the difference in language
ability between those who pass and fail FB tasks both in ASD and MLD, whilst Study
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4 (Chapter 8) investigates the performance of those who pass ToM tasks, with the aim
of identifying strategies that children with autism may be using to compensate for
their difficulties. Study 5 (Chapter 9) looks at real life ratings of both ToM and
executive functioning and relates these to performance on experimental tasks,
comparing the ratings given to children with ASD and those with MLD (both FB
'passers' and 'failers').
The first issue that will be addressed in this thesis is the relationship between
language and performance on ToM tasks in children with ASD and MLD. Study 1
will also investigate the specificity of a ToM deficit to autistic spectrum disorders, as
compared to individuals with moderate learning difficulties.
Summary
There is now a great deal of evidence indicating that individuals with ASD
have difficulties in attributing mental states, both in experimental tasks and in
eveiyday life. It is not clear how this deficit in ToM might relate to other difficulties
seen in ASD. Nor is it clear whether this ToM deficit is in fact specific to individuals
with ASD, or whether it might be shared with some individuals with MLD. Chapter 2
of this thesis will review the evidence for a relationship between language and ToM in
children with ASD and MLD. Chapter 3 will present a study investigating this
relationship and the specificity of a ToM deficit to individuals with ASD. Chapters 4
to 7 will discuss and present studies testing the relationship between ToM and EF in
children with ASD and MLD, and the possible impact of intervention in either of
these domains. In chapter 8, the performance of those able individuals with ASD
who pass basic ToM tasks will be investigated, in particular in the context of possible
verbal strategies. In chapter 9, teacher ratings of ToM and EF in everyday life will be
used to compare both those with ASD and MLD, and also those who pass ToM tasks
and those who fail, and finally, in chapter 10, the results from the whole thesis will be
discussed and a theoretical perspective will be offered on their interpretation.
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CHAPTER 2
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY OF MINI) AND
LANGUAGE
Language is a crucial part of human social existence. We use language to
communicate our needs, thoughts and feelings, to share experiences and to express
opinions on the world at large. We talk to others, to ourselves, and to those who have
no chance of understanding, such as animals or even inanimate objects. Those
without language are severely disabled in their ability to interact and participate in the
social environment. But just how important is language in the development of socio-
cognitive understanding? Is language simply the medium through which we can
express understanding of concepts such as a ToM, or is it a fundamental part of the
construction of these concepts? Alternatively, does some sort of social understanding
have to precede normal linguistic development, providing the impetus and context for
language learning?
Theory of mind (ToM), and its importance in the conceptualisation of autistic
spectrum disorders, has been discussed in detail in the previous chapter. To
summarise briefly, a ToM is the ability to attribute thoughts and beliefs to people in
order to predict and explain behaviour.
The concept of language needs less explanation. However, language has a
number of components which may be assessed in a range of ways, including standard
tests of receptive vocabulary or grammar, more specific measures of syntax or
pragmatics, naturalistic measures based on free speech, or measures of productive,
narrative language. Many studies use the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS;
(Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1999) or its American equivalent, the Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT; (Dunn & Dunn, 1981). These are tests of receptive
vocabulary, where the child is asked to point to a picture that matches a word spoken
by the examiner. Other tasks assess syntax (e.g. the Test for Reception of Grammar
(TROG), Bishop, 1989), or narrative language (e.g. The Bus Story, Renfrew, 1991).
This chapter reviews the research on the relationship between ToM and
language to date. It will discuss the relationship in normal development but then
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focus on ASD and the possibility of a special relationship in autistic spectrum
disorders. Chapter 3 will then look at the relationship experimentally in children with
ASD and MLD. The thesis will return to this theme in Chapter 8, where the role of
language in those individuals with ASD who pass basic ToM tasks will be
investigated.
What is the evidence for a relationship between ToM and language?
Table 2.1 summarizes a number of recent studies that have looked at the
relationship between language and ToM both in typically developing populations and
in those with developmental delay or disorders. In order to include as many relevant
studies as possible, a range of measures of social cognition have been included.
These include not only FB tasks, but also tests of affective perspective taking, social
problem solving and emotion recognition. The finding of an association between
language and social cognition is remarkably robust. The only group study (as
opposed to case studies) that has found no association was Baron-Cohen, Leslie and
Frith (1985), who found no effect of VMA on FB performance in an autism group.
All the other studies found a significant correlation between language ability and
socio-cognitive skills, despite using a wide variety of measures and samples. Some
found specific rather than general associations, for example, Tager-Flusberg and
Sullivan (1994) found no association between a vocabulary test and ToM, but a
significant association between syntax and ToM, and Dunn et al (1991) found an
association between feeling state and causal talk and later ToM performance, but no
association with total amount of talk or mean length of utterance.
Table 2.1. Summary of studies on the relationshzp between social cognition and language
;tudies with typically developing children only	 _________________________
uthors	 'articip ants	 vleasures	 elevant findings
)unn, Brown SO preschoolers,	 ['1 - observations of family 	 To relationship between total
;lomkowski, ['1 CA = 2:9	 anying out normal routine. 	 Lumber of talk turns at Ti and
[esla, &
	
['2 CA = 3:4	 ['2 - social cognition tasks, FB ocio-cognitive measures at 12.
!oungblade	 sid affective perspective takin lild's mean length utterance at
i99i)	 asks.	 Ei associated with affective
perspective taking tasks but not
vithFB at 12.
eeling state and causal talk at Tl
__________ _________________ ________________________ ssociated with performance at 12.
enkins &	 is preschoolers.	 FB tasks.	 B significantly associated with
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It appears that despite a wide range of tasks used to assess both social
cognition and language, the picture is overwhelmingly that of a robust relationship
between language ability and aspects of social cognition (mostly ToM, but also some
other areas), both in typical development and in developmental disorders such as
ASD.
Language impairment appears to have a relationship with non-verbal social
communicative deficits independently of ASD. Lord and Pickles (1996) found a
strong relationship between expressive language and social deficits (as assessed by
parents) in language-delayed participants aged between 3 and 5 years both with and
without ASD. The children with language delay were not compensating for their lack
of verbal ability with non-verbal communication, and the severity of their language
delay was associated with the severity of their social deficits. This relationship was
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also found by Cohen et a! (1998) who looked at social cognitive processing (facial
emotion decoding and social perspective taking) in psychiatrically referred children
with and without language impairments.
Further evidence for a strong relationship between language and ToM comes
from deaf children. These individuals make up a particularly interesting group
because their exposure to language is often seriously reduced in the early years of life.
Several studies have found that deaf children who come from non-native signing
families show a tendency to be delayed in passing FB tasks (De Villiers, 2000; Lundy,
2002; Peterson & Siegal, 1995) in contrast to deaf children born to deaf parents, who
are exposed to fluent signing from their earliest days. This is not simply due to the
linguistic demands of the task, since an unpublished study described by de Villiers
(2000) found that deaf children passed a non-verbal FB task on average at the age of
7 years 3 months, whilst hearing controls passed at 4 years 4 months. Peterson and
Siegal (1995) suggest that this may be due to a lack of conversational input in the deaf
children at a critical time in brain development, which means than even when the
children get to school and meet signing peers and teachers, it takes them a long time
to catch up on their social cognitive skills. De Villiers (2000) has a different
perspective and argues that the delay is due to the late learning of complement syntax,
a grammatical structure that she claims is crucial for ToM development. Her recent
longitudinal study (De Villiers & Pyers, 2002) found that children's memory for
complement syntax predicted later performance on a range of FB tasks (including
explanation and justification tasks), whilst the converse was not true. However, if
only the standard 'prediction' FB task was used, the direction of the relationship went
both ways.
These findings with deaf children do seem to indicate a crucial role for
language in early acquisition of ToM. However, their deafness may have other
consequences - for example, it may be harder for a deaf child to establish joint
attention with a hearing parent without auditory cues. This could result in delayed
ToM development because the precursors are also delayed, due to the child's
deafness. A longitudinal study of joint attention, ToM and language in young deaf
children, both of deaf and hearing parents would help to clarify this issue.
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How are language and ToM related?
There are several possible explanations for the relationship between language
and social cognition. In this chapter I will concentrate on ToM rather than addressing
wider areas of social cognition such as emotion recognition, since much of the
research on social cognition and language has centred around ToM, and it is the main
area of this thesis. I will briefly describe several alternative explanations of the
relationship, and will then discuss them in the light of the available evidence.
Language is a precursor to theory of mind
Language may be a necessary precursor to ToM. There are two alternative
possible pathways here. It is possible that language is necessary for ToM
development because the child needs to engage in and hear conversations about the
mind and mental states in order to learn about this area for themselves (Dunn et al,
1991). Alternatively, syntactic language may itself provide a representational
'bootstrap' for ToM - the structure of language in itself introduces the possibility of
different points of view, and provides the structure for symbolic representations of the
type necessary for ToM understanding (Tager-Flusberg, 2000, De Villiers, 2000). Of
course, this second account does not claim that conversational input is unimportant,
but that exposure to specific aspects of language is what a child needs to develop a
ToM - therefore a child who was exposed to conversation but who never heard
complement structures might be expected to have a ToM delay. However, this is a
highly unrealistic scenario and in real life it is hard to pull these two aspects of
language exposure apart.
Early understanding of mind is necessary for language development
Whilst the ToM tested at age 4-5 by FB tasks is quite obviously not necessary
for language development since most children are talking fluently by that age, early
socio-cognitive skills such as joint attention could be a necessary precursor to
language development. A child may have to have some understanding of the
intentionality of other people in order to learn language (e.g. Baldwin & Saylor, 2002;
Tomasello & Farrar, 1986).
Language and theory of mind develop separately and independently
Language and ToM may develop separately and independently, and their
association may be due to some other factor that relates to both. However, obvious
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candidates such as age, family background and general ability can be partialled out
without the association disappearing (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Jenkins & Astington,
1996).
Theory of mind tasks make demands on language abilit y which account for the
relationship
The association may be due to task-specific factors in ToM tasks such as
demands on language ability (Siegal & Beattie, 1991).
I will start this discussion with the last option, as it is important to eliminate
this possibility before discussing any more complex issues. Almost all these ToM
tasks are linguistically mediated, and it is easy to imagine how young children might
fail due simply to misunderstanding the requirements of the task. Factors other than
language may also contribute to the failure of children below the age of 4 - for
example executive function (abilities such as strategic planning, inhibitory control
and working memory; (Russell, Jarrold, & Potel, 1994). These are discussed in detail
in chapter 4. To control for these factors, many researchers have developed tests of
ToM that attempt to eliminate or reduce the other (non-ToM) demands on the child.
Several of these studies report above-chance performance from 3-year-olds, indicating
that it may in fact be these other demands that account for their frequent failure
(Siegal & Beattie, 1991). However, a meta-analysis of these studies, looking at 77
reports of 178 different studies found that despite these experimental manipulations,
the findings overall are consistent with a conceptual change in social understanding
occurring between the ages of 3 and 5 (Wellman et al., 2001). Non-verbal FB tasks
correlate with language ability highly in deaf children (De Villiers, 2000), again
indicating that it cannot be the language demands of the task alone accounting for the
association. It seems, therefore, that we are justified in looking more closely at the
association.
It seems unlikely, given the evidence, that language and ToM in fact develop
completely independently. No convincing third factor has been put forwards as yet
which accounts for the association, and there is a great deal of evidence which
indicates that the two are associated in a range of groups with a range of measures.
This is not to say that we can rule out this possibility, simply that the evidence as it
stands does not support this view.
38
If we take a narrow definition of 'theory of mind' as the conceptual
understanding of minds measured by FB tasks, then it is not possible that this is a
precursor to language as children do not pass these tasks until the age of 4, by which
time they are already talking fluently. However, it is likely that earlier forms of
understanding of minds - for example, the understanding of intentionality
demonstrated in joint attention - are necessary for normal language development.
Carpenter, Nagell and Tomasello (1998) demonstrated in a longitudinal study that the
amount of time infants aged between 9 and 15 months spent in joint attention
engagement with their mothers and the degree to which mothers used language
following their child's attentional focus predicted variation in the infant's earliest
communication skills, both linguistically and gesturally. Sigman & Ruskin (1999)
showed that initiating and responding to joint attention was related to level of
language skills (both concurrently and a year later) in children with ASD and Down
Syndrome. This relationship could go some way to explaining the association between
ToM and language, as joint attention may be a precursor of both ToM and
communication and language skills. To rule this out, we need longitudinal studies
which can look at the relationship between ToM and language whilst partialling out
joint attention. However, this may be problematic since joint attention and ToM are so
closely linked that joint attention may be considered more of a building block for
ToM than a tool in its development, which it presumably is in the case of language.
Partialling out variation in joint attention may therefore result in partialling out a good
deal of the variance in ToM. It may be informative to look at different aspects of
language - as I will discuss later, syntax appears to be particularly strongly linked to
ToM, and it is possible that other aspects of language such as vocabulary may be
more closely linked with joint attention. It is certainly possible to envisage how
joint attention may be necessary for vocabulary development, as a child needs to
appreciate which object is being labelled in order to learn its name, and there is lots of
research which indicates that this is indeed the case (e.g. Charrnan, Baron-Cohen,
Swettenham et al., 2001; Loveland & Landry, 1986; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1990;
Mundy & Stella, 2000). It is less easy to see how joint attention might be directly
related to grammar, although it may well be indirectly linked through vocabulary.
Finally, I will consider the option that language is in some way causally
related to ToM development. There is a growing body of evidence, from work with
special groups (e.g. De Villiers, 2000), longitudinal studies (Astington & Jenkins,
39
1999; Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & et aL, 1991) and most recently two
training studies (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2002; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2002) that
language has a crucial role in the development of a ToM. Lohmann and Tomasello's
training study (2002) 3- to 4-year-old TD German children, trained large numbers of
children (who initially failed at least one FB task) on perspective taking using a range
of deceptive objects. There were five training conditions. The basic training revolved
around children being shown objects first deceptively and then with the true nature of
the object revealed - for example they were shown a rose that was in fact a pen. A
third person then entered and the child was asked what he would think the object was.
In the 'full training' condition this was discussed with the child using sentential
complements, in half the cases using mental state verbs (24 children), in the other half
using only communication verbs (24 children). In the Discourse only condition (30
children) no mental state terms or embedded complements were used in discussing the
objects, but the child was still shown the deceptive objects and asked the questions.
In the Sentential complements only condition (30 children) no deceptive objects were
shown, the child was just exposed to complements using mental state terms. Finally,
in the no language condition (30 children) the children were shown the deceptive
objects with no language beyond 'look'. Children's performance on FB tasks (both
an appearance reality task and FB transfer tasks) improved in all cases except for the
no language condition. Those in the full training condition improved most, and it did
not matter whether mental state verbs or just communication verbs were used. Those
in the 'Discourse only' and 'Sentential complements only' groups both improved
significantly. This study appears to indicate that without linguistic experience,
children were not able to benefit from exposure to FB and deceptive situations. All
the aspects of language varied appeared to contribute - and sharing perspective and
labelling perspective appeared to have an additive effect. The improvement did not
appear to be due to exposure specifically to mental state verbs, as communication
verbs alone also had a similar effect on FB performance. Hale and Tager-Flusberg
(2002) also found that training children on sentential complements improved their
performance on FB tasks, even when no mental states were included in the training.
They also trained children on FB tasks using a straightforward feedback and
explanation paradigm (with no reference to mental states), and found that this group
improved on FB tasks, but not on tests of sentential complements, suggesting that
sentential complements are not a necessary part of passing FB tasks. A third training
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group, in which the children were trained on relative clauses, showed no improvement
on either sentential complementation or FB tasks.
The work with deaf children (De Villiers, 2000) has been described above.
Deaf children of hearing parents (who have limited exposure to any sort of language
for the first few years of life) show a delay in FB of around 3 years. It seems unlikely
this is caused by their deafness since deaf children brought up in a signing
environment from birth do not show any delay. This points to the importance of
language as a necessary precursor to ToM, but does not inform us as to whether
conversational aspects of language or syntax are more important, since deaf children
have restricted access to both.
Both Astington and Jenkins (1999) and Dunn et al. (1991) found that early
language predicted later ToM performance in young TD children. Their language
measures were quite different - Astington and Jenkins used the CELF-R, and found
that syntax was particularly strongly related to ToM. Dunn et al used more
naturalistic measures and found that feeling state and causal talk was related to later
ToM.
Given that the evidence for language being important for the development of
ToM appears quite compelling, it would be useful to examine more closely the
possible mechanism of this relationship. As stated above, there are two suggested
alternative routes. Firstly, language may provide children with access to the social
world, providing children with experiences of mental state talk and the opportunity to
learn about the mental states of others. This is supported by Dunn et al (1991) who
found that the amount of feeling state and causal talk in young children's families at
age 33 months was related to their performance on FB tasks seven months later.
Dunn and Brophy (2002) suggest that discourse and conversation are crucially
important for a child's developing understanding of mind, and that the properties of
specific relationships that the child has (e.g. with their parents or with their peers)
predict individual differences in later ToM. In this case, presumably general rather
than specific aspects of language should predict ToM, since those children with better
general language skills would have superior access to the social environment. There
is evidence that verbal ability as measured by standard tests such as the BPVS is
related to ToM in normal groups (Cutting and Dunn, 1999) and in ASD (Happé,
1995). However, the problem with these findings is that they do not inform us as to
the causal direction of the relationship, and it is plausible that those children with a
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good ToM (or good precursors to a ToM) are able to acquire a better vocabulary
because of their superior ability to infer a speaker's intentions. Even in the Dunn et a!
(1991) study, it may be that at the earlier time point some of the children already had
superior socio-cognitive skills that stimulated greater amounts of feeling state and
causal talk within the family. The work with deaf children could also be interpreted
as supporting this more general account, as deaf children who are delayed in acquiring
language have less access to the social world, and less experience of conversations
and interactions (Peterson & Siegal, 1995). However, as discussed above, alongside
their lack of experience of interaction goes a lack of exposure to syntax, and there is
also a possibility that their deafness causes early difficulties in establishing joint
attention with a hearing parent. Lohmann and Tomasello's (2002) training study also
appears to suggest that many aspects of language contribute to FB understanding, and
it may be the experience of deceptive situations in conjunction with some sort of
language describing and contrasting them that allows children to gain a
representational understanding of mind. However, it is striking that training children
on sentential complements alone (with no deceptive situations) also improved their
performance on FB tasks, although inevitably this training involved some reference to
points of view.
The alternative option is that language itself provides the structure for
understanding representation, and therefore is a bootstrap to ToM. Gaining the
concept of a ToM requires symbolic thought, and language makes this a practical
possibility. In non-social domains, there is evidence that providing a structure
through language can aid children in making comparisons - for example in cases of
relative size (Baldwin & Saylor, 2002) and also that labelling a dimension of a multi-
dimensional object makes flexibility between other dimensions more likely in 4-year-
olds (Zelazo & Jacques, 2002). It is therefore possible that the use of language may
enable children to make comparisons between mental states that they would otherwise
not have been able to do.
Syntax appears to be particularly strongly related to ToM - Astington and
Jenkins (1999) in a longitudinal study of young TD children, found that the syntax
subscore of their language measure was the only language subscore making an
independent contribution to predicting later ToM scores. Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan
(1994) also found that a syntactic language measure correlated highly with ToM
performance in participants with ASD, whilst a vocabulary test was not associated at
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all. Whilst it is possible to envisage how a better ToM could lead to an enhanced
vocabulary because of the social learning of words (Bloom, 2000), it is harder to
envisage how a better ToM could lead to better syntactic knowledge. Therefore, an
association between syntax and ToM is more likely to mean that a sophisticated
syntactic knowledge is a precursor of a ToM than vice versa. This syntactic
knowledge may provide children with the structure to consider propositional attitudes
(i.e. an attitude which may or may not be true). De Villiers (e.g. De Villiers, 2000)
suggests that complement syntax in particular provides the bootstrap for comparing
points of view and therefore gaining a ToM. For example, in a sentence such as 'Sam
thinks that Anne has a dog', the complement is 'Anne has a dog', and it has a point of
view marker 'that'. The complement may be true or false, without affecting the truth
value of the whole phrase - in other words, Anne may or may not have a dog, but it
can still be true that Sam thinks that she has one. This is not the case with verbs such
as 'want' - if we say 'Sam wants Anne to have a dog', there is no point of view
complement and 'Anne to have a dog' does not have separate truth value to the truth
of the whole phrase. De Villiers postulates that this distinction between the truth
value of the complement and the truth value of the whole phrase is the crucial element
that enables children to consider different perspectives and thus gain a ToM.
However, since in English the only verbs that take a tensed complement are mental
state and communication verbs, it is hard to tease apart the causal direction - use of
these complements may indicate the existence of a ToM, rather than being a precursor
to it. In contrast, in German the non-representational verb 'want' takes a tensed
complement, and Perner and Zauner (2002) have shown that young children
understand and use it well before they use representational verbs such as 'think that'
or pass FB tasks. However, De Villiers counters this by pointing out that even though
verbs such as 'want' take a tensed complement in German, this complement does not
have the potential for different truth values that it would in the case of a verb such as
'think' and therefore does not provide a fair comparison (De Villiers, 2002). Against
De Villiers' claim, Varley et al (2001) present two case studies of adult men with
agrammatical acquired aphasia. Despite serious grammar impairments, both of these
men were able to pass FB tasks. Since these men presumably did have the necessary
grammatical structures at earlier stages of their life, we might argue that the
relationship is a developmental one, and once the ability to attribute mental states has
been acquired it is not necessary to retain the ability to use syntax to retain the
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concept. Since these are single cases we should be careful about drawing too many
conclusions, even about the online relationship - a way of investigating this further
might be to temporarily selectively lesion brain areas relating to grammar using TMS,
and to test the participants on FB tasks.
From the available evidence, it appears that in the early stages of language
acquisition joint attention (and therefore early social understanding) is important
(Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Sigman & Ruskin, 1999). This early
understanding of intentionality may be particularly important in the development of
vocabulary. Through this the child is able to acquire language, and through an
increased competence in syntax and improved understanding of the social world
around them is then able to form a concept of mental states and a ToM. It is very hard
to pull apart the contributions of syntax and social interactions, as there are no real life
cases of people who are exposed to syntax but no social interactions, or social
interactions but no syntax. Lohmann and Tomasello's (2002) training study suggests
that both discourse and complement syntax may be independently important.
Problems at any stage of this development could lead to difficulties in ToM - we
know that children with language impairment show socio-cognitive deficits (Lord &
Pickles, 1996) as do deaf children (Peterson & Siegal, 1995), and it appears that
children with ASD show less joint attention behaviour than their TD peers (Sigman &
Ruskin, 1999).
Most of my discussion of the mechanism of the relationship between ToM and
language so far has focused on TD children. ASD provides a special case of
individuals with impairments in both ToM and language, and also a case where the
relationship between the two areas may be quite different to that seen in TD children.
There is evidence that both vocabulary (e.g. Happé, 1995) and syntax (e.g. Tager-
Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994) are related to FB performance in ASD, and there is some
evidence that children with ASD require a higher level of language ability than TD
children in order to pass FB tasks. Happé (1995) suggests that a threshold effect may
exist. In her sample, children with autism with a VMA of less than 5 years 6 months
invariably failed FB, and those with a VMA over 11 years 2 months all passed. Given
that the tasks themselves do not require such a level of language ability (as they are
normally passed by 4-year-olds), what might it be about children with autism that
means that they require such a relatively high level of language? Tager-Flusberg
(2002) suggests a model of ToM development in which both language and mental
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state awareness contribute in normal development. She postulates that in ASD an
awareness of mental states (and possibly the attention to social stimuli) is lacking, and
therefore language is the only potential route to ToM. Language ability therefore
becomes crucially important in the development (or not) of ToM, having to
compensate for lack of other sources of learning about mental states such as pretend
play and friendships.
Figure 2.1 Tager-Flusberg's model of ToM and Language development (adapted
from Tager-Flusberg, 2002)
Typical development	 Autistic Soectrum Disorders
Attention to social stimuli
Language specific mechanisms





Tager-Flusberg (2002) suggests that children with ASD use logical reasoning
to pass FB tasks, in a way that TD children do not have to, because they do not
possess a 'language of thought', by which she means an intuitive understanding of
mental states. She postulates that communication verbs may be of particular
importance as they can provide children with ASD with concrete examples of people
saying things that do not match reality, and therefore the children can gain access to
differing points of view even without considering mental states. In this case, syntax in
particular should be important in predicting ToM performance, and this relationship
should be stronger in individuals with ASD than in language or age matched controls
without ASD. As yet, the studies demonstrating this relationship have either been
with fairly small samples (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994) or have only used one
language measure (Happé, 1995). The next chapter in this study therefore reports a
large study of FB understanding and language in children with ASD and MLD.
Receptive vocabulary and grammar measures were used, along with three FB tasks.
Summary
This chapter reviewed available research on the relationship between language
45
and ToM, and considered possible explanations of the relationship. From the
available evidence it seems unlikely that the relationship is due to task demands alone,
or that both develop separately and independently with the association being due to
some third factor (although joint attention is a possibility). Theory of mind as
measured by FB tasks cannot be necessary for language development, but earlier
elements of ToM such as M-representations can, as can precursors such as joint
attention. There is some evidence that indicates that language may be necessary for
the development of a ToM, although the mechanisms behind this relationship are still
debated. Language may be necessary as the route of access to the social world, to
discussions about mental states and emotions, or syntactic language may provide the
structure to enable the consideration of representations. Language may be particularly
important in ToM development in children with ASD, providing them with an
alternative route to some degree of social understanding. The following study
examines the relationship between FB performance, vocabulary and grammar, in an




STuDY 1:110w DO THEY PASS AND WHY DO THEY FAIL?
THEORY OF MIND AND LANGUAGE IN CHILDREN WITH ASD
AND CHILDREN WITH MLD
Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapters, the specificity and origins of ToM
deficits in autism have been much debated (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1989, 2000; Russell,
1 997a; Yirmiya et a!., 1998). This study aimed to test the specificity of a ToM deficit
in ASD by comparing a large sample of children with ASD with a sample of
participants of MLD of a similar verbal ability level. It also aimed to look more
closely at the relationship between language and ToM by including measures of both
vocabulary and grammar. An association between vocabulary and ToM does not
inform us as to the direction of the relationship, since, whilst some degree of
vocabulary may be necessary for the acquisition of a ToM, it is equally possible that
possessing a ToM allows the acquisition of further vocabulary. Learning words from
other people may require some understanding of their intentions and mental states, in
order to deduce what they are referring to and therefore what the words mean.
However, it is less likely that a ToM is required for the acquisition of grammatical
structures, except in an indirect way through vocabulary. Therefore a relationship
between grammar and ToM over and above that seen with vocabulary would suggest
a causal role for language in ToM development in ASD. By comparing and
contrasting the two groups, this study aimed to identify differences in the relationship
between language and ToM in ASD and MLD, the hypothesis being that language
(and particularly grammar) may play a more important role in ASD as it can provide
an alternative route to ToM understanding, bypassing the awareness of other minds
which non-autistic children (including those with MLD) have more intuitively (Tager-
Flusberg, 2000).
The three main predictions for this study, therefore, were as follows. Firstly,
children with ASD would be impaired on tasks of FB understanding when compared
to those with MLD. Secondly, that language and FB performance would be
particularly strongly related in ASD, and that grammar would predict FB performance
over and above vocabulary, indicating a possible causal relationship from language to
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ToM. Lastly, that FB performance in the MLD group would reflect task-specific
factors rather genuine difficulties in ToM, and that this would be reflected in a patchy
pattern of task success and failure. Several subsidiary questions arose from these
main predictions. These were: one, are the different FB tasks equally difficult? Two,
are there gender differences in FB performance? Three, is a certain level of language
necessary or sufficient for FB task success in ASD or MLD?
Method
The participants in this study were 181 children and adolescents, recruited
from schools for children with special educational needs in the greater London area.
All children for whom parental consent was obtained and who were at school during
the testing were included.
The autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) group contained 49 children who had a
primary diagnosis of autism or an autistic spectrum disorder and 5 children with a
diagnosis of Asperger's Syndrome. The remaining 9 (who were from a single school
and who were all being educated in classes for children with autistic spectrum
disorders) were described on their records as having social and communication
disorders. These children were assigned to the ASD group after completion of a
checklist of symptoms based on DSM-IV after discussion with their teachers.
The results are unchanged if these 9 children are excluded from the analysis.
There were therefore 63 children in total in the ASD group. The age of the children in
the ASD group ranged from 5 years 7 months to 16 years 2 months, with a mean of
10.74 years (s.d. = 2.35). There were 58 boys and 5 girls.
The remaining 118 children had non-autistic moderate learning difficulties and
made up the MLD group. They were all being educated in schools for children with
special educational needs, and were of mixed aetiologies. Children with fragile-X
syndrome, or any suggestion of an ASD were excluded from this group. The age of
the children in the MLD group ranged from 5 years 3 months to 14 years 5 months,
with a mean of 12.13 years (s.d. = 1.75). There were 76 boys and 42 girls.
Table 3.1 gives age, gender and language characteristics of the two groups.
Children whose scores fell below the lowest standardised or age equivalent score were
credited with a value one unit below the floor value. This problem only applied to the
BPVS standardised scores and the TROG VMA score. In the case of the BPVS std
score the assigned value was 39, and applied to 3 children in the ASD group and 3
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children in the MLD group. For the TROG VMA this value was 3.92 (i.e. 3 years 11
months). This applied to all children who passed fewer than 5 blocks, which was 13
children in the ASD group and 7 children in the MLD group. The large number of
children affected by this floor effect was a reason for creating a TROG age-adjusted
score that captured more of the variance in scores. All of the analyses were
performed with both the age equivalent scores and the age-adjusted scores.
Performance on the two language measures were significantly correlated (ASD VMA
r = .73 (p<.001), standardisedlage-adjusted r = .70 (p<.001) MLD VMA r = .62
(p<.00l), standardised/age-adjusted r = .56 (p<.00l)).
Table 3.1 Age, gender and language scores for the ASD and MLD groups;
mean (s.d.) range
ASD(n=63)	 MLD(n=118)
CA(years)	 10.74(2.35)	 12.13 (1.75)
5.58-1 6.17	 5.25-14.58
BPVS \'MA	 6.94 (3.26)	 7.58 (1.95)
3.58-1 6.67	 2.67-1 0.58




TROG age-adjusted	 88.37 (46.41)	 91.47 (28.65)
0-198.24	 13.80-159.47
Gender (boys/girls)	 58/5	 76/42
A one-way ANOVA showed no significant differences between the groups on any of
the language measures. F-values ranged from 0.195 —2.73, with all p-values above
.10. There was a significant difference in CA (F18.373, df179, p<.001).
Procedure
All the children were tested individually by the researcher in a quiet room in
their school. The testing session typically took 25 minutes. The tasks were presented
in the following order: First Language measure, First FB task, Second FB task,
Second Language measure. The order of both the language measures and the FB tasks
was counterbalanced.
Measures
British Picture Vocabulary Scale 2n edition (BPVS II). Receptive vocabulary was
assessed using the BPVS II (Dunn et al., 1999). In this test, children are shown four
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pictures and asked to point to the picture which best tells the meaning of a word. The
words become progressively harder. The test is discontinued when a child makes 8
errors in a group of 12. Raw scores were converted to a VMA and a verbal IQ score
(std).
Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG). Receptive grammar was assessed using the
TROG (Bishop, 1989). This task involves presenting the child with four pictures, and
asking them to indicate which picture goes with a sentence containing a grammatical
construct. Questions are arranged in blocks of 4, all of which test the same
grammatical construct, and a child is said to have failed the block if they fail a single
question. If the child fails 5 consecutive blocks the test is discontinued. Raw scores
(number of blocks) were converted to a age-equivalent, referred to as a VMA,
according to the manual. In addition, for comparison with the age-standardised score
on the BPVS, an age-adjusted score was calculated as follows. The number of blocks
passed was divided by the child's CA and this was then multiplied by 100. This gave
a score that varied between 0 and 198 with a mean of 90.39 (s.d. = 35.74). This is
referred to as TROG std.
False belief tasks.
Two different FB tasks were used, counterbalanced in order. One was an
illustrated version of the standard unexpected transfer task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983).
The script for the story is in Appendix I. The characters were a girl called Sally and a
boy called David. Children were asked a FB question, a justification question and
two control (memory and reality) questions. They were only credited with passing the
FB question if they also passed both controls.
The second test was a standard deceptive box task using a Smarties tube.
Children were asked both about another person's FB and about their own FB prior to
the tube being opened. (Pemer et al., 1987). The script for this task is shown in
Appendix I. Children were asked two FB questions, concerning other's false belief
and their own prior false belief, and a reality control question. They were only
credited with passing the FB questions if they also passed the control.




How many children passed each FB question?
Table 3.2 gives the number and percentage of participants who either passed, failed,
or failed the control question for each FB question. Two-tailed chi-square tests were
used to compare the number of participants in each group who passed each task
versus the number who failed. For the Sally-David task, the difference approached
but did not reach significance (%2=2.94, df = 1, p=.O9). For both Smarties questions
the difference was highly significant (Self x 2=20•75 df = 1, p<.001; Other %2=15.o2,
df= 1, p<.00l). Table 3.3 gives the performance on the 'Justification' question of the
Sally-David task. Participants could only pass this if they had already passed the
Sally-David FB question, and so only the results for those who passed that question
are given.
Table 3.2 Performance on the different FR tasks, split by group. Number
(percentage) ofparticipants who passed, failed or failed the control question.
Task	 ASD (n = 63)	 MLD (n = 118)
pass	 Fail	 failed	 pass	 fail	 failed
control	 control
question	 question
Sally-David	 25	 26	 12	 66	 38	 14
(unexpected transfer) (40%) (41%) (19%) 	 (56%) (32%) (12%)
Smarties other	 28	 29	 6	 90	 25	 3
(deceptive box) 	 (44%)
	
(46%)	 (10%)	 (76%)	 (2 1%)	 (3%)
Smarties self	 31	 26	 6	 99	 16	 3
(deceptive box)
	 (49%)	 (41%)	 (10%)	 (84%)	 (14%)	 (3%)
Table 3.3 Number (percentage) participants who passed the Sally-Davidjustification
question, having already passed the FB question.
Task	 ASD (n = 25)	 MLD (n = 66)
Pass	 incomplete! fail	 pass	 incomplete! fail
partial	 partial
S ally-David	 16	 3	 6	 46	 9	 10
justification	 (64 %)
	
(12%)	 (24%)	 (70%)	 (14%)	 (15%)
question
There was no difference between the groups (x 2 = 0.65, df =1, p = .72).
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Participants who failed control questions
Those who failed control questions were considered to have failed to grasp the
task, and therefore were not placed in either the 'pass' or 'fail' group as their ToM
had effectively not been assessed in that task. Some children failed the control
questions for only one task (8 in the ASD group, 17 in the MLD group), whilst others
failed both (5 in the ASD group only). This group of five children who failed all the
control questions had extremely low language ability (average BPVS VMA 3.10,
average TROG VMA below floor) and were excluded from any further analysis.
For those who failed only one control, their data was treated as missing for that task
only.
When these five children had been excluded, the comparisons on age and
language were repeated. Age was still significantly lower in the ASD group (ASD
mean = 10.74, MLD mean = 12.13; F(1,174) = 19.17, p<.001). The BPVS
standardised score was higher in the ASD group (ASD mean = 74.4, MLD mean =
69.8; F(1,174) = 3.89, p=.O5). There were no significant group differences in the
BPVS VMA score or either of the TROG measures. The difference in the BPVS
standardised score reflected the lower CA but comparable VMA (as measured by the
BPVS) of the ASD group.
Did the FB tasks vary in difficulty?
Performance on the various tasks varied greatly, particularly in the MLD
group, with over 85% passing the Smarties self question, but only 59% passing the
Sally-David task. In order to look at the relative difficulty of the tasks, the number
who performed inconsistently across the FB tasks were compared. If those
individuals who perform inconsistently consistently fail one task rather than another,
it would indicate that this task is harder overall for the group. Tables 3.4 and 3.5
gives the numbers of inconsistently performing participants who showed each pattern
of passing and failing.
McNemar's test showed that there was no systematic difference in task
difficulty for the ASD group (all p-values> .3 8), but that in the MLD group there was
a significant difference between the numbers passing Smarties self and other (p<.05),


















Table 3.4 Number of inconsistently performing participants with ASD who passed
a particular task whilstfailing another
ASD	 Passed





Table 3.5 Number of inconsistently performing participants with MLD who passed
a particular task whilstfailing another
MLD	 Passed




How is FB performance distributed?
Figure 3.1 illustrates the percentage of each group who passed 0, 1, 2 or 3 of
the FB questions in each group. Those who failed control questions were placed as
follows: if they passed all the other FB questions they were given (and on which they
passed controls), they were placed in the 3/3 group (this applied to 7 children in the
MLD group and no children in the ASD group); if they passed one out of the two
remaining FB questions they were placed in the 1/3 group (this applied to 4 children
in the ASD group and 2 children in the MLD group); the remaining children failed all
the tasks, even those they passed control questions on, and so they were placed in the
0/3 group.
Figure 3.1. Percentage of each group who passed 0, 1,2 or 3 FB question
ASD	 MLDGyj
Performance does not appear to be dichotomous in either group, that is, children did
not either pass or fail all the FB tasks. In the MLD group 65% of the group
performed consistently, with 54% passing all tasks, and 11 % failing all tasks. In the
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ASD group 48% of the group were consistent, with 22% failing and 26% passing all
the tasks. A large proportion of both groups, therefore, showed inconsistent
performance across the three FB tasks.
Characteristics of FB passers and failers
In order to ease comparison between the groups and with previous studies (e.g.
Happé, 1995) a pass/fail variable was created. Children were credited with passing
FB only if they passed all possible FB questions on which they had passed the control
questions. For the majority of children this meant that they had to pass 3 questions.
However, those children who failed a control question were scored as passing if they
passed all the FB tasks on which they passed the control - i.e. either one or two
questions. On this criterion, 15 of the ASD group (24%), and 65 (55%) of the MLD
group were credited with passing FB. This difference was highly significant
(x2=l6.29 df=1, p.001). If a less stringent criterion for 'passers' is adopted - i.e.
passing 2/3 questions rather than 3/3, then 24 (38%) of the ASD group and 93 (79%)
of the MLD group are 'passers'. This difference is also highly significant (2 = 29.79,
df = 1, p<.00l). Hereafter the more stringent criterion is used for passing all FB
questions. The group characteristics of these 'passers' and 'failers' are given in Table
3.7.
Inspection of Table 3.6 suggests that the passers and failers in the ASD group
differed on language ability more than did passers and failers in the MLD group: there
was a difference of over 4 years on BPVS and TROG VMA in the ASD group in
contrast to a difference of only about one year in the MLD group. A similar pattern
emerges on the standardised measures. A one-way ANOVA showed that in the ASD
group, passers and failers differed significantly on BPVS VMA (F (1,56) =36.51,
p<.00l), BPVS std (F (1,56) = 29.54, p<.001), TROG VMA (F (1,56) = 116.75,
p<.00l) and the TROG std (F (1,56) = 46.46, p<.00l). There was a trend towards a
difference on CA (F (1,56) = 2.97, p=.09).
In the MLD group, a one-way ANOVA showed significant differences
between the passers and failers in CA (F = 6.36, df=1,1 16, p<.OS), BPVS VMA
(F=l0.37, df=1,1 16, p<.Ol), TROG VMA (F=10.88, df=1,1 16, p<.Ol and TROG std
(F = 10.97, df= 1,116, p<.Ol). The groups did not differ on the BPVS std score (F =
1.54, df= 1,116 p=.22).
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Table 3.6 Group characteristics of FB 'passers' and 'failers' mean (s.d) range
ASD 'passers'	 ASD 'failers'	 MLD 'passers' MLD 'failers'
(n=15)	 (n=43)	 (n65)	 (n=53)
CA (years)	 11.64	 10.42	 12.49*	 11.72*
(1.44)	 (2.61)	 (1.27)	 (2.13)
9.08-13.42	 5.58-16.17	 7.25-14.58	 5.25-14.50
BPVSVMA	 10 . 63***	 6.10***	 8.09**	 6.97**
(3.50)	 (2.06)	 (1.64)	 (2.13)
4.92-16.67	 3.08-10.83	 3.08-11.08	 2.67-10.58
BPVSstd	 92.73***	 67.98***	 71.05	 68.34
(19.53)	 (13.44)	 (10.61)	 (13.05)
48-126	 39-91	 39-88	 39-89
TROGVMA 9 . 30***	 4.92***	 6.49**	 559**
(2.01)	 (1.04)	 (1.55)	 (1.52)
5.75-11.00	 3.92-9.00	 4.00-10.00	 3.92-10.00
TROGstd	 142.85***	 78.02***	 99Ø4**	 82.18**
(24.76)	 (33.72)	 (22.14)	 (32.92)
100.00-198.24	 11.55-146.88	 41.15-142.22	 13.79-159.47
Significant differences between passers and failers within each diagnostic group are marked as follows:
p<.001, p<.Ol, p<.O5
In order to get some idea of the magnitude of the differences, effect sizes (d)
were calculated for both groups. In the ASD group effect size 'd' for differences
between passers and failers ranged from 1.50 - 2.87 (with the TROG having higher
effect sizes to the BPVS) indicating very large effect sizes (Cohen, 1969, suggests
that 0.8 should be considered large). In the MLD group d ranges from 0.23-0.59,
indicating low to moderate effects.
Are there gender effects on FB performance?
There has been some suggestion (e.g. Bosacki & Astington, 1999; Charman,
Ruffman, & Clements, 2002) that girls may out-perform boys on ToM and verbal
ability measures. The ASD group had only 5 girls in it, and thus numbers were too
small to compare genders statistically, although the means suggested that the girls had
a slightly superior BPVS 1/MA (8.57, versus 7.15 years for boys). On the TROG
VMA the groups were very similar (girls mean = 6.30 years, boys mean = 6.03 years),
as they were on the age-adjusted scores (BPVS std girls mean = 77, boys mean 74;
TROG std girls mean = 97, boys mean = 95). As far as FB performance goes, 2
(40%) of the girls with ASD and 13 (25%) of the boys were FB'passers'.
The MLD group had 42 girls and 76 boys. A one-way ANOVA showed that
the two groups differed significantly on the language measures, with boys
outperforming girls on the BPVS standardised (p<.01) and VMA (p<.05), and the
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TROG age-adjusted score (p<z.05). The difference on the TROG VMA did not reach
significance (p=. 11). A x2 analysis found no difference in number of boys and girls
who passed FB. A forced entry logistic regression was done to test the effects of
gender on FB performance in the MLD group, this showed that gender was not a
significant predictor alone, nor was it an additional predictor once language was
entered into the analysis.
Language and FB
Table 3.7 shows the correlations between FB total score (numbers of questions
correct, 0-3) and age and language characteristics in each participant group. When
BPVS and TROG VMA were partialled out of the age x FB correlation this was no
longer significant: ASD (r =.20 p=.l3), MLD (r= .06, p=.53). By contrast, FB x
language correlations all remained highly significant when CA was controlled for.
Logistic regression analyses were performed to look for predictors of FB
performance in the two groups. The two groups were examined separately because
there is much prior evidence indicating that the relationship between language and FB
is different in those with ASD and those with MLD. Of primary interest was whether
the grammar measure (the TROG) predicted performance on FB over and above
vocabulary (BPVS) and age. Therefore a forced-entry logistic regression was
performed, with age and BPVS entered first, followed by TROG. In the ASD group
in the first block age was entered with a non-significant improvement (x 2 = 2.92,
df=1, p=:.09) In Block 2 BPVS VMA was then added with an improvement (x2 =
22.17 df=l, p'<.00l), and was found to be a significant predictor (13 = 0.69, df=l,
p<.001). In the final block TROG VMA was added with an improvement (x2 = 17.58,
df=1, p<z.001). In Block 3 TROG VMA alone was a significant predictor (13 = 1.27,
df=1, p= .0l). This final model using BPVS VMA and TROG VMA predicted 89,7%
of cases (i.e. whether they passed or failed) correctly.
If the standardised scores are used the pattern is similar, except that CA is a
significant predictor and remains so throughout, so that in the final model both the
TROG (13 = 0.10, df=1, p=.Ol) and CA (13 = 0.72, df=l, p<.O5) are significant
predictors. This difference was expected since the TROG VMA and BPVS VMA are
highly correlated with age. This final model predicted 91.4% of cases (pass/fail)
correctly.
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Table 3.7 Correlations between FB, age and language for the ASD and MLD
groups
ASD (n=58)	 MLD (n=118)
FBxCA	 .46**	 33**
FB x BPVS VMA	 .67**	 5Ø**




In the MLD group the same analysis was run. In Block 1, CA was added with
significant improvement (x2 = 5.98, df=l, p<.O5). In Block 2, BPVS VMA was added
with an improvement (x2 = 4.42, df=l, p<.O5). In the final block (when the TROG
VMA was added) there was no significant improvement in the model (x2 = 1.59,
df=1, p= .21). None of the 3 predictors were uniquely significant in this model (all p-
values were greater than .22). In Block 2, the BPVS VMA alone was a significant
predictor (13 = 0.25, df = 1, p<.OS). This model using BPVS VMA only predicted
65% of cases correctly.
With the standardised scores the pattern is somewhat different in the MLD
group. Adding in the BPVS std at Block 2 makes a non-significant difference (x2 =
3.14 df=1, p=.O8), and adding the TROG std at Block 3 makes a significant
difference (x2 = 4.76 df=1, p<.OS). In Block 2 only CA is a significant predictor, and
in Block 3 both CA and the TROG std are significant predictors. This difference may
be due to the increased variance in the TROG std as compared to the TROG VMA
(which shows a floor effect) and the reduced variance in the BPVS std (which also
has a floor effect) as compared to the BPVS VMA. The best model in this regression
(i.e. that in Block 3) predicted 62.7% of cases correctly, in contrast to the same
analysis in the ASD group, which predicted 91.4% of cases correctly.
To examine the relationship between the two language measures and FB
performance at a more individual level, scatter plots were inspected, showing TROG
VMA against age, with markers set by whether the participant passed or failed FB.
Figure 3.2 shows these plots. The VMA variables were chosen for this analysis




Inspection of figures 3.2 and 3.3 suggest that passers and failers in the ASD
group were more easily distinguished by the TROG VMA than were passers and
failers in the MLD group. In the ASD group no participant with a TROG VMA of
less that 5.75 years (38 individuals) passed FB, whilst all those with a TROG VMA
equal to or above 10 years (10 individuals) passed. A dividing line at a VMA of 6
years would divide passers and failers with the exception of four children. In the case
of CA, no child younger than 9.08 years passed FB (14 individuals), but there is no
upper threshold - the oldest participant in the study failed at the age of 16.17 years.
In the MLD group the relationship is far less clear. Individuals with TROG
VMA scores of 4 years passed PB, and 20 individuals with scores less than 5.75
passed (the threshold in the ASD group). At the other end of the ability range there is
no more clarity: one participant with a TROG VMA of 10.00 still fails FB. All
children (3 individuals) with a CA of less than 7.25 years failed.
Figure 3.3 gives the equivalent graphs for the BPVS YMA. From figure 3.3 it
can be seen that the BPVS distinguishes between passers and failers less well than the
TROG, but it still divides the groups more clearly in the ASD group than in the MLD
group.
In the ASD group all participants with a BPVS VMA of less that 4.92 fail (13
individuals). A single child passes with a BPVS VMA of 4.92, but no one else passes
with a score of less than 6.67. All children with scores higher than 10 years 11
months pass (7 individuals).
In the MLD group again the pattern is less clear. One participant passes PB
with a BPVS VMA of only 3.08 years. No children in the group had a BPVS VMA
of more than 10.58, but one child with this VMA still failed PB.
Discussion
This study aimed to investigate a number of questions. The three main
predictions were that children with ASD would be impaired on FB as compared to
children with MLD, that language (specially grammar) and FB would be particularly
strongly related in ASD, and that task-specific factors would be important in
determining performance on FB tasks in children with MLD.
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False belief performance in ASD and MLD
The prediction that children with ASD would perform less well on FB tasks
than non-autistic children matched on VMA was confirmed, with 74% of the ASD
group failing at least one FB task, whilst only 45% of the MLD group did.
The specificity of the ASD deficit in ToM is a topic of some debate, and some
authors have argued that a deficit in FB performance can be seen in other groups with
learning difficulties. (Yirmiya et a!., 1998; Zelazo et al., 1996). This study found
some support for that view. Since we did not have a control group of TD children, it
is not possible to contrast our non-autistic group with normal development. However,
it is striking that 45% of the MLD group failed at least one FB question, even though
the majority of them had VMA scores of over 4 years (only 10 children in the group
had either a TROG or BPVS VMA of less than 4 years), the age at which a TD child
would be expected to pass. Even if we exclude all children with either a TROG or
BPVS VMA of 5 years or less, (taking 5 as a conservative estimate of when a TD
child would be expected to pass a FB test) 39% of the remaining MLD group (32
individuals) still failed. There are a number of possible explanations for their poor
performance.
A first option is that many children with MLD do have genuine difficulties in
ToM. Against this is that they do not appear to have the social and communication
difficulties associated with this in ASD (although this has not been widely studied in
individuals with MLD). Frith, Happé and Siddons (1994) found that in children with
MLD FB performance did not relate to teacher ratings of real life social adaptation,
implying that FB tasks may not be a good measure of true social cognitive ability in
this group. This study will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 8 and 9. Chapter
9 of this thesis will also investigate the relationship between FB task performance and
real life behaviour in children with MLD and ASD. It is possible that these children
are similar to TD 3-year-olds who fail FB tests despite demonstrating relatively
competent social understanding through speech and behaviour (Bartsch & Weliman,
1995). However, those with MLD are obviously not equivalent to TD 3-year-olds in
that they have language levels (and, presumably, general developmental levels) far
above that of the average 3-year-old. It has been suggested that TD 3-year-olds may
fail FB tasks due to executive difficulties (e.g. Roth & Leslie, 1998), and these could
also be a source of problems for some of this group of children with MLD. More
specifically, candidates for executive limitations of FB performance could include
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inhibitory control or flexibility. This will be discussed in greater detail in chapters 4
and 5.
If some of the MLD group were failing these tasks because of task-specific
demands rather than due to genuine ToM difficulties, we might expect some tasks to
be notably easier than others. In contrast, if the ASD group was failing due to ToM
problems, the task demands should be less significant and a similar percentage of the
group should be failing each task. We therefore examined performance across tasks
next.
Variation in performance across FB tasks
Three different FB questions were included in this study (one memory of own
FB, two prediction of other's FB), from two different tasks (Smarties and Sally-
David). The two tasks included in this study varied in their task demands, with the
Sally-David task having a more complicated narrative and being about fictional
characters, as opposed to the Smarties task, which was simpler and about real people.
There was a much greater variation in performance across FB tasks in the MLD
group. Individually, the MLD group outperformed the ASD group on 2/3 of the
questions. On the third question, (which was the Sally-David FB prediction task)
performance was not significantly different. This was due to the MLD group
performing particularly poorly on this task (as compared to the other FB tasks), rather
than to the ASD group performing well. Amongst those in the MLD group who
performed inconsistently across the three questions, the tasks clearly formed a
hierarchy of difficulty, with 'memory for own FB' being easiest, the 'prediction of
other's FB' in the Smarties task next, and the Sally-David FB prediction being
hardest. In the ASD group there was no such hierarchy - if a child failed one task,
they were as likely to fail the Sally-David task as they were to fail either part of the
Smarties task. This pattern of performance perhaps suggests that task success in those
in the ASD group who performed inconsistently was due to chance factors.
The relative difficulty of the Sally-David task for the MLD group could be for
a number of reasons. This task was presented in an illustrated format in contrast to
the Smarties task, which was about a real object. In addition, the Sally-David task
was about fictional characters rather than real people (in the Smarties prediction task
the children were asked 'If your friend (name) came in, what would he/she think was
in the tube?'), and had no element of deception, whilst the set up of the Smarties task
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made it more likely to appear like a trick, although deception was not explicitly
referred to at any point. Deception is known to be a feature which makes FB tasks
easier for young ID children (Weilman, Cross Ct aL, 2001).
The difference in the MLD group between the 'memory for own FB' and
'prediction of other's FB' questions in the Smarties task is particularly interesting as
the task demands (e.g. EF) appear to be otherwise identical in this case. The 'own
FB' question was always asked second, after the control question, but it might be
expected that this would make it harder, as the child has just been asked again what is
really in the tube and therefore that information has become more salient. It may be
that in children with MLD there is a developmental progression in FB performance,
with reflecting on one's own FB being easier that predicting another person's. It is
also interesting that the ASD group showed no such progression, in their case the
three tasks were equally difficult. This may indicate that children with ASD have a
general difficulty in ToM that over-rides other task factors, whilst in children with
MLD their problems in FB tasks are in many cases due to task-specific factors (e.g.
executive or language demands of particular tasks). It is particularly striking how
hard the MLD group found the Sally-David task in contrast to the Smarties 'other'
task (56% passed Sally-David as opposed to 76% passing Smarties 'other') -
questions which might have been assumed to be equivalent in their ToM demands.
This finding is unexpected, as other studies of this type (e.g. Grant, Grayson, &
Boucher, 2001) have found that performance across tasks such as these is largely
consistent in children with ASD (77% of the group either passed or failed all tasks in
the Grant et al study). However, Grant et al's findings are in line with ours in that
they found a lack of agreement between performance on a 'Sally-Anne' type task and
a deceptive box type task, similar to the 'Smarties other' task used in this study. This
was in fact the only comparison in the Grant et al study that did not meet their
criterion for acceptable agreement (they had a 'three boxes' task and a second
deceptive box task in which the child was asked what a toy hippo would think was in
the box rather than what another child would think) indicating that these two tasks
may be particularly different in the demands they make on children.
Gender differences
Some recent studies have suggested that girls may show slightly superior
performance on social cognitive tests as compared to boys (Bosacki, 2000; Charman
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et al., 2002). In order to look at this issue in children with MLD and ASD, we
compared scores on the FB tasks. Gender comparisons were only possible in the
MLD group, as there were only 5 girls in the ASD group. The boys in this sample
were more verbally able than the girls, an unexpected result, probably due to having
drawn our sample from special schools, which have a higher proportion of boys
generally and probably represent a wider range of ability in boys as compared to girls.
This may be because boys are more likely to demonstrate disruptive behaviour than
girls, and therefore low ability girls are less likely to cause problems in a mainstream
classroom and to be sent to a special school. However, there was no gender
difference in FB perfonnance and gender did not predict performance on FB in this
sample.
Language and FB
The second major area of interest in this study was the relationship between
language and FB performance in ASD and MLD. Happé (1995) found that
performance on the BPVS predicted performance on FB tasks in children with ASD,
but not in children with MLD. In contrast, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1994) found
in a much smaller sample (21 children with ASD with FB data as opposed to 70 in the
Happé study) that performance on the American equivalent of the BPVS (the PPVT)
did not correlate with FB performance, whilst performance on a grammatical test did
in both ASD and non-autism groups. Their sample was unusual in that 90% of the
ASD group passed at least three out of four FB questions. In the present study, FB
performance correlated significantly with both BPVS and TROG in both groups.
How to standardise raw scores from measures such as the BPVS and TROG
has long been problematic in samples of this nature. Most studies with children use
VMA scores, which equate a child's performance with a developmental level. An
alternative is to use age standardised scores, which give a measure of ability relative
to children of the same age, and which should remain relatively stable over time.
Therefore, a child of 5 who achieves a certain raw score on a task such as the BPVS
may achieve a standardised score of 100, whilst a 10-year-old who achieves the same
raw score would have a standardised score of 50. However, they would both be given
the same VMA of 5 years. This can be problematic in that it assumes that a 5-year-
old of average ability and a 10-year-old of subnormal ability are developmentally
equivalent All analyses in this study were done using both types of scoring,
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however, the VMA is the most conventional for groups of children such as the ones in
this sample and therefore is the one on which most of this discussion is based, and
which is used through most of the rest of this thesis.
A hypothesis for this study, following Happé (1995), was that receptive
vocabulary would predict FB performance in children with ASD, but that receptive
grammar would also be a significant predictor over and above vocabulary. The
prediction, following a range of studies (e.g. Capps, Kehres, & Sigman, 1998; Tager-
Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995) was that the relationship between language and ToM
would be stronger in children with ASD than in those with MLD.
This hypothesis was supported by the data. Vocabulary was a significant
predictor of FB performance in children with ASD. However, grammar was the best
predictor, and when it was entered into a forced-entry logistic regression the effects of
vocabulary became non-significant. In contrast, in the MLD group the pattern was far
less clear - logistic regression models including age, vocabulary and grammar did not
fit particularly well, the best models predicting only 65% of cases correctly (in
contrast to 92% of passers and failers in the ASD group). There was also no clear
indication of whether grammar or vocabulary was most important - when the
regression was done using age equivalents, vocabulary was the best predictor, whilst
when it was done using age-standardised scores grammar was. When the relationship
was investigated further, it appeared that in the ASD group there was a clear threshold
effect for both the TROG and the BPVS VMA. Again, the relationship seen in the
MLD group was far less predictable. Individuals passed and failed at every level of
TROG and BPVS VMA.
Happé's (1995) study with 70 participants with ASD found that there was a
BPVS VMA lower threshold of 5.5 years, and an upper threshold of 11.58 as regards
passing FB tasks. The findings from this study are about 6-8 months lower in both
cases (although that lower threshold is reliant on only one child).
Happé found no correlation between BPVS performance and FB in children
with MLD. The present study did not replicate this result, finding highly significant
correlations between BPVS and FB. This difference is not simply due to a larger
sample size, as the magnitude of the correlation is greater, not just the significance
level. However, it is true that no clear relationship between either vocabulary or
grammar and FB performance was found in the MLD group - although there were
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significant positive correlations between the language measures and FB, logistic
regression models did not predict more than 65% of cases correctly.
The findings from this study support claims by Happé (1995) and Tager-
Flusberg and Sullivan (1994) that language may be particularly important in the
development of FB understanding in individuals with ASD. The strong associations
between the language means and FB within the ASD group cannot be due to linguistic
demands of the FB tasks - TD children pass these tests by the age of 4, yet a child
with ASD appears to need a level of grammar nearly 2 years above that to have even a
chance of passing. The existence of a third factor influencing both language and FB
is a possibility, although the most plausible candidates - such as joint attention - are
so closely linked to ToM that to separate their influences seems impossible. It
appears that the relationship between language and ToM is likely to be a genuine one,
and it is interesting to consider what might be its cause. A relationship between
vocabulaiy and FB understanding tells us little about the causal direction of the
relationship. It is possible that a good vocabulary allows children to develop an
understanding of FB, or alternatively it is possible that a child cannot achieve a good
vocabulary without some understanding of mind or mentalising ability (Bloom, 2000;
Happé, 1995). A deficit in ToM and its precursors (such as joint attention) could
prevent vocabulary gains. However, although it may be necessary to have a certain
level of grammatical knowledge to acquire an understanding of FB, it is less easy to
see how a deficit in ToM would prevent grammatical gains except by delaying
general language acquisition, in which case vocabulary and grammar should be
equally affected. The special association between grammar and FB performance
found here, and elsewhere (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994), therefore indicates that
some elements of language may be necessary for FB success in children with ASD,
rather than vice versa. The two options are not exclusive however, as early forms of
social understanding may be necessary for early language gains, which are then
themselves necessary for ToM development.
This begs the question of how language might be influencing ToM
development in ASD. Children who pass ToM tasks still demonstrate the
characteristic social impairments associated with ASD, their ability to pass FB tasks
does not mean that their social difficulties are solved, although there is evidence that
some of those who pass FB tasks show more socially insightful behaviour such as
taking hints, lying and cheating (Frith et al., 1994). It therefore seems likely that
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some, at least, of these children have not simply learnt to pass FB tasks, but do
actually have a better understanding of minds than do most children with ASD, albeit
not a good enough understanding to completely overcome their social and
communication difficulties. Their performance will be investigated further in studies
4 and 5 (chapters 8 and 9).
How might language influence ToM development in ASD? It is possible that
language skills give children with ASD access to social experiences and interactions
that enable them to develop a basic ToM. However, this leaves unanswered the
question of why children with ASD should need better language skills that TD
children to access these experiences. Alternatively, language itself may provide a
structure for developing representational understanding. Happé (1995) and Tager-
Flusberg (2000) suggest that children with ASD may use cognitive strategies to solve
FB tasks in a way that is not necessary for TD children (or presumably children with
MLD), and that language may provide the structure for this logical reasoning.
As the TROG does not contain any mental state or communication verbs our
data does not directly test Tager-Flusberg's theory that the complement structures of
communication verbs are particularly important for children with ASD. However, we
did find that children with ASD required levels of language up to two years higher
than TD children to have a chance of passing FB tasks, and that language appears to
be more strongly related to ToM in ASD than in MLD. The role of alternative
strategies in passing ToM tasks in ASD will be further examined in chapter 8.
Summajy
This study found that children with ASD were more likely than those with
MLD to fail FB tasks. However, a significant proportion of children with MLD also
failed these tasks. The performance of those with MLD appeared to be more affected
by task demands, and there was evidence that they found it easier to remember their
own FB than to predict another person's. Language, especially grammar, was
strongly related to FB performance in ASD. These findings provide support for the
theory that language is necessary for ToM development, particularly in ASD, where it
may provide an alternative neuro-cognitive route to representational thought. In those
with MLD, there was evidence that they may be failing FB tasks for reasons other
than a lack of a ToM. Possible sources of difficulty are executive problems, and these
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ExEcuTivE FUNCTION AND
THEORY OF MIND
Chapters 2 and 3 have discussed the relationship between language and ToM
in children with ASD and MLD. Another factor that has been linked to ToM
performance is executive functioning (EF). This chapter will review the evidence for
a relationship between ToM and EF in normal development and in those with
developmental disorders, and chapters 5 and 7 will investigate the relationship in
children with ASD and MLD experimentally.
Much recent work has focused on the relationship observed between
performance on tasks of EF and ToM. Several studies have demonstrated links
between these tasks, both in young TD children, and in children with developmental
disorders. The concept of a 'theory of mind' has been discussed in depth in chapter
1. The processes included under the umbrella term of 'executive function' will briefly
be described here, before discussing possible relationships between these two
competencies.
Executive function, as defined for example by Pemer (2000), is a term for
processes responsible for higher level action control, in particular those that are
necessary for maintaining a mentally specified goal and for implementing that goal in
the face of distracting alternatives. Executive functions enable an individual to carry
out novel actions and to act on their knowledge and understanding of a situation.
Deficits in executive functioning may therefore lead to widespread difficulties, both in
real life and on experimental tasks, and may be responsible for poor performance on
tasks where participants understand the concepts involved, but do not have the
necessary level of self-control to demonstrate their competence.
Processes subsumed under the term executive function include inhibition, set
shifting, planning, coordination and control of action sequences. Tasks tapping set
shifting include the Wisconsin Card Sort Task (WCST:Heaton, 1981), and the
Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS: Frye et al., 1995), both of which require the
participant to sort cards by a variety of rules. Examples of planning tasks are the
Tower of Hanoi and Tower of London, in which the child must copy an arrangement
of disks or balls in a restricted number of moves, with certain rules restricting their
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movements. Inhibition tasks include the Go-NoGo task (Drewe, 1975), in which
children must respond to a certain stimulus (e.g. a plane) whilst inhibiting their
response to another (e.g. a bomb). Tasks of working memory include the Backwards
Digit Span, where the participant must repeat a lengthening series of digits
backwards. Many EF tasks (and particularly those which relate to performance on FB
tasks) require suppression of a prepotent or habitual response in favour of a new
response (e.g. WCST, Go-NoGo), and failure of EF in these tasks is therefore
manifested as perseveration of the old response.
A growing number of studies have demonstrated a relationship between EF
and ToM both in young TD children, and in those with developmental disorders.
Several theoretical explanations for this relationship have been suggested. In this
chapter the evidence for a relationship between EF and ToM will be summarised, both
in TD children and in those with developmental disorders, and the theories will be
discussed in light of the available evidence.
EF and ToM in young typically developing children.
It is well established that children pass tests of FB understanding (and thus are
often credited with the possession of a 'theory of mind') at around the age of 4 years
(see chapter 1). Their understanding of mind appears to start to develop much
earlier, however. By the age of eighteen months children appear to have an
understanding of goal-directed action and some understanding of intention (Meltzoff,
1995) and understanding that different people may have different preferences
(Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). From the age of 2 years children begin to demonstrate
their understanding of perspective taking through speech. Bartsch and Wellman
(1995) reported older 2-years-olds explicitly contrasting different people's thoughts
and feelings. However, the explicit understanding of mistaken beliefs (and therefore
the ability to lie and deceive) does not appear to emerge until the age of around 4
(Weliman, Cross et al., 2001). At around the age of 4, children begin to show a clear
understanding of mistaken belief as shown in a number of different tasks.
At around the same age (4 years) as the majority of children pass FB tasks,
young children improve substantially on EF tasks requiring the inhibition of a
prepotent response (e.g. an habitual rule) in favour of a new response (Russell,
Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991). An example of the type of task which 3-year-
olds find difficult is a simplified version (Hughes, 1998a) of Luria's hand game
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(Lw-ia, Pribram, & Homskaya, 1964), in which children are first asked to copy the
experimenter's hand actions (e.g. a fist or a pointed finger), and then to do the
opposite action to the experimenter. They thus have to inhibit the rehearsed tendency
to copy the action. Three-year-olds also perform badly on a range of other tasks which
share this need to inhibit a prepotent tendency, including the DCCS (Frye et al., 1995)
and a highly simplified version of the WCST (Hughes, 1998a). In both of these tasks,
the child must suppress a tendency to sort the cards by a previous rule, and instead
sort by a new rule. Another task which improves at around the age of 4 years is the
backwards digit span (Davis & Pratt, 1995), in which children must repeat a list of
numbers in reverse order, thus inhibiting the natural tendency to repeat the numbers as
heard.
This improvement in executive functioning at the age of around four has been
shown to be correlated with ToM development, even when chronological and mental
age are partialled out (e.g. Carison & Moses, 2001; Hughes, 1998a). Table 4.1
summarises those studies with young normal children using tests of EF and ToM. For
ease of comparison the correlations given are mostly averages of the more specific
relationships between tasks cited in the studies. Separate correlations are given when
they are particularly informative.
Table 4.1. Mean correlations from studies looking at the relationship between ToM
and EF tasks in TD children
uthors	 ge of children foM tasks	 F tasks	 roMxEF (age
_______________ ______________ ________________ _______________ )artialled out)
usse11 (1991)	 :0-4:10 (n=33)	 B UT prediction	 Vindows task	 ).89 (0.70)
)avis & Pratt	 :3-5:4 (n=54)	 B DB self and	 3ackwards digit	 ).46
1995)	 )ther, false photo	 pan
_______________ ______________ ask. 	 _______________ _______________
rye (1995)	 :1 - 5:5 (n=60)	 -R, FB DB self and )CCS card sort,	 ).38 (0.16)
xperiment I	 )ther	 thysical causality
_______________ ______________ ________________ ask. 	 _______________
xperiment 2
	
:8-5:4 (n=40)	 -R, FB DB self and )CCS card sort 	 ).50 (0.37)
___________________ __________________ )ther 	 ___________________ ___________________
ixperiment 3
	
:9-6:1 (n=60)	 -R, FB DB self and ard sorting task in ).33 (0.25)
________________ _______________ )ther 	 I version	 ________________
ordon & Olsen	 :0-6:4 (n=72)	 -R, FB DB self and ounting and	 ).56 (0.46)
1998)	 )ther	 abelling task,
inger tapping and
_______________ ______________ _______________ abelling task. 	 _______________
{ughes (1998a)	 :3-4:7 (n=45)	 B UT prediction,	 EF test battery	 ).49 (0.30)
B UT explanation, e.g. hand game and
_______________ _______________ leception	 ard sorting)	 _______________
Tughes (l998b)	 fime 1 3:3-4:7	 B UT prediction,	 EF test battery	 ).27
n-45)	 'B UT explanation e.g. hand game and
:ard sort)
_____________ rime24:2-5:8	 dorderFB	 As above	 ).34
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uthors	 ge of children L'oM tasks	 F tasks	 [oMxEF (age
_________________ )artialled out)
{ughes, Dunn &
	 3:6-4:6 (n=40)	 10 FB tasks,	 i EF test battery	 ).31 (.19)a
White (1998)	 •ncludmg UT, DB •ncluding IC, WM,
md deception	 danning and
_________________ ttention. 	 ________________
toth & Leslie	 3:0-5:0 (n=57)	 B UT prediction	 C: Screen task	 ).38
1998)	 ________________ _________________ ________________ ________________
erner (1998)	 3:0-5:11 (n=57)
	
B UT prediction	 )CCS card sort 	 ).59 (0.48)
ole(2000)	 3:2-5:1 (n=121)	 B DB self and	 EF test battery	 ).38(DCCS only)
xperiment1
	 ______________ )ther, A-R	 including DCCS) _______________




_________________ ________________ B UT prediction, ________________ _________________
arlson (2001)	 3:3-4:11 (n=107)	 -R, FB DB self and 10 EF test battery ).66 (0.34)
)ther, FB UT	 including DCCS)
,rediction, deceptive
_______________ _______________ )olntlng, 	 _______________ _______________
larman, Carroll & 8:1 - 10:10 (n=22) roM stories	 'oH (planning) and lanning: 0.29
Jturge (2001)	 o-NoGo (IC)	 0.32)a
_________________ ________________ __________________ _________________ C: 0.43 (0.38)a
arlson, Moses & 4:4-5:6	 -R, FB DB self and 5 EF test battery 	 C:0.41 (0.18)a
h-eton (2002)




	 4:1 - 6:2 (n=56)	 'B UT explanation, )CCS	 B Prediction 0.65
1oo (2002)	 B UT prediction	 0.40)a
xperiment 1	 ?B Explanation
_________________ ________________ __________________ _________________ ).61 (0.38)°
emer, Lang &
	
:9-5:8 (n=73)	 B UT explanation )CCS	 )CCS: 0.50 (0.28)a
1oo (2002)	 'B UT prediction	 [C: Go-NoGo	 C:0.24 (.00)a
xperiment2	 ______________ _______________ _______________ _______________
emer, Kain &





___________ ___________ ____________ [C tasks. 	 ___________
correlation with age and IQ partialled out Abbreviations: AR = Appearance-Reality task. F13 = False
belief, UT = unexpected transfer task, DB = Deceptive box task, DCCS = Dimensional-change card
sorting. IC = inhibitory control. WM = working memory. ToM stories = Happé's Strange Stories
(Happé, 1994). ToH = Tower of Hanoi
Pemer and Lang's (1999) useful meta-analysis of nine recent studies with TD
children aged between 2:8 and 6:4 found a strong overall effect size for the
relationship between EF and ToM. The general pattern seen from this table is one of
a strong positive correlation between performance on FB tasks and on EF tasks, even
when the EF tasks are treated as a single entity. This is particularly clear with tasks
that require the inhibition of a prepotent response - both in tests of attentional
flexibility such as the DCCS, and tests of inhibitory control such as the Windows task
and Luria's Hand Game. Carlson et al. (2002) found a specific relationship between
FB and inhibitory control requiring the child to chose between two conflicting
responses, as opposed to the inhibition involved in delaying gratification. There are
also a number of studies showing a relationship between working memory and
71
performance on FB tasks. A possible explanation for this may be because of working
memory demands of keeping one perspective in mind whilst considering another
perspective.
EF and ToM in children with developmental disorders.
As discussed in chapter 1, there is extensive evidence indicating the
existence of a ToM impairment in children with ASD. There is also evidence for
deficits in EF in this group (see Sergeant et al., 2002 for a recent review). However,
whether these deficits are specific to ASD is not clear. Executive function deficits
are seen in a range of developmental disorders, for example Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) (Grodzinsky & Barkley, 1999), Tourette's Syndrome
(Harris, Schuerholz, Singer, Reader, & et al., 1995) and conduct disorder (Morgan &
Lilienfeld, 2000). It is not yet clear what distinguishes the EF problems in ASD from
those seen in other groups. Hughes (2001) suggests that they may characteristically
involve high-level and non-spatial problems of inhibition, whilst Ozonoff (1999)
points to difficulties in flexibility and set shifting. Table 4.2 summarises the findings
of studies of EF and ToM in individuals with developmental disorders.
Table 4.2. Studies looking at the relationship between ToM and EF tasks in those
with developmental disorders.
uthors	 articipants	 l'oM tasks	 EF tasks	 F x ToM
)zonoff (1991)	 3 ASD	 foM battery of 5 Fower of Hanoi,	 SD
A: 8:1 - 20:11	 S tems, including A- WCST	 1orderFB=0.64
0 controls with	 L FB DB (other),	 "'order FB0.50
lyslexia, ADHD,	 lnd order FB	 Ton-autistic
vILD.	 1order FB=0.13
______________ A=8:7-19:6	 ______________ ______________ ndorderFB=039
aron-Cohen and 1 ASD
	
B UT and DB	 ntention editing: 	 .SD: poor ToM, but
tobertson (1995)	 A = 13:6,	 other), Deception 'es and No game, ood intention
1 GTS CA=1 3:1 1	 uria Hand Game, diting.
o-morbid ASD and	 )ay-Night Stroop 3TS:good ToM,
ITS CA = 13:5	 luency: FAS test oor intention
diting.
SD and GTS: poor
['oM and intention
diting. All poor on
__________________ __________________ __________________ __________________ luency test.
elazo (1996)	 12 Down Syndrome 'B DB (other and )CCS 	 orrelations with
A =16:0 - 30:9	 elf), A-R, pretend	 both groups
12 TD preschoolers eality.	 ombined
______________ A=5:2-6:8	 ______________ ______________ =0.59 (0.51)a
rager-Flmberg	 10 Praeder-WilIi	 'B UT prediction lexibility: Day- 	 Ton-significant
:1997)	 yndrome,	 iight Stroop,	 elationship between
= 5:6 - 8:8 14	 rapping task	 assing and failing
William's Syndrome	 cross both groups.
______________ A=5:5-8:11
	 ______________ ______________ _______________
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uthors	 Participants	 loM tasks	 F tasks	 iF x ToM
-lughes, Dwm and 0 'Hard-to-	 10 FB tasks,	 EF test battery	 .32 (0.35)'
White (1998)	 nanage'	 ncluding UT, DB nc1udmg IC, WM,
reschoolers	 nd deception	 ,lanning and
_______________ CA = 3:6-4:6	 _______________ LttefltiOn. 	 _______________
toth and Leslie	 1 ASD	 B UT prediction C: Screen task 	 o relationship
1998)	 A=6:0-19:l	 _____________ ____________ r=0)
3arner (1999)	 Fragile-X	 B DB self and	 vlodified WCST	 ot reported,
= 10:3 - 14:2	 ther, FB UT	 Leficits in both
MLD	 rediction, 2m order	 ;roups.
_____________ A= 12:4-14:9 Btask. 	 ____________ _____________
harman, Carroll l2 Boys with	 EoM stories	 rower of Hanoi	 1anning: 0.07
nd Sturge (2001) .DFID	 planning) and Go- 006)1)
_______________ A= 6:7-10:6
	 _______________ 'oGo (IC)	 IC: .06 (•18)b
erner, Kain and	 4 preschoolers at 	 order FB	 EF battery of tasks .14 (0. 16)a
3archfeld (2002) 	 isk of ADFTD	 ncluding IC,
A=4:7-6:6	 lanningand
_______________ ________________ _______________ Lttentional tasks 	 ________________
elazo, Burack and 10 medium	 B UT prediction F battery of tasks .ower-functiornng
?rye (2002)	 'unctiornng	 ixplicit FB	 'equiring rule—use = -0.40
= 9:3 - 27:1 12	 nc1uding DCCS	 4edium-functioning
ower functioning	 ;roup r = 0.82
2A=7:7- 16:2
ndividuals with
___________ SD	 ___________ ___________ ___________
a__i_ L.:1:
	 ___.:iiI	 j ..t.:i:...	 ....iii j..,,.
.v--J--,."
Abbreviations used: FB = False belief, A-R = appearance-reality, DB deceptive box, UT =
unexpected transfer, WCST = Wisconsin Card Sort Task, DCCS = Dimensional Change Card Sort
task, IC = inhibitory control, ToM stories = Happé's Strange Stories (Happé, 1994), GTS = Gilles de la
Tourette Syndrome.
The findings here are less consistent than those with young TD children -
perhaps unsurprisingly, given the variety of disorders and ages involved in the various
studies. Several studies have reported a strong association between EF and ToM task
performance in higher functioning people with ASD. A single study (Roth & Leslie,
1998) found no association between an executive task and FB in ASD, this study will
be discussed below. The findings from other developmentally disordered groups are
less consistent. The Zelazo (1996) study, which indicated a possible connection in
Down Syndrome (DS) reports only the correlation of both the DS group and young
preschoolers combined. In ADHD or those at risk of ADHD there appears to be a
relationship in preschoolers that becomes less significant with age. A less
comprehensive range of tasks has been used with those with developmental disorders
than with young TD samples, and as such it is hard to distinguish what aspects of EF
might be related to FB in these groups. However, all the studies that report high
correlations used some form of card sorting task in their EF batteiy, and the results
indicate that set shifting and flexibility may be particularly related to ToM. Those
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using inhibitory control tasks (Charman, Carroll et al., 2001; Perner, Kain Ct al., 2002;
Roth & Leslie, 1998) found much lower correlations than those seen in young TD
children.
Why is there a relationship between EF and ToM?
Several explanations have been suggested for this relationship. Five major
alternatives are outlined below. This chapter will only discuss the first four since the
fifth theory is on a neurological rather than a psychological level and as such is not a
focus for this thesis. It is also possible for it to co-occur with some of the other
theories. The five alternatives are:
1. ToM tasks have an executive component that causes children to fail.
2. ToM is a prerequisite for (or an integral part of?) the development of EF.
3. EF is a prerequisite for ToM.
4. A third factor underlies both EF and ToM (for example, a common logical
structure).
5. Common brain structures mediate both EF and ToM.
ToM tasks have an executive component that causes children to fail.
The standard unexpected transfer FB task has an obvious inhibitory
component. To pass the test, children must suppress their knowledge of reality, and
predict that the protagonist will look in the empty box, usually by pointing. This led
to suggestions that it might be this inhibitory requirement that causes children to fail,
rather than the ToM demands of the tasks (Russell et a!., 1991). Russell (Hughes &
Russell, 1993; Russell et al., 1994; Russell et al., 1991) used a 'Windows task' to
assess children's ability to inhibit a prepotent response. In this task the child sees two
boxes with windows in them. One box contains a sweet, the other is empty. To win
the sweet, the child must point to the empty box. They are trained on the contingences
beforehand. However, despite this training, most 3-year-olds and children with ASD
pointed to the full container, and continued to do so for 20 test trials, despite never
being rewarded for this strategy. Initial forms of the task had an opponent, who won
the sweet when the child pointed to the full box (and thus the task could have been
said to have a ToMldeceptive element). However, later forms of the task carried out
without an opponent proved just as difficult for 3-year-olds and children with ASD.
This appeared to be strong evidence for inhibitory difficulties that could account for
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the poor performance of most 3-year-olds and children with ASD on the standard FB
task.
Leslie and colleagues (German & Leslie, 2001; Roth & Leslie, 1998; Scholl &
Leslie, 2001) put forward a different account of the role of EF in FB task
performance. They suggest that, in order to pass FB tasks, it is necessary to have both
a functioning ToM mechanism (T0MM) and a selection processor (SP) (see chapter 1
for an outline of Leslie's theory of ToM). The ToMM is defined as a module that
spontaneously processes behaviours that are attended to, and computes the mental
states that contribute to those behaviours, whilst the selection processor is a general
executive function required in many situations to inhibit salient but unwanted
responses (Scholl & Leslie, 2001). Roth and Leslie (1998) suggest that 3-year-olds
possess the concept of belief, but have difficulty in predicting behaviour on the basis
of that belief. Their first study included a 'partial true belief task, which paralleled
the unexpected transfer FB task, except that instead of the original object being
moved, another identical object was produced and placed in a different location. The
children were asked whether the protagonist knew that there was a coin in the new
location, and then asked where the protagonist would look for the coin on their return.
Seventy percent of the 3-year-olds in their study passed the 'knowledge' question, but
only 33% of these then predicted behaviour correctly on the basis of that knowledge.
This contrasts with Leslie and Frith's (1988) findings on the same task with children
with ASD, in which 61% of the children passed the knowledge question, and 73% of
these then went on to correctly predict behaviour. Roth and Leslie point to these
results as evidence that 3-year-olds and children with ASD fail standard FB tasks for
different reasons.
Roth and Leslie's (1998) 'Screen' task, designed to put demands on the
selection processor without taxing the ToMM showed no correlation with
performance on FB tasks in children with ASD, but was highly significantly
correlated in three-year-old children. This task involves an opaque screen, a basket, a
box and a marble. The marble is placed in the basket, and the display is placed
behind the screen, out of the children's view. Another identical set of basket, box and
marble is then placed in front of the screen, and the marble is moved from the basket
into the box. The child is then asked where the marble is behind the screen, and
where it is in front of the screen. Three-year-olds found the Screen task nearly as
difficult as standard FB, and more difficult than non-standard FB tasks. Children with
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ASD, in contrast, were almost at ceiling on the screen task, whilst more than 50% of
them failed the non-standard and 65% the standard FB task. Roth and Leslie interpret
this as evidence that children with ASD have an intact SP, but impaired ToMM,
whilst the 3-year-olds had an immature SP, but intact ToMM. However, the
correlation between FB and performance on the Screen task in 3 to 4-year-olds is not
particularly high (r = .38). If limitations of the selection processor account for all the
difficulties demonstrated by young children on FB tasks, this correlation might have
been expected to be higher.
Leslie's account differs from Russell and colleagues' in that he contrasts TD
3-year-olds (who he claims fail FB tasks due to an immature selection processor, but
have an intact T0MM), with children with ASD, who he argues fail due to an
impaired ToMM, despite having an intact SP. This would seem to imply that the
relationship between performance on FB tasks and inhibitory control and flexibility
should only be evident in TD children. It would also follow that if we could reduce
the executive demands of FB tasks, not only would TD children pass at an earlier age,
but also that the association with EF should be reduced in normal samples.
It does seem to be the case that reducing the executive demands makes FB
tasks easier for young TD children. Adding a photographic cue (whereby the
participant posted a photo of what they thought was in the box before it was opened)
aided performance on the Deceptive box task in TD children and children with ASD
(Charman & Lynggaard, 1998), and telling the young TD children of the new location
of an object rather than showing them improved performance on the unexpected
transfer task (Zaitchik, 1991). However, in spite of these manipulations, the Weilman
et al. (2001) meta-analysis found that children aged below 3 years 6 months
performed at best at chance level on FB, whilst children older than 4-years-old
passed, indicating that executive demands cannot account for the developmental
transition seen between the ages of 3 and 4 years.
One type of task which in fact was not included in the Wellman et al (2001)
meta-analysis, but which appears to substantially reduce executive demands of the
task is the 'FB explanation' task in which the protagonist returns and searches in the
wrong box, and the child is asked to explain why they searched there. The demands
on the SP in a task like this are presumably minimal, as the selection has effectively
already been made. However, children pass FB explanation tasks at around the same
time as they pass FB prediction tasks, and the explanation tasks correlate as highly
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with EF tasks as do the prediction tasks (Hughes, 1998, see table 4.1 for summary),
and show the same developmental trend. These findings appear problematic for the
ToMMISP account, as there are no apparent demands on the SP, and yet 3-year-olds
still fail, indicating that their difficulties in FB tasks go deeper than difficulty with
inhibiting a salient response. In addition, they suggest that the relationship between
EF and ToM is deeper than one due simply to task demands.
There is less controversy over the case of children with ASD. Not only do they
pass tasks that aim to control for the inhibitory demands of the FB task (the False
Photo and Screen task), but there is myriad evidence from tasks with no obvious
executive demands that they do have ToM deficits (see chapter 1 of this thesis, Baron-
Cohen, 2000; Happé, 1994). Russell and colleagues, who initially proposed that
executive factors were responsible for FB failure in children with ASD, now favour a
more developmental account, in which early EF is a precursor for ToM (Russell,
199Th).
However, despite it seeming improbable that task specific executive factors
are entirely responsible for FB task failure in either young TD children, or children
with ASD, they may be one source of individual differences in performance
(Weilman, Cross et al., 2001). It is possible that in a cohort of young 3-year-old
children, those with superior inhibitory control will have an advantage in FB tasks,
and all the children will show an improved performance on a task with fewer
inhibitory demands. These improvements will be due to the lack of the systematic
errors typically seen in young children, which will mean their performance improves
from below-chance to chance level. At a more transitional stage (in terms of
understanding of belief), those children with poor inhibitory control may perform at
chance, whilst those with better control perform above chance. Here, Leslie's analysis
is useful, in that it identifies two distinct components to passing a FB task, both of
which may be of varying importance at different times in development. However,
this analysis ignores the question of whether these two components are related, and if
so, how.
To briefly summarise, it seems unlikely that executive demands of the FB task
mask the ability to attribute mistaken thoughts or beliefs either in young normally-
developing children, or in children with ASD. However, executive factors may
account for individual differences in performance in young TD children in the year
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before they pass FB tasks. It seems very likely that the relationship between EF and
ToM is not simply due to task demands.
ToM is a prerequisite for (or an integral part of?) the develo pment of EFg or EF
is a prerequisite for ToM
The ToM as a prerequisite for EF theory has two forms. An early and strong
form suggests that it is necessary to have an understanding of metarepresentation and
mentality in order to gain control of mental processes and actions, and that therefore
without some understanding of mental states, the development of EF is not possible
(Wimmer, 1989). A later and somewhat weaker form (Pemer et al., 1999) suggests
that ToM is an integral part of EF. Perner's argument goes like this: In order to
inhibit unwanted actions, the child must understand that there are existing schemata
which make one act in an unwanted way unless one actively inhibits those actions.
Understanding the existence of these schemata as entities which make one act in a
certain way is to understand them as representations with causal powers, and this
understanding can therefore be dubbed metarepresentational. However, it is not clear
from Perner's account how much of this metarepresentational understanding is
conscious. According to this theory, an understanding of the causal/representational
nature of mental states is necessary for a child to develop executive inhibition, which
they define as inhibitory control directed at action schemata on the basis of their
representational content. Pemer contrasts this with general inhibition, which he
suggests can happen at a lower level of contention scheduling. This will be discussed
in greater detail below, alongside evidence for the third option.
Russell (1996; 199Th) suggests that very early executive control, in the form
of action monitoring and agency, is a prerequisite for the development of self
awareness and therefore the later development of a ToM. This theory has the strong
implication that early difficulties in EF should by necessity lead to later difficulties in
ToM.
The evidence for these two theories (the functional dependency theories) will
be discussed together, as many of the studies which provide evidence for one side are
therefore evidence against the other, and many points are relevant to both.
Many children with ASD who show ToM deficits also show severe
impairments in EF. Pennington and Ozonoff (1996) reviewed 14 studies that
measured EF in children with ASD. Thirty-two different tasks were used, and
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children with ASD were impaired (in contrast to ability matched controls) on 25 of
them. Sergeant et al. (2002) reviewed a range of studies which showed a deficit in EF
in children with ASD when compared to TD controls. However, it is less clear
whether there is a deficit when compared to children with other developmental
disorders such as ADHD or MLD. As mentioned above, some researchers have
suggested that it is in fact essential to be able to reflect on mental states in order to
develop executive function (e.g. Wimmer, 1989). In its strongest form, this theory
suggests that it should not be possible to have a ToM deficit whilst demonstrating no
EF deficit, and that early difficulties in ToM should reliably predict later difficulties
in EF. A later form of this theory (Perner et al., 1999) argues that a ToM is an
integral part of EF. Hughes (1998) found that in 50 TD children, early performance
on EF tasks (at age 3:7) accounted for 34% of the variance in ToM tasks at age 5.
When age, verbal ability and initial ToM were taken into account, performance on EF
task still predicted 20% of the variance in ToM at age 5. In contrast, early ToM
measures correlated significantly with only one later EF task (although all the
correlations were positive) and a stepwise regression showed no significant predictive
relationship between early ToM and this task. This appears to support an account by
which EF is necessary for later ToM development, rather than vice versa.
Ozonoff et al (1991) assessed EF and ToM in a group of 23 high-functioning
children with ASD, and found that impairment on the EF tasks (when compared to an
IQ-matched group with learning difficulties) was greater than on the ToM measures,
and that the EF impairment was a better discriminator between the groups. The
authors conclude that the EF deficit is more likely to be the primary cause of ASD, as
it discriminates better between the groups. However, there are a number of problems
with this. The finding may well have been due to the choice of ToM tasks (1st and 2'
order FB tasks); both groups were almost at ceiling on the 1 order FB tasks, which
restricted the potential for any group difference. When the groups are compared on
the 2 order task alone, then ToM performance discriminated between the groups as
well as did the EF measures (Perner, 2000). It may be that the FB tasks used were not
appropriate for the higher functioning members of the ASD group (whose IQs ranged
from 55 to 140), and a more complex mentalising task would have revealed more
pervasive difficulties. From a developmental perspective, if it could be shown that
only some children with ASD have ToM difficulties, whilst all have EF difficulties,
this would suggest that deficits in ToM are not the necessary cause of EF problems.
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However, Ozonoff Ct a!. did not take a developmental perspective, and since the ToM
tasks in this study may not have been demanding enough for the very high functioning
members of the group, we cannot conclude this from their findings. It is also not clear
whether the ToM and EF tasks used were comparably difficult.
A study by Baron-Cohen and Robertson (1995) documents 3 single cases of
13-year-old children, one individual with autism, one with Gilles de la Tourette's
Syndrome (GTS) and one with both. The children were given 3 ToM tasks (l order
PB, unexpected transfer and deceptive box, and the penny-hiding deception task), 3
'intention editing' tasks (executive tasks mostly requiring inhibitory control and
flexibility; for example the day/night Stroop task), and a further test of generativity,
the FAS verbal fluency task. The child with autism failed all the ToM tasks whilst
succeeding on all of the 'intention editing' EF tasks, whilst the child with GTS failed
2/3 EF tasks but succeeded on all ToM tasks. The child with both GTS and autism
performed poorly on both EF and ToM measures. All three children performed poorly
on the verbal fluency test. This would appear to indicate a dissociation between EF
and ToM, with neither being essential for the development of the other. However,
there are several problems with this approach. Firstly, there are obvious difficulties
with extrapolating too much from single cases. Secondly, this assumes that both ToM
and the inhibitory component of EF are unitary concepts that a child either has or does
not have. Whilst it is certainly the case that a child can pass or fail a ToM task, this
may be a limitation of the tasks rather than a reflection of the nature of ToM as a
unitary concept which a child either possess or doesn't possess. In the case of EF
tasks, there is no natural pass or fail mark, and so these are set somewhat arbitrarily.
It is entirely possible that, whilst EF is important for the development of ToM, a
lower level of inhibitory control is required for the development of ToM than has
been set as the pass mark in most studies. It is also the case that the tests that were
used in the Baron-Cohen and Robertson study (1 order FB tasks and a deception
task) are likely to have been too easy for the participant with GTS (who had a VMA
of 9 years). Using tasks more appropriate for that age group might have revealed
deficits.
Tager-Flusberg (1997) tested 10 children with Prader-Willi syndrome and 14
children with Williams Syndrome on two FB and two EF tasks. Perner (2000) gives
some further details of their data that indicate that, whilst 6 children (3 from each
group) passed both ToM tasks whilst failing both EF, no children passed both EF
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tasks whilst failing both ToM. Looking at those children who did better in one area
than another (but who did not fail or pass both in each area) reveals four cases where
the children did better on ToM than on executive functioning, but three cases where
children did better on EF than on ToM. The strongest evidence (the dissociations
seen in 6 children) would therefore appear to indicate that intact EF is not necessary
for intact ToM.
A further difficulty for the theory that EF is fundamental to the development
of a ToM is the existence of clinical disorders such as ADHD, obsessive compulsive
disorder (OCD) and Tourette's Syndrome (TS), in which individuals demonstrate
executive dysfunction without showing autistic-like difficulties in ToM. Perner et
al. (2002) in a longitudinal study of children with behavioural problems, found
pervasive problems in executive functioning at age 4.5 - 6.5, but no deficit in second
order ToM tasks at age 6. This is problematic for an account that claims that intact
EF is necessary for ToM development.
To summarise, there are studies that could be used to support the theory that a
ToM is necessary for or an integral part of EF development (e.g. Pemer, Kain et al.,
2002; Tager-Flusberg et al., 1997), and there are also studies which could be used to
argue that EF is necessary for ToM development (e.g. Hughes, 1998a). In addition,
there is some evidence for a dissociation between the two (Baron-Cohen &
Robertson, 1995). In order to further elucidate the nature of the relationship,
longitudinal studies are needed. However, given the logistical problems with this type
of study, an alternative would be intervention studies which trained children in either
ToM or EF, and which tested them in both domains before and after training, in order
to identify any interactions. Children with ASD would be particularly appropriate for
this type of training, since they demonstrate difficulties in both domains, and because
it is particularly difficult to do longitudinal studies with young children with ASD, as
they are typically not diagnosed until the age of 3 or 4 years at the earliest, and are
often late in developing language and other skills which would be necessary in order
to test them in the usual way. Chapter 7 will report the findings of such a training
study.
EF and ToM tasks share a common logical sfructure
Zelazo, Frye and colleagues (Baron-Cohen & Robertson, 1995; Frye et al., 1998)
suggest that the relationship between tasks such as the DCCS and ToM is seen
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because the development of both depend on underlying domain-general mechanisms,
specifically rule use involving an embedded conditional 'if-if-then'. They use the
DCCS task, in which children must sort cards that vary along two dimensions (for
example colour and shape). Initially participants must sort by one dimension, and
then after a switch (which are told about) they must sort by the second dimension.
The authors argue that the DCCS involves this type of rule as follows: f we are
playing the colour game, and f you give me a green circle, then I will put it with the
green square target. However, f we are playing the shape game and f you give me a
green circle, then I will put it with the yellow circle target. In the unexpected transfer
FB task, the rule could be analysed as follows: if Sally did not see us move the
marble, and if she wants to find the marble, then she will look in the wrong box.
They argue that the ability to pass FB tasks reflects the use of these rule systems, and
that this accounts for the association seen between FB performance and performance
on the DCCS (and, presumably, other EF tasks).
Zelazo, Frye and colleagues (e.g. Frye et al., 1998; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, &
Frye, 1997) suggest that the correlation between EF and ToM in normal development,
and the co-occurrence of such difficulties in ASD, are accounted for by domain-
general demands of reasoning, specifically embedded conditionals or the ability to
integrate two opposing perspectives. They argue that the developmental transition
seen at age 4 is due to the child's emerging ability to reason with these embedded
conditionals. Zelazo et al (2001) suggest a domain-general developmental framework
for executive functioning with three key dimensions of cognitive development:
consciousness, rule complexity and behavioural control. They argue that
developmental changes in reflexive consciousness permit the formulation and use of
increasingly complex rule structures, which in turn permit increased flexibility and
control. In these terms, they argue that the deficits in ToM seen in people with ASD
can be understood as a problem with using rule systems, and are therefore
fundamentally difficulties in executive functioning. However, it appears possible
that a 'reflexive consciousness' is in itself part of what others would consider a ToM
- this is not well defined in Zelazo Ct al.'s account.
Evidence for and against
Zelazo (1996) found a strong association between performance on FB tasks
and the DCCS in individuals with Down Syndrome (DS), with the individuals with
DS focusing on a single state of affairs in both tasks (reality in the case of the FB
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tasks, the first rule in the case of the DCCS). Frye (1995) found a similar relationship
in TD 3 to 5 year olds, and Zelazo et a!. (2002) found a high correlation between
performance on the DCCS and FB tasks in high-functioning individuals with ASD.
In addition, Zelazo et al (2001) point to the growing body of evidence that a ToM
deficit (at least when measured by FB tasks) is neither unique to ASD nor specific to
the ToM domain (see Yirimiya et al. 1998 for a meta analysis), as evidence for a more
general cognitive deficit. Others have not always found the same deficits, however,
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985), for example, found good performance on FB tasks in their
control group, who had Down Syndrome.
However, Pemer (1999) argues that the embedded conditional structure which
Zelazo and colleagues postulate underlies difficulties in FB tasks can just as well be
applied to a food-preference task (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997) which children can
pass as young as 18 months. This task could fit the if-if-then format as follows. If you
want food, and if you like broccoli, then I will give you broccoli (as opposed to
biscuits, the child's own preference). Pemer also argues that the application of this
rule structure is arbitrary, and FB tasks can be just as easily cast in an if-then
structure; e.g. f Sally is looking for her apple then cupboard. In addition, whilst
embedded conditionals may encapsulate a similarity between FB and the DCCS task,
it is not clear how it can account for the widespread social difficulties seen in people
with ASD. In more advanced tests of mentalising such as the Eyes task (Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997), the participant is asked to identify
mental states from a picture of eyes. This task requires no embedded conditionals,
and thus if this was the key to the problems demonstrated by people with ASD, we
should expect no difficulties. However, children with Asperger's Syndrome found
this task substantially more difficult than did controls with burette's Syndrome.
Zelazo et a! (2001) admit that, in addition to a grasp of the embedded conditional,
'mental state concepts will perhaps be useful' (j).2O6) when reasoning about human
behaviour. This theory is silent on the question of how these mental state concepts
emerge, and whether they might also be impaired in people with ASD. There are
cases of children performing well in ToM whilst failing tests of EF (Baron-Cohen &
Robertson, 1995; Tager-Flusberg et al., 1997), which are problematic for a theory
which states that both ToM and EF tasks use common logical structures, but that ToM
tasks may require extra knowledge of mental states. It is also harder to see how FB
explanation tasks may be framed in the embedded conditional framework, and yet
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they still correlate highly with tests of EF requiring rule use (Hughes, 1 998a), which
implies that even the correlation between ToM and FB in TD 3-year-olds may depend
on more than a common rule structure.
In addition, whilst this rule might define a similarity between some EF and
ToM tasks, it is silent on the question of whether ToM deficits in real life are
attributable solely to a failure to reason with embedded conditionals. It seems
unlikely that all understanding of other minds, in TD children and children with ASD,
can be reduced to a rule such as this. Whilst this theory may have some explanatory
value for the correlation seen between the DCCS and FB tasks in TD children, it
cannot explain either the relationship seen with all FB tasks, nor can it explain the
deficits seen in ASD.
Summary
There are four distinct possibilities that could explain the observed
relationship between EF and ToM on a psychological level. After evaluating the
available evidence, it is clear that there is no straightforward answer from the research
to date. The field suffers perhaps from an overly narrow view of 'theory of mind',
taking it often to mean whether a child passes or fails a FB tasks, and a lack of graded
and comparably difficult EF and ToM tasks. However, it does appear to be clear that
executive factors in FB tasks cannot account for the relationship seen between the
tasks, and it seems unlikely that failing to grasp the embedded conditional can account
for all the difficulties seen in ASD. Therefore we are left with the two functional
dependency options, that ToM is a prerequisite for EF, or that EF is a prerequisite for
ToM. These two theories cannot co-exist, particularly if we continue to take a narrow
view of ToM and to measure it by the FB task.
The literature on children's ToM has long suffered from the tendency to
categorise ToM as a unitary concept, measurable by the FB task, at the expense of all
earlier and later developments in the understanding of mental states. It is only
necessary to compare ID 3-year-olds to children with ASD to see a ToM cannot be
reduced to passing or failing FB. Tbree-year-olds and children with ASD both fail FB
tasks in the majority of cases. However, TD 3-year-olds are not at all like children
with ASD - their apparent lack of FB understanding does not result in the profound
difficulties in socialisation and communication exhibited by children with ASD. To
equate their performance seems to miss out on the dramatic differences between their
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understanding of minds and mental states. As Pemer (1999) points out, FB tasks do
not provide a privileged access to a child's ToM. They demonstrate only the existence
of a certain ToM capacity, the understanding of mistaken belief. This may indicate a
wider impairment in attributing thoughts and beliefs, as it appears to in ASD, or it
may simply indicate that children are not yet able to attribute mistaken beliefs in the
context of experimental tasks, as it appears to in young TD children. These young TD
children demonstrate in many other ways that they are able to attribute a range of
mental states and emotions (see chapter 1). These earlier precursors to a 'full' ToM
may be crucial in the development of EF, but as yet there has been little attempt to
assess their development.
Having said this, there may also be reason to postulate a special relationship
between a representational ToM and executive functioning. The data certainly
suggests that there may be a particularly strong relationship between the acquisition of
FB understanding and performance on EF tasks (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2), which may
not generalise to other, more advanced tests of ToM. Since, as argued above, it
seems unlikely that this relationship is due to task demands, it appears that there may
be a particular relationship between the acquisition of a representational
understanding of mind and executive functioning. This may also be part of a more
general relationship between the two, where early ToM precursors predict later EF
and vice versa, but the evidence for a 'special relationship' between the ages of 3 and
5 in normal development is quite compelling. Perner's account (e.g. Perner & Lang,
2000) argues that meta-representation is in fact an integral part of executive
functioning, that the ability to 'step back' from our actions and therefore monitor
them effectively poses similar demands to the ability to step back from our thoughts
or beliefs and therefore attribute other thoughts to other people. It is true that many of
the early skills needed in the development of EF (e.g. self awareness, action-
monitoring) are very close to those skills needed to consider the contents of one's own
and other's minds, and Perner (1999) makes a convincing case for the need for meta-
representation in inhibiting a prepotent schema. Russell's approach (e.g. Russell,
199Th) in contrast argues that self-monitoring is needed for meta-representation. This
again is quite specific about the representational understanding of mind being linked
to EF. Others have also suggested there may be a special relationship - Harris (1992)
suggests that imaginative flexibility is necessary for a child to represent mistaken
beliefs, although he does not link this to executive functioning.
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It is less clear whether this relationship is also seen in those with
developmental disorders, specifically those with ASD. There is some evidence for a
relationship between ToM and EF in high-functioning individuals with ASD, but less
for a relationship in lower-functioning individuals (e.g. Ozonoffet al., 1991; Zelazo et
al., 2002). This may be because lower-functioning individuals with ASD often do not
appear to acquire any form of a representational ToM. This would have two
consequences, first, that the FB tests commonly used would show little or no range in
performance and therefore a relationship could not be demonstrated for
methodological reasons, and secondly, that if there is a special relationship between a
representational understanding of mind and executive functioning (as suggested
above), this would not be evident in a group with no representational understanding of
mind. However, this group may be particularly interesting when it comes to
examining the causal direction of the relationship between ToM and EF. If a
representational understanding of mind is necessary for EF, then all those who lack
this representational understanding should have poor EF. If they do not, this implies
either that the two domains are in fact functionally independent in this group, or that
executive functioning is necessary (but not sufficient) for a ToM. Training this
group in either EF or ToM would help to elucidate the relationship still further, since
if a representational ToM is necessary for executive functioning, then training
children in ToM may improve their EF, and vice versa.
The next chapter describes a study looking at the relationship between ToM
and EF in lower-functioning individuals with ASD and MLD - precisely those
individuals who appear to lack a representational ToM. Chapter 6 will then review
the literature on training ToM and EF, and chapter 7 will report the findings of a ToM
and EF training study with lower-functioning children with ASD and MLD.
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CHAPTER 5
STuDY 2: ToM AND EF IN CHILDREN WITH ASD AND MLD
Introduction
Following the discussion in chapter 4 on the relationship between EF and
ToM, this study tests the relationship in lower-functioning children with ASD and
MLD, all of whom failed at least 2/3 standard FB tasks.
The relationship between ToM and EF has attracted much interest in recent
years. Whilst the relationship in young TD children has been fairly well elucidated
(see Perner & Lang, 1999 for a review), far less research has been done with those
with developmental disorders such as ASD. A wide range of studies have found
deficits in participants with ASD on ToM tests, including first-order FB tasks (Baron-
Cohen et al, 1985, 1986, Leekam and Pemer, 1991, Perner et al, 1989, Swettenham,
1996, Swettenham et al, 1996) second order FB tasks (Baron-Cohen 1989, Bowler,
1992, Happe, 1993, Ozonoff et al, 1991), stories requiring mental state attributions
(Happe, 1994) and tests assessing the ability to make mental state attributions from
the eye region of the face (Baron-Cohen et a!., 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright,
Scahill, Spong, & Lawson, in press). Deficits have also been found in executive
functioning (see Sergeant et al., 2002 for a review), particularly in set shifting and
flexibility. The co-existence of these two deficits has led some authors to postulate
that ToM and EF are in fact fundamentally related in ASD, to the extent that one
causes the deficits seen in the other (e.g. Russell, 199Th; Wimmer, 1989). However,
surprisingly few studies have directly tested the relationship between the two areas,
and to date these studies have found associations only in higher-functioning
individuals with ASD (Ozonoff et al., 1991; Zelazo et al., 2001). There is evidence
from a single case study that it is possible for a child with ASD to have good levels of
EF whilst still demonstrating deficits in ToM (Baron-Cohen & Robertson, 1995).
This relationship may have strong implications for our understanding of autistic
spectrum disorders, and the core deficits involved.
The present study examined ToM and EF in a fairly low functioning sample of
children with ASD and MLD, all of whom were selected for having failed basic first
order tests of FB. Therefore the MLD group had atypically low ToM performance (as
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compared to other children with MLD), and those children with ASD who pass FB
tasks (and who appear in virtually every study of ASD and ToM) have been excluded.
Looking at this group may help us to distinguish whether the relationship between EF
and ToM is specific to the transition to a representational understanding of mind (as
measured by FB tests), or whether it is also evident in those who do not yet pass FB
tasks. Including a control group with MLD is important in enabling us to distinguish
between deficits which many children with developmental disorders share, and those
that are more specific to ASD.
The performance of these children with MLD who fail FB tasks may be
crucial to our understanding of both ToM and ASD. If we argue, as many researchers
do, that a deficit in ToM is fundamental to ASD, and explains many aspects of autistic
behaviour (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 2000), and we take the FB task as a marker of ToM,
then why are those children with MLD who failed FB tasks not demonstrating
autistic-like behaviour? Does FB failure mean something different in their case, and
if so what? If children with MLD are failing FB tasks because of task-specific factors
rather than due to genuine ToM deficits, they should be able to demonstrate their
relative competence in other ToM tests and on real life measures. This study included
8 ToM tasks, and the prediction was that children with MLD would perform better
than children with ASD overall, despite being selected on failing a FB unexpected
transfer task. A questionnaire containing items for which a ToM is thought to be
necessary (e.g. white lies, deception, recognising complex emotions) was also
completed by the teachers of the participants, and the prediction was that the MLD
group would perform better on this real-life measure of ToM skills than would the
members of the ASD group. This will be discussed in chapter 9.
The other predictions for this study, based on the literature to date, were that
the group with ASD would demonstrate deficits in both ToM and EF when compared
to verbal age matched controls with MLD, even when both groups were selected due
to their poor performance on FB tests, and that ToM and EF (set shifting and
flexibility in particular) would be related in both groups (following Ozonoff et al.,




Participants were recruited from eight schools for children with special
educational needs in the greater London area. They had all participated in Study 1,
and were included on the basis of two criterion. First, that they had to have a VMA
(as assessed by the BPVS II; Dunn et al., 1999) over 4 years 3 months (as it was
thought that they needed at least this level of language to understand the training
programmes for which they were being selected, and since TD children with this level
of language would be expected to pass FB tasks), and secondly, that they must fail at
least 2/3 FB tasks which involved predicting the contents of another's mind. To this
end, an additional unexpected transfer FB task was administered to those children
who failed only one of the two tasks (the 'Sally-David' task and the 'Smarties -
other' task) administered in Study 1. This task was analogous to the Sally-David task
described in Study 1, but used a toy bear and hedgehog with coloured boxes instead of
the illustrated pictures used in the Sally-David task. The ages of the children ranged
from 6 years 5 months to 15 years 3 months.
The children formed two groups. Twenty-one had non-autistic moderate
learning difficulties (MLD), and 27 had autistic spectrum disorders (ASD). Twenty of
the children in this group had a statement of special educational needs with ASD or
autism as their primary diagnosis, one had a diagnosis of Asperger's Syndrome. The
remaining 6 (who were from a single school and who were all being educated in
classes for children with autistic spectrum disorders) were described on their records
as having social and communication disorders. These children were assigned to the
ASD group after completion of a checklist of symptoms based on DSM-IV after
discussion with their teachers.
The relative ages and ability of each group are given in table 5.1. A oneway
ANOVA found significant differences between the groups on Raven's Coloured
Progressive Matrices (CPM) (F = 10.12, df= 1,46, p<.OI) and CA (F=6.63, df= 1,46,
p=.Ol ) only. This discrepancy in nonverbal ability will be taken account of where
appropriate.
The tasks were administered by a single researcher in a quiet room in the
child's school. All tasks were typically administered in a single session, lasting about
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an hour. However, in the case of some of the younger children this was divided into
two half hour sessions to maximize their concentration. The tasks were presented in
one of two fixed orders, counterbalanced in the two clinical groups. There were no
order effects on task performance.
Table 5.1. Age and ability of the ASD and MLD groups: mean (&d)
ASD(n=27)	 MLD(n=21)
CA (years)	 10.35 (2.55)	 12.02 (1.69)
BPVS VMA (years)
	 6.52 (1.75)	 7.12 (1.93)
TROG VMA (years) 	 5.00 (.99)	 5.50 (1.34)
Raven's CPM (raw scores)	 22.93 (7.17)	 17.14 (4.79)
The tasks described in this study formed the pre-test for the training study described
in chapter 7, and were therefore designed with that in mind. In order to minimise the
repetition of tasks in the training study, variations or subsections of some of the tasks
were used. This means that the Eyes task, for example, was split into two sections,
each containing 14 items. These sections were matched for difficulty using the results
from a sample of 52 TD eight-year-olds (Fisher, Dunn and Hughes, submitted).
Alternative forms of some of the other tests were used, for example a marble was used




Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM) (Raven. Raven. & Court. 1998): Non-
verbal ability was assessed using the coloured set of Raven's Matrices, which are
recommended for children and those with learning difficulties. The test was
administered according to the test manual. As standardized scores are not available
for the full age range tested here, raw scores were used.
Test for Reception of Grammar (Bishop. 1989): The administration and scoring of
this test is described in Study 1. For ease of comparison across a wide age range the
age equivalent score was used in this study. This will be referred to as the TROG
VMA score.
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn et al.. 1999): The administration and scoring
of this test is described in Study 1. For ease of comparison across a wide age range
the VMA score was used in this study.
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ToM tasks
Sally-David: This task is described in the methods section of Study 1.
Smarties self and other: This task, which involved two FB (FB) questions, is
described in the methods section of Study 1.
Extra unexpected transfer FB task: This task was only administered to those who
performed inconsistently on the Sally-David and the Smarties-other task. It used a toy
bear 'Barney' and a toy hedgehog 'Henry', two coloured boxes and a ten pence piece.
The child was told that Henry had ten pence, which he was going to place in one of
the boxes to keep it safe whilst he went outside. Henry then left. Barney then entered
and moved the coin into the other box. Henry then returned and the child was asked
four questions:
FB question: Where will Henry look for his coin?
Justification: Why will he look there?
Reality control: Where is the coin really?
Memory control: Where was the coin first of all?
Marble hiding Deception task (based on Baron-Cohen, (1992): A marble was used in
this task. The task was introduced by three trials of the researcher hiding the marble
in one of her hands behind her back. She brought her hands forward and the child
was invited to guess which hand the marble was in. After this, the child was asked to
have a turn, with the instructions to 'See if you can trick me. Hide it really well, just
like I did.' The child was given three trials, and was marked as having passed a trial
if they successfully put both hands behind their backs, hid the marble in one hand, and
brought both closed hands forwards, with the marble hidden, and did not tell the
researcher where the coin was. They were scored as passing the whole task only if
they passed all three of these trials.
Seeing Leads to Knowing (based on Pratt and Bryant, 1990): A small teddy bear, a
toy hedgehog, a toy train and a box were used in this task. The toy train was placed
inside the box. The two characters then entered the room. The bear looked inside the
box, whilst the hedgehog touched the outside of the box. The child was then asked the
following questions:
Seeing-Knowing (S-K) question: Who knows what is in the box?
Justification question: How does he know?
Children were credited with a pass if they gave the correct response to the S-K
question.
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Knowinglguessing (based on Kazak, 1997): This task was introduced by showing the
child a sealed envelope. The child was told that the researcher had received this
envelope in the post that morning, and hadn't looked inside it yet. The child was then
shown the contents of the envelope whilst the researcher looked away, and said that
she was not looking. The child was then asked the following questions, with the order
of 'know' and 'guess' counterbalanced:
Self knowledgeable: Do you know what's inside the envelope, or do you have to
guess?
Other ignorant: How about me, do I know what's inside the envelope, or do I have
to guess?
Another envelope was then introduced, and the researcher looked inside without
showing the child. They were then asked (with 'know' and 'guess' counterbalanced
in order):
Self ignorant: Do you know what is inside the envelope, or do you have to guess?
Other knowledgeable: How about me, do I know what is inside the envelope, or do I
have to guess?
This task was scored in two sections, 'self and 'other'. Children were credited with
passing only if they passed both questions in a section (e.g. self ignorant and self
knowledgeable.)
Children's 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes' task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997): Children
were given half of the children's version of this task. This task involved the children
being shown 14 pictures of someone's eyes. For each picture, they were read four
words that described what the person in the picture might be thinking or feeling, and
asked to chose one, either by pointing to the word on the page or by saying their
choice. The items included were selected by comparing scores on this task from an
earlier study of TD children (Fisher, Dunn, & Hughes, submitted), to create two
halves on which scores were comparable. Potential scores therefore ranged from 0 -
14.
Non-ToM confrol task
False photograph (Zaitchik, 1990). A Polaroid camera, a toy hedgehog ('Henry'), a
box and a basket were used in this task.
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The hedgehog was placed in the box, and a photo was taken. The photo was placed
face down on the table, and the hedgehog was moved from the box into the basket.
The child was then asked.
FP question: Where will Henry be on the photo?
Justification question: Why?
Memory control: Where was Henry first of all?
Children were given 1 mark for a correct answer to the FB question as long as they
passed the control. All children passed the control question.
Executive Function
Card Sort: This was a simplified version of the Wisconsin Card Sort Task. It was
modified to make it shorter and easier for the present sample of children with
intellectual impairments. A pack of 27 cards was used. The cards varied along 3
dimensions, colour, number and shape. Three cards were placed in front of the child,
with a single red triangle, two blue circles and three yellow rectangles on them. The
children were told that they were going to play a guessing game, and that the
researcher was not allowed to tell them very much about how to play it, they had to
work it out for themselves.
They were asked to match each of the cards in the pile to one of the three in front of
them, and told there was a rule that they must work out to get the matching right.
The researcher gave them immediate feedback on their performance. Once they had
matched six consecutive cards correctly, the cards were reshuffled, handed back to
them and they were told that there would now be a new rule for them to work out.
If the child did not work out the rule within 24 trials, they were told the rule and given
10 trials to demonstrate their ability to match by the given dimension. If they sorted
more than 2 cards incorrectly within those 10 trials, the task was discontinued.
Otherwise, the cards were reshuffled and they were asked to try and find a new rule.
If the child failed to work out two consecutive rules, the task was discontinued. There
were four rules, presented in the following order; Colour - Shape - Number - Colour.
Scoring was as follows.
Five variables were calculated from this task.
1. Number of categories achieved, a general measure of success on the task, was
calculated by counting the number of categories the child achieved without help. This
could range from 0-4.
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2. Percentage conceptual level responses, a measure of what percentage of the time
the participant was sorting by the correct rule, was calculated as follows. All correct
responses that occurred in runs of three or more were counted, and these were
calculated as a percentage of total responses. Participants who scored highly on this
measure were therefore achieving each category quickly with minimal trial and error.
3. Percentage perseverative errors, a measure of a child's tendency to remain
'stuck' on an earlier category of cards. This variable was calculated as follows.
A count was taken of perseverative responses, that is responses that would have been
correct in the previous stage. They had to be either unambiguous (i.e. they were only
matched by the perserverative category), or, if they were ambiguously matched, had
to be contained within runs of 3 or more all sorted by the same category.
In the first category, the first unambiguous error became the 'perseverated to'
category. The perseverated to principle could change within a single stage of the test
if the participant made three unambiguous matches in succession according to another
rule. Ambiguous responses were allowed between the unambiguous ones, as long as
they were sorted according to the same rule as the unambiguous responses. The
perseverative responses that were also errors were then counted, and this was
expressed as a percentage of the total number of responses made over the course of
the task.
In order to capture a different sort of perseveration, a score was also given for
perseverative strategies other than matching to a category. These included placing all
the cards in a single pile, or dealing the cards onto the three piles in order (e.g. from
left to right), regardless of the feedback. A percentage error score was calculated as
above. Very few children made such errors, and so in order to avoid multiple
comparisons, this count was added to the percentage perseverative error score
calculated above to create a single variable of percentage ofperseverative errors.
4. The number of trials to complete the first category was counted as a measure of
speed of understanding the nature of the task. This had a minimum of six and a
maximum of 24, since if the child failed to get 6 correct within 24 responses they
were told the rule.
5. Failure to maintain set was calculated as the number of times a participant made 4
correct responses but failed to get 6 right and therefore complete the category. This
variable was included in order to identify those children who appeared to find a rule
but then were unable to sort by it consistently.
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Trails task (Reitan, 1958): This task has two sections. Trails A requires the child to
connect a series of circles according to the numbers on them. The numbers go from
1-15, and there is a short practice first. The child is timed as they connect the circles.
Trails B has both numbers and letters. The child must connect numbers and letters
alternately, keeping both in order (i.e. 1-A-2-B). Again, there is a short practice, and
they are timed. This task was discontinued if it was obvious that the child could not
count or did not know the alphabet, or if they took over 300 seconds to complete
either section of the task. If the child went wrong, they were told to go back to the
last circle where they were right, and try again. Therefore, whilst they were not
scored on their errors (although they had to complete the task accurately to be given a
time) it added to their total time. A difference score, reflecting the difficulty of
switching set, is then calculated by subtracting the time for Trails A from the time for
Trails B.
Go-NoGo (Drewe, 1975): This computer based task tests inhibitory control. The
child is told that they will see aeroplanes and bombs appearing on the screen, and they
must shoot the aeroplanes by pressing a button on a mouse, but they must never shoot
the bombs. No feedback was given for any of the trials. The task had 180 trials and
lasted 5 minutes, 12 seconds. Thirty percent of trials were bombs, and the remainder
were planes. The percentage commission errors and omission errors were calculated.
Signal Detection theory was used to provide a measure of the participant's sensitivity
to the task, and their response bias. A non-parametric measure of their sensitivity, A'
was used. The Log-linear correction as proposed by Hautus and Lee (1998) was used
to cope with response frequencies of zero.
Results
Performance on ToM tasks
The ToM tasks (apart from the Eyes task) and the False photograph task were
all scored as pass/fail. The percentages of children passing each task, and mean
scores for the Eyes task, are given in Table 5.2. Note that the children were selected
for this study by their poor performance on the Sally-David and Smarties-other tasks,
and so these scores are necessarily low.
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Chi-square analyses showed that there were significant difference between the
groups on the Smarties other (x 2 = 4.70, df= 1, p<.05) and the Know-guess other (x2
= 6.03, df= 1, p = .01). There were trends towards significance on the Seeing leads to
Knowing (x2=2.9O df = 1, p = .09), Know-guess self (x2=2.9O df = 1, p = .09),
Smarties se1f( 2 = 3.18, df= 1, p = .07) and Sally-David (x2=2.89, df= 1, p = .09).
This last is towards the ASD group performing better, all the others are in the opposite
direction. Only the Marble Hiding task out of these ToM tasks does not approach
significance, with both groups performing very poorly. There was no difference on
the False photograph task. Performance on this task was much higher in both groups
than performance on the supposedly equivalent FB unexpected transfer tasks. This
was unsurprising in the case of the ASD group, but in the case of the MLD group the
prediction had been that they would be as impaired on this task as they were on FB
tasks. There was no group difference on the Eyes task.
Table 5.2 ToM and control task performance split by group (percentage passing or
mean; s4)
ASD (n=27)	 MLD (n=21)
Sally David (% pass) 	 22.2	 4.8
Smarties - other (% pass)	 14.8*	 42.9*
Smarties - self (% pass)	 40.7	 66.7
Seeing -Knowing (% pass)	 70.4	 90.5
Marble Hiding (% pass)	 7.4	 14.3
Know-guess - other (% pass) 	 4Ø7**	 76.2**
Know-guess - self (% pass) 	 29.6	 57.1
False photo (% pass) 	 70.4	 71.4
Average no. of ToM tasks passed (max = 7) 	 2.26 (1.26)	 3.52 (1.60)
Eyes task (14 items)	 4.30 (2.32)	 5.10 (2.26)
* p <.05, p <.01
Agreement between ToM tasks
In order to look at the level of consistency across performance on ToM tasks,
and to look at the justification for creating a ToM aggregate, Cronbach's alpha was
calculated for all eight ToM tasks with the groups separately. This gave a very low
value of .16 for the MLD group and .28 for the ASD group. The Eyes task appears to
be a very different type of task to the other ToM tasks used, and previous work by the
author (Fisher et al., submitted) had found that it did not relate strongly to other ToM
measures. In addition, it is a continuous measure whilst all the others are categorical.
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Removing the Eyes task brought the value for the MLD group up to .62, whilst the
ASD group alpha dropped slightly to .20. The Sally-David task was also removed
from the aggregate. The rationale for removing this task was that it had effectively
been the main task on which the groups had been selected - children were only
included in this study if they failed at least one unexpected transfer task (either in
conjunction with failing the Smarties-other task or an additional unexpected transfer
task). Removal of the Sally-David task brought the MLD alpha up to .66, and the
ASD group's alpha up to .33. The aggregate created therefore consisted of 6 items,
all the dichotomous ToM tasks except for the Sally-David unexpected transfer task.
This score (equivalent to no. of tasks passed) ranged from 0 to 6, with a mean of 2.67
(s.d. = 1.58). The two groups had a highly significant difference on this aggregate
(ASD mean = 2.04, s.d. = 1.26, MLD mean = 3.48, s.d.=1.60; F (1,46) = 12.21, p =
.001). This aggregate did not correlate significantly with the Eyes task in either
group (ASD r = .31, p = .12, MLD r -.08, p .72).
Performance on EF measures
Table 5.3 gives the mean group scores for the EF tasks administered.




	 38.23 (23.14) 26.84 (18.15)
Number of trials to complete first category (max = 24) 	 9.92 (5.21)	 10.00 (4.32)
Number of times failed to maintain set
	 0.19* (0.40)	 0.52 * (0.68)
No. of categories achieved (max=4)
	 1.96 (1.45)	 1.81 (1.29)
% conceptual level sorting. 	 28.01 (23.32) 30.03 (20.84)
Trails b
Trails A(secs)	 38.99 (17.09) 32.31 (8.36)
Trails B (secs)
	 94.78 (54.70) 88.42 (47.67)
Trails Difference (secs) 	 55.80 (42.42) 56.12 (45.19)
GoNoGoc
% commission errors
	 41.77 (22.57) 41.43 (22.69)
% omission errors
	 22.24 (18.09) 20.04 (17.41)
A'	 0.76	 0.78
a 7 children with ASD and 5 children with MLD did not complete the first category within 24 turns and
so did not have a score for this variable
b 6 children with ASD and 5 children with MLD could not complete the second half of the Trails task
within 300 seconds. These children are not included in the scores.
C Due to a malfunctioning computer the results for 10 of the children with ASD were lost for this task.
Therefore these results represent only 17 children with ASD.
*p<.05
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A oneway ANOVA found that the only significant difference on the Card Sort
task was on the 'failure to maintain set' variable (F (1,46) = 4.68, p <.05) on which
the MLD group was worse than the ASD group. The difference on the 'percentage
perseverative responses' approached significance (F (1,46) = 3.44, p .07), with the
MLD group outperforming the ASD group. No other variables in table 4.2 were
significantly different between groups (all p-values> .29). The two groups differed
on non-verbal ability, and therefore this might have accounted for the difference on
the 'failure to maintain set' variable, and indeed the lack of differences between the
other variables. Since Miller and Chapman (2001) suggest that it is theoretically
suspect to co-vary for factors that differ between groups in a case such as this, forced
entry hierarchical multiple regression was done as an alternative. Failure to maintain
set was entered as the outcome variable, and Raven's matrices were entered in the
first block (R2 .002, F = .08, p = .77). In the second block, group (ASD or MLD)
was entered (R2 = . 13, F = 3.13, p <.05). Group was a significant predictor of
performance over and above Raven's Matrices, which was in fact not a significant
predictor alone or with group. Therefore it seems that the difference in non-verbal
ability does not account for the group difference on failing to maintain set.
This analysis was repeated with the other EF variables in order to analyse the
effect of non-verbal ability separately from the effect of group.
With percentage perseverative errors, in the first block, Raven's was not a
significant predictor (R2 = .05, F = 2.50, p=.12). When group was added in the
second block, it predicted perseverative errors along with Raven's Matrices (R2 = .21,
F = 5.94, p <.01). Both Raven's and group made independent contributions to this
model (Raven's t = -2.82, p<.Ol, group t = 2.99, p<.Ol). With percentage conceptual
level processing, Raven's was a significant predictor alone (R 2 = .15, F = 8.33, p
<.0 1), but group was a predictor over and above Raven's (R 2 = .25, F 7.44. p <.0 1).
Both Raven's and group remained significant predictors in this model (p<.Ol in both
cases). Neither Raven's nor group were significant predictors of the number of trials
to complete first category (both R2 <.02, Fs <0.56, ps >.46). In the case of the number
of categories achieved, Raven's was a significant predictor (R 2 = . 19, F = 11.08,
p<z.Ol), but group did not predict number of categories over and above it (t = 1.10,
p=.28).
In the case of Go-NoGo, neither Raven's nor group were significant predictors
(both R2 <.02, F-values < .37, p-values >.69). In the case of the Trails, Raven's was a
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significant predictor alone (K2 = . 18, F = 8.31, p<.Ol), and group did not predict
performance over and above Raven's (t = -0.44, p = .66).
Therefore, it seems that group predicted performance over and above non-
verbal ability on the percentage of perseverative errors, percentage of conceptual level
sorting (in both cases with the ASD group performing worse than the MLD group)
and on failing to maintain set (with the MLD group performing worse than the ASD
group).
The EF measures were simplified down to three variables in order to look at
the relationships between EF and ToM. Within the Card Sort task, all variables
correlated significantly or approached significance in the ASD group except for the
Failure to Maintain Set variable. In the MLD group, all variables correlated
significantly or approached significance except for the 'number of trials to complete
first category' variable. Due to this differing pattern of results in the MLD and ASD
groups, it was felt to be important to keep in all the measures rather than selecting one
or two of the variables as the most informative measures. To simplify comparisons a
'Card Sort' aggregate was created combining scores from all 5 variables as follows.
Each child was given a score of 0-2 for each variable. Those who were in the top
25% relative to the whole group were given 2, those in the middle 50% were given 1,
and those in the bottom 25% were given 0. These scores were then summed to make
a Card Sort aggregate score. This ranged from 0 - 10, with a mean of 4.58 (s.d. =
2.45). The MLD and ASD groups did not differ on this score (ASD mean = 4.85
(2.81), MLD mean = 4.24 (1.89), F = .74, df= 1,46, p = .40). The Difference score
was used for the Trails, and A' for the Go-NoGo.
There were no significant correlations between performance on the Trails task and the
Card Sort aggregate, or between Go-NoGo and Trails or the Card Sort aggregate.
Table 5.4 gives these correlations.
Table 5.4 Pearson's correlations between EF tasks ASD group (N = 27) above
diagonal in bold, MLD group (N=21) below diagonaL
Go-NoGo Trails	 Card sort
A'	 difference aggregate
Go-NoGo (A') (high = good performance) 	
-.18	 .17
Trails difference (high = poor performance) 	
.08	 -.12
Card sort aggregate (high = good performance)	
-.12	 -.37
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Ability, age, ToM and EF.
The relationship between ability, age and the ToM and EF measures was
investigated as ability and age might account for any relationship seen between ToM
and EF. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 report the correlations between the age, ability measures,
the ToM measures and EF measures. To minimise the risk of a Type 1 error, the
aggregates rather than individual task performance are used.
The Eyes task and the Card Sort were most closely related to ability, both
verbal and non-verbal, in both groups. The ToM aggregate appeared to be less
strongly related to verbal ability in the MLD group than in the ASD group, although
this is based on effect sizes only, since no correlations were significant in either
group. The Trails was related to ability in both groups, but this was stronger in the
MLD group (although this again is based on effect sizes since the numbers for this
task were small and the correlations are non-significant). The Go-NoGo was related
strongly to age in the MLD group, there was no relationship at all between age and
Go-NoGo in the ASD group.
Table 5.5. Correlations between age, ability, ToM and EFfor the ASD group
(N=27)




ToM aggregate	 .11	 .26	 .37	 -.13
Eyes task	 .27	 .23	 .48*	 .18
Card sort aggregate
	 .04	 •39*	 •44*	 .52**
Trails (n=21)	 -.27	 -.28	 -.03	 -.38
Go-NoGo A'
	 .02	 .19	 .13	 .00
* p <.05, p<.Ol
Table 5.6. Correlations between age, ability, ToM and EFfor the MLD group
(N=21)
Task	 CA	 BPVS TROG	 Ravens
(years) VMA	 VMA
ToM aggregate	 .00	 .14	 .14	 -.07
Eyes task	 .51*	 •59**	 .39	 •54*
Card sort aggregate
	 .13	 .27	 .56**	 .13
Trails (n=16)








In order to look at the relationship between the ToM aggregate and EF
measures, correlations were calculated within each diagnostic group. Table 5.7 gives
these correlations.
The ToM aggregate did not correlate significantly with any of the EF
measures in either the ASD or the MLD group (all p values> .45).
Table 5.7 Pearson 's correlations between the ToM and EF measure for the ASD (N
=27) and MLD (N =21) groups (ASD above diagonal in bold).
ToM	 Eyes task	 Card Sort	 Trails	 Go-NoGo A'
aggregate	 aggregate
ToM aggregate	 .31	 .07	 .00	 .20
Eyes	 -.08	 .38*	 -.19	 .15
CardSort	 -.11	 .40	 -.12	 .17
Trails	 .01	 -.45	 -.37	 -.18
Go-NoGo A'
	
-.12	 .28	 -.12	 .08
*p<.05
The Eyes task
The relationship between the Eyes task and the EF measures was calculated
separately as the Eyes task was not included in the ToM aggregate. The Eyes task
correlated highly with EF tasks in both the ASD and MLD groups. However, when
the TROG (which correlated with both Card Sort aggregate, Trails and the Eyes task)
was partialled out all these correlations that were significant or had a trend towards
significance became non-significant (Card Sort: ASD r = .22, p .29, MLD r = .24, p
= .31, Trails MLD r = -.27, p = .3 0), indicating that it may have been the relationship
of both tasks to the TROG which accounted for their association rather than a genuine
link between EF and the Eyes task.
Individual patterns of performance
If EF is absolutely necessary for ToM development, or if EF is necessary for the
actual execution of ToM online (or indeed vice versa), it should not be possible to
find children with good EF who have poor ToM (or vice versa). In order to look at
this, an EF summed score was created by dividing all three EF variables into 3 bands,
with the top 25% relative to the whole group getting a score of 2, the middle 50%
getting 1, and the bottom 25% getting zero. These variables were then summed.
Children who scored highly on this summed score had therefore had done well on all
3 EF tasks. This is not an EF aggregate and has not been used as such due to the low
correlations between performance on the different EF tasks. For those 10 children
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Summary of the relationships seen between age. ability. ToM and EF.
There is no evidence for a relationship between ToM and EF in the ASD group. In
the MLD group a single EF variable (failure to maintain set in the Card Sort)
correlated with the ToM aggregate. A relationship between the Eyes task and EF
disappeared when the TROG was co-varied out. Individuals in both the MLD and
ASD group existed who had very good EF but poor ToM, and individuals existed in
the MLD group who had relatively good ToM but poor EF. There were no
individuals in the ASD group with good ToM performance but poor EF, but this may
be because there were very few individuals in the ASD group with good ToM
performance.
Discussion
Theory of Mind and Executive Function in children with ASD and MLD
A hypothesis of this study was that, whilst children with MLD can be found
who fail FB tasks, these children would still perform better on a range of ToM tasks
than would children with ASD. The children in this sample were chosen because they
failed at least 2/3 standard PB tasks. The present study indicates that whilst a
proportion of children with MLD fail PB tasks, these children still demonstrated
superior mentalising abilities in other experimental ToM tasks when compared to
children with ASD. These results suggest that whilst some children with MLD might
have difficulties with standard FB tasks, this should not be taken as an indication that
they have comparable socio-cognitive difficulties to those with ASD. Study 1 of this
thesis (chapter 3) indicated that children with MLD might be particularly vulnerable
to task-specific demands of ToM tasks, and that therefore care should be taken when
comparing them with children with ASD on PB. However, there is some indication in
this study that task specific demands cannot account for all of the variability seen in
ToM performance in children with MLD - it is intriguing that the ToM tasks are more
strongly related in the MLD group than in the ASD group. It was also the case that,
contrary to predictions, the MLD group had no difficulties with the 'false photograph'
task, a non-social task designed to mirror the representational demands of the standard
PB task without reference to mental states. Both the ASD and MLD groups found the
false photograph task relatively easy, with over 70% passing in both groups. This
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indicates that whatever it is about the FB task that the MLD group found hard is not a
component of the False photograph task. This is in contrast to TD 3-year-olds, who
have been reported to find this task as hard as the FB task (Leekam & Perner, 1991),
although other studies (Slaughter, 1998) have found that the false photograph task is
easier for young TD children than the FB task. It is possible that the False
Photograph task is easier than a FB task by virtue of children's frequent exposure to
photographs and their properties - which may effectively provide repeated practice on
this type of task.
The poor association between ToM tasks seen in the ASD group may reflect
the fact that three of the tasks in this study differed from more standard ToM tasks in
that the failure to understand mental states will not lead to a consistently incorrect
response. Whilst in the standard unexpected transfer task, a child who does not
appreciate that a mental state can differ from reality will consistently say that the
protagonist will look in the wrong box, in tasks such as Seeing Leads to Knowing a
child without ToM would be expected to perform at chance when given a choice
between two dolls who have both had some contact with the box. This will lead to
essentially random performance in those with difficulties in ToM, and will therefore
lead to poor agreement between tasks. This may account for the poor inter-task
agreement seen in the ASD group. By contrast, children who understand the
character's mental states will perform correctly above chance, hence, perhaps, the
superior alpha for the ToM tasks in the MLD group.
The relationship between language and ToM has been discussed elsewhere
(chapters 2 and 3). Study 1 found that grammar was a significant predictor of
performance on standard FB tasks over and above vocabulary and age in ASD, but
not in MLD. The present study found a trend towards a relationship between grammar
and ToM in the ASD group only, despite the ToM tasks used in this study covering a
broader range than the standard unexpected transfer and deceptive box tasks used in
the earlier study. The lack of an association in the MLD group indicates again that
there may be a special relationship between language and ToM in ASD, (in line with
study 1 of this thesis and Happé; 1995).
There were some EF differences between the groups, in line with earlier
studies (e.g. Hughes et al., 1994; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Ozonoff et al., 1991;
Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988). There was a trend towards the ASD group showing
more perseveration on the card sort task then did the MLD group, and this was
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significant once the effects of non-verbal ability were accounted for. The ASD group
also showed less conceptual level sorting once their superior non-verbal ability was
accounted for - not surprisingly, since perserverative errors and conceptual level
sorting are closely inversely related. However, there were also differences from
earlier studies (e.g. Ozonoff et al., 1991) in that the ASD group in this study were
better at maintaining set on the Card Sort tasks than were the MLD group - this is a
measure of how many times individuals sorted four cards correctly in a row but then
failed to continue to get the six necessary to complete the category. There were also
no differences on other measures of EF, the Trails task and Go-NoGo, in contrast to
Rumsey and Hamburger (1988) who found differences on the Trails task when
comparing adults with ASD with normal adults, and Ozonoff et al (1994) who found
differences between an ASD group, a group with burette's Syndrome and a TD
group on the Go-NoGo task. This may reflect the nature of the present control
sample, all of whom had MLD, in contrast to the normal IQ controls used in the
Rumsey and Hamburger and Ozonoff et al studies. It is possible that some of the EF
deficits seen in ASD may be evident only in comparisons with controls who do not
have learning difficulties, and may in fact be shared with other developmental
disorders. However, this cannot explain all the differences since the control group in
Ozonoffis (1991) study had learning difficulties and were still significantly better on
an EF aggregate and on separate variables from the WCST and Tower of Hanoi.
The relationship between ToM and EF
A prediction of this study was that the EF tasks would be related to
performance on ToM in children with ASD and MLD, reflecting the findings from
earlier studies (Ozonoff et al., 1991; Zelazo et al., 2001). This was not found to be
the case, in contrast to the earlier studies cited above. What might explain this
difference? Task differences are one candidate - all other studies have used the
standard unexpected transfer FB task, which was excluded from the ToM aggregate in
this study as the children were effectively selected by their failure on it. As suggested
in chapter 4, there may be a special relationship between the acquisition of a
representational ToM (as assessed by a FB task) and EF, and that therefore the
relationship is far less evident in a study which includes only children who appear to
lack this representational understanding. It also could be that children who pass these
standard FB tasks demonstrate superior EF than do those who fail them, and that this
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dichotomous distribution accounts for the observed relationship. It could also be
because of floor effects on FB tasks in these groups - the sample in the present study
represents a group who were near floor on standard FB, however, due to the inclusion
of other ToM tasks a range of ability was still found to be present. If the relationship
between ToM and EF in ASD only holds in higher functioning individuals - or
possibly only in individuals who pass FB tasks, this may be because higher-
functioning individuals with ASD are using cognitive strategies to solve FB tasks
which themselves involve a degree of EF - for example, the language based strategies
which were suggested in chapter 2 would require a degree of 'holding in mind' and
shifting between perspectives which may be shared with EF tasks such as the Card
Sort or tests of working memory. Another possible explanation for the lack of an
association is that the performance on the ToM aggregate in the ASD group does not
reflect genuine differences in ToM ability - it is argued above that performance on
some of these tasks may be due to chance, and that even when ToM skills were
lacking, consistent failure would not have been expected.
The relationship between the Eyes task and EF measures was unexpected.
The Eyes task was significantly related or had a trend towards being related to the
Card Sort task in both the MLD and ASD group. However, this became non-
significant when grammatical ability was partialled out. The lack of a relationship
between the Eyes task and the ToM aggregate suggest that these tasks measure quite
different elements of the understanding of mind - although both measure elements
that individuals with ASD appear to have difficulties with. The Eyes task has been
used mostly in high functioning individuals with ASD or Asperger's Syndrome in the
past, where a deficit has been found when compared to normal controls (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Baron-Cohen et a!., in press). Quite
why grammatical ability (as measured by the TROG) should be related to the Eyes
task is a puzzle - there are no obvious grammatical demands in the Eyes task, and it is
hard to see how grammar might be important in the development of emotion
recognition from eyes, in contrast to how it might be important to the development of
FB understanding.
There has been some debate over whether individuals with ASD consistently
demonstrate either ToM or EF deficits, and what this implies for our understanding of
the disorder (Baron-Cohen & Robertson, 1995; Russell, 199Th). There was no real
evidence for ASD —specific EF deficits in this study, the ASD group only differed
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significantly from the MLD group on one EF measure, and several of the highest
scorers on the EF summed score were in the ASD group. However, this score was
relative to the rest of the sample rather than an absolute score, and it is possible that
both groups were performing poorly on EF. Since we had no TD control group we
cannot rule this out. In contrast, the ASD group performed much worse than the
MLD group on the ToM aggregate. There were individuals, both with ASD and MLD,
who performed very badly on ToM whilst displaying very good EF. There were only
individuals with MLD with the opposite pattern, but this may be due to the poor
performance of many children with ASD on the ToM tasks. We should not draw too
many conclusions from individual cases but these may indicate, along with Baron-
Cohen and Robertson (1995) and Tager-Flusberg, Sullivan, & Boshart (1997), that EF
and ToM may be functionally independent in lower-functioning people with ASD or
MLD.
Conclusion
This study found that children with ASD demonstrated ToM difficulties when
compared to children with MLD even when all children were selected by their poor
performance on standard PB tasks. It therefore seems that, whilst some children with
MLD do have difficulties on standard FB, this does not mean that the majority of
those who fail FB have ToM problems in the same way as do children with ASD.
However, further work is needed to elucidate the nature of these difficulties in
children with MLD, as this study indicates that task-specific factors do not account for
all variation in performance, and performance on ToM tasks in MLD was unrelated to
age, ability and EF.
This study also found that whilst children with ASD made marginally more
perserverative errors than children with MLD on a card sort task, they were
unimpaired relative to the MLD group on other EF measures (inhibitory control and
set shifting). Performance on ToM tasks was unrelated to performance on EF in both
ASD and MLD. This contrast with previous studies may reflect the lower-
functioning nature of this sample, and the fact that the unexpected transfer FB task
was not included in the ToM aggregate. These results tentatively suggest that it is
possible to achieve (relatively) high levels of EF without a good ToM, and vice versa.
However, this does not mean that improving EF might not improve ToM (or vice
versa). Whilst good EF might not be necessary for ToM, training children on EF may
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still be sufficient to improve their ToM or vice versa. In order to investigate this
relationship further, a training study of EF and ToM was carried out (Chapter 7).
Before reporting these results, a literature review of studies attempting to train either
ToM or EF will be presented (Chapter 6).
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CHAPTER 6
ToM	 EF INTERVENTION STUDIES
Introduction
As discussed in chapter 4, the relationship between ToM and EF is one which
has recently stimulated much interest (e.g. Frye, 1999; Hughes, 1998a; Tager-
Flusberg et a!., 1997). Several studies have shown a direct relationship between the
development of ToM and increasing executive control in normal development (see
Perner & Lang, 1999 for a review). Children with ASD and other developmental
disorders have been shown to have executive problems alongside their difficulties in
ToM; (Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Ozonoff et al., 1991; Pennington & Ozonoff,
1996), and there has been much debate over which of these deficits might be primary,
and therefore causal to the other. Whilst a range of studies have found correlations
between children's concurrent performance on EF and ToM tasks (e.g. Hughes,
1 998a; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996), only a very few have taken a longitudinal
approach, and have therefore been able to look at possible causal relationships
between the domains (e.g. Hughes, 1998b; Ozonoff& McEvoy, 1994). There is some
evidence that early executive performance may predict later ToM performance
(Hughes, 1 998b), but other studies suggest that the relationship may go in the
opposite direction (see Perner & Lang, 1999). It is also important to bear in mind
that a ToM is only one milestone of a young child's developing social understanding,
and failing to measure early antecedents of ToM might lead us erroneously to the
conclusion that a certain level of executive control precedes the development of
understanding of mind, when in fact it only precedes the understanding of mistaken
beliefs. It is possible that early antecedents of ToM could lead to the development of
certain executive skills in TD children, which are important in later advances in
mentalising.
Several different developmental accounts of the relationship between ToM
and EF are possible. These have been discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Briefly, one
option is that the relationship is a side effect of the tasks used to assess ToM. It has
been suggested that children may fail tasks designed to assess ToM due to task
demands such as flexibility or inhibitory control, rather than due to difficulties in
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mentalising (Hughes & Russell, 1993). In this case, difficulties in one area may be
masking competence in another area, and the association seen would be due to
common task demands. Secondly, it is possible that a minimum competence in, for
example, executive control is necessary for the development of mentalising skills, and
that whilst the children are not failing FB tasks due to the executive demands of the
task, they are failing due to limitations in the executive skills required either to
develop a ToM, or actually use a ToM online (Hughes, 1 998b). The converse could
also be the case - it is possible that a certain understanding of mental states is
necessary in order to perform well on EF tasks. Pemer (e.g. Perner & Lang, 1999)
proposed that an understanding of the representational nature of mental states (and an
understanding of the causal relationship between mental states and action) is
necessary in order to monitor behaviour sufficiently to pass EF tasks. Lastly, a third
factor (e.g. embedded rule structure), may underlie both EF and ToM.
The relationship between EF and ToM in ASD is of particular interest because
of the difficulties that children with ASD often demonstrate in both areas (although
not always, see Chapter 5, this thesis), and the profound disabilities that these
impairments may cause. If we could identify any causal relationship between the
domains, we might be able to intervene at an early stage in order to facilitate
development.
Given the difficulties of longitudinal studies, an alternative approach to testing
the direction of the relationship between ToM and executive functioning would be to
train children in either ToM or EF, and to examine the inter-relationships between the
two domains. If, for example, children are failing ToM tasks due to their problems in
inhibitory control and flexibility, rather than difficulties in mentalising, then training
them in flexibility and inhibitory control might enable them to pass ToM tasks.
Conversely, if they are failing tests of EF due to the representational demands of the
tasks, then training them in ToM might enable them to overcome these difficulties and
improve their EF performance.
This approach may also help us to distinguish between the difficulties seen in
different groups of children. It may be that children with MLD are failing FB tasks
for reasons other than deficits in ToM. As discussed in chapters 1,2 and 4, executive
control and language ability are plausible candidates for limiting factors on ToM task
success. Training these children alongside children with ASD may help us to identify
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the differing sources of task difficulty in these groups and test the specificity of the
ASD ToM deficit.
The success of some children with ASD on PB tasks is also surprising, and
suggests that some children with ASD can successfully use and develop strategies for
thinking about thoughts, at least in an experimental situation. The performance of
children with ASD on FB tasks is strongly linked to verbal ability, and it has been
suggested that more verbally able children may be able to compensate for some of
their difficulties by using their superior language skills either to work out logically a
non-ToM based method of passing FB tests (Happé, 1995), or as an alternative route
to some genuinely better understanding of mind (Tager-Flusberg, 2002). It therefore
seems possible that children with ASD might be able to be taught a verbally mediated
strategy as a compensatory device for ToM.
The first step in designing a study of this kind is to devise training
programmes in ToM and EF. Whilst an increasing number of studies have been done
which aim to improve the performance of children with ASD on FB tasks (e.g.
Hadwin et al., 1996; McGregor, Whiten, & Blackburn, 1998a; Swettenham, 1996;
Swettenham et al., 1996) only a single study to date has aimed to improve the EF of
individuals with ASD (Shimmon and Lewis, 2000). The majority of the studies that
attempt to train any kind of EF have aimed to improve attention in children with
ADHD. In the following review of intervention studies, the widest possible approach
has been taken in order to identify any strategies that might enable children with ASD
and learning difficulties access to the concepts involved. When examining ToM
training studies, studies have therefore been included that have introduced
modifications to FB tasks with the aim of improving the children's performance, as
well as those that have set out to train children in a specific strategy. The review of
EF training studies does not attempt to be exhaustive; the single training study with
children with ASD is considered, and some representative studies with children with
ADHD are considered insofar as they may inform the design of a programme for
children with ASD.
Theory of Mind intervention studies.
Several studies have set out to improve the ability of children to pass FB tasks,
with varying degrees of success. The participants in this type of training study have
mostly been children with ASD, but some participants with learning difficulties and
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young TD children have also been included. These studies range from small scale
intervention studies done on a one-to-one basis (e.g. McGregor Ct al., 1998a;
Swettenham et al., 1996), to studies where groups of children or young people meet
with the trainer for several months (e.g. Ozonoff & Miller, 1995). In the one-to-one
intervention studies the child is trained, usually in a specific FB scenario, using
different techniques to highlight problem areas. These techniques have ranged from
feedback from a computer (Swettenham, 1996), to enhanced cues within the task
(such as expressions of surprise on the part of the protagonist; (e.g. Bowler & Strom,
1998; Charman & Lynggaard, 1998; Parsons & Mitchell, 1999) to direct instruction in
specific strategies. For example, Swettenham et al. (1996) used a 'photo in the head'
technique as a cognitive prothesis to help the children think about thoughts, whilst
Weliman, Baron-Cohen, Caswell et a!. (2001) used thought bubbles in a similar way.
The techniques used in some of these studies are compared in greater detail below.
Initial discussion will focus on those studies that introduced modifications into
repeated FB tasks, considering what they may tell us about the tasks and children's
approach to them. The discussion will then move on to review the longer term
intervention studies.
ToM task modifications.
There are a number of modifications that may be introduced to the standard
FB task. These modifications sometimes appear to help TD children younger than 4
to pass the tests, although children rarely pass at ages younger than 3:6 (Wellman,
Cross et al., 2001). These modifications include clarifying the question (e.g. asking
'where will Sally look first for her marble?'), enhancing the salience of the
representation by introducing picture cues, introducing a deceptive motive to the task,
the child actively participating in the transformation, or reducing the salience of
reality in some way, for example by not having a real object present. Several of these
modifications have been used with children with ASD, and it is these that I will
concentrate on here.
Modifications to a FB task often appear to improve performance, but whether
this performance is transferred to tasks without cues is less clear. These studies
generally introduce the cue in the course of a single session, and in some cases do not
conduct post-testing without the cue - the aim is to see whether the cue can improve
performance, rather than whether the children can pass the tests independently of the
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cue. Studies will only be discussed where the modifications introduced inform our
interpretation of the training studies which I will refer to later. Some of these studies
use similar techniques to the training studies (for example, a photographic cuing
technique), whilst others use repeated FB tests. Both of these are elements of training
studies, and considering studies with these modifications but without training could
help to clarify which elements of the training programmes may be helpful.
Behavioural and emotional cues
Bowler and Strom (1998) used six repetitions of the unexpected transfer FB
task with the inclusion of enhanced behavioural and emotional cues to the
protagonist's FB. Their participants were children with ASD (9 in the experimental
group, 8 controls), TD young children (15 older and 15 younger in the experimental
group, 10 older in the control group), and children with MLD (8 in the experimental
group only), all of whom failed an initial FB task. The cues used were very explicit -
in the 'Surprise' form of the task, the protagonist returned, looked in the original
hiding place, looked surprised, and gasped 'Gosh, my (object) isn't here!', whilst in
the 'Action' condition the protagonist returned and looked in the original hiding place
without saying anything. The child was then asked 'where does X think her (object)
is?' No feedback was given after the child's responses. Only the children with ASD
and the older TD children (CA mean 3:11) benefited from the cues, whilst those with
learning difficulties and the younger normal children (CA mean 3:5) showed no
improvement at all. The control groups of children with ASD (who were given 6
standard FB tasks and one own FB task in place of the cued FB tasks) also showed
some improvement, with 4/8 passing some of the later tasks (in contrast to 0/8 in the
first task). The most helpful version was the 'Surprise' condition - which had the
most explicit cues - and which 8/9 of the children with ASD in the experimental
group passed the second time it was administered. The improvement in the older
normal children was much less dramatic, with only 5/15 passing the second 'Surprise'
condition. A standard task was not administered last, and so it is not possible to tell
if this improvement generalised to non-enhanced FB tasks. The children with ASD
did improve on their second administration of a standard task (with 5/9 passing),
however, since 4/8 of the control group with ASD also passed this task, it appears that
the cues themselves may not be responsible for this improvement in performance, but
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instead other more general factors may come into play (for example familiarity with
the scenario and the experimenters).
These findings are unexpected, as they seem to indicate that children with
ASD are particularly open to learning from enhancements of this type and from
practice of the scenario, as compared to children with learning difficulties and young
TD children. Given that the majority of children with ASD appear to fail to learn
about false beliefs from the social experiences and cues they see in real life, whilst all
TD children and most of those with learning difficulties generally do so, this is
surprising. However, the cues used in this case were very explicit and there was no
evidence to suggest that the children were able to use this experience to improve their
performance on other FB tasks. Indeed, the 'Surprise' condition is scarcely a false
belief task, since the protagonists explicitly stated their surprise at not finding the
object before the child is asked the question, and therefore all the child needs to
understand to pass is that saying something is indicative of what you think. As the
authors suggest, it may be that the young TD group are simply too young to
comprehend the tasks properly - previous studies have found it impossible to improve
the performance on FB tasks of children aged below 3 years 7 months (Sullivan &
Winner, 1991). The performance of the group with learning difficulties is puzzling -
one suggestion was that the IQs of the children might have been important, rather than
simply their VMAs. The group with learning difficulties were on average older than
the group with ASD, and were therefore of lower IQ, as a consequence of being
matched on \/MA.
How should these results be interpreted? It is possible that the reasons why
children with ASD fail these tasks - which may be genuine difficulties in considering
mental states, or problems with inhibiting a prepotent response - are solved by the
cues presented in the Bowler and Strom study. However, TD children (particularly
young ones) and those with learning difficulties may be failing for alternative reasons,
which are not solved by the cues. These alternative reasons are not obvious - but
possibilities could be misunderstanding the question or even in this case failing to
attend to the additional cues (particularly after 6 administrations of variants of the
task, when the test questions must have become quite predictable). However, there is
no obvious reason why this should be more marked in the non-autistic groups. Still,
this study does raise interesting questions about the differing ways in which children
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with ASD, young normal children and those with learning difficulties approach FB
tasks.
Photographic cues.
Photographic cues have also shown some success in facilitating FB
performance. Charman and Lynggard's (1998) study with photographic cues is
notable for finding no ASD-specific impairment on the standard FB task - although
this appears to be because the two control groups (children with MLD and young TD
children) performed particularly poorly, rather than because the group with ASD
performed well. This study used a posting version of the Deceptive box Smarties task
(adapted from Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991). When the child was asked 'What do you
think is in the tube?' for the first time, they were invited to chose a photo of what they
thought (i.e. Smarties) and post it into a toy postbox. The 'FB' question then took the
following form, 'When you posted your picture, before we opened the tube, what did
you think was in here?' This improved performance as compared to the standard task
in all three groups (although not significantly in the group with learning difficulties).
However, children with ASD still only performed at chance level, whilst over 70% of
the two control groups passed the posting task, which was significantly better than
chance. It is not demonstrated whether this facilitation shows any degree of transfer,
and the usefulness of the cue appears to be very task-specific. Bowler and Briskman
(2000) found that whilst the posting paradigm described above improved performance
on the Smarties task in children with ASD and young normal children, the same
technique had no effect on performance on an unexpected transfer test, even among
children who had done a posting version of the Smarties task beforehand. This may
reflect the relative difficulty of remembering someone else's belief, as opposed to
your own (as in the Smarties task), or the greater complexity of the Sally Anne task.
This technique again removes some of the demands of the standard FB task.
Firstly, the version used is really a 'memory for FB' task rather than a conventional FB
task. In addition, reframing the FB question as 'When you posted your picture, before
we opened the tube, what did you think was in there?' may have serious implications
for the way the child understands the task. This question is substantially more
elaborate than the standard 'Before I opened the tube, what did you think was inside?'
In children with some degree of communication difficulties, their understanding of
these questions may well not be complete, and they may be responding to the 'picture'
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element of the question rather than to the 'thinking' element - in other words, it is
possible that at least some of them are answering the question 'What was on the
picture you posted?' Even if they do understand the 'think' element of the question,
they do not necessarily have to consider mental states to reach the conclusion that the
photograph is the right answer.
Another alternative is that this task removes some of the executive demands of
the task - or at least, reverses the answer that a child with executive problems would
give. Posting the picture may make the initial answer much more salient in the child's
mind - and therefore whilst previously the salience of reality was greater than that of
a prior mental state, now, the salience of a posted picture is greater than reality,
particularly if the question specifically refers to that picture. However, the fact that
Bowler and Briskman were unable to replicate these results using an unexpected
transfer tasks seems to imply that it may be crucial that the task is one of memory for
own FB rather than one of considering other's false beliefs, or that it eliminates some
task-specific source of difficulty.
Training programmes designed to improve FB performance
The various different training techniques and their efficacies are summarized
in Table 6.1. Studies included are all those that have actively tried to train children or
adults to pass FB tasks over a series of sessions (i.e. those that introduced
modifications in the course of a single session are not included), and that tested the
participants after the training on a separate task, rather than simply assessing progress
during training. The different methods are then described, and their relative success
discussed.
Table 6.1. ToM training studies
uthors	 Participants	 Type of training	 esu1ts
lavell, Everett, 1 preschoolers
	 [ndividual. Visual	 o sig. improvement in
roft & Flavell 3-year-olds) 	 erspective taking training.	 erformance on visual perspective
1981)	 ______________ _____________________ aking tasks.
E'aylor & Hort 19 preschoolers
	 [ndividual. Played games	 o sig. improvement vs. pre-test
1990)	 A: 2:7 - 5:1	 lesigned to teach	 r control group.
inderstanding of the terms





adolescents with 3roup.	 Frend towards sig. improvement
vhller (1995)
	
SD (5 trained, 4 FoM and perspective taking )fl ToM composite. No
ontrols)	 kills. 14 sessions over 4 '/2 mprovement on parental social
A 11:0-16:2,	 nonths.	 kills ratings.
_________ TIQ 66— 104	 ________________ ___________________
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4uthors	 Participants	 Fype of training	 Results
ppleton &
	 16 3-year-olds (23 3roup. Discussion of videos ['rained group improved
teddy (1996)	 rained, 23 controls) lepicting UT FB scenarios. ignificantly on UT tasks,
ontrols: story reading	 eneralised to DB. Retained 2-3
_______________ ___________________ essions. 	 veeks later.
ladwin, Baron- W children with	 ndividual.	 klief group: sig. improvement in
ohen, Howlin	 SD, in three	 klief training: Principle-	 iumber of levels passed at post
c Hill (1996)
	 roups of 10 (traine ased training on 5 levels	 est and 2 month follow-up. No
rn emotion, belief o: itended to mirror normal	 ;eneralisation between domains
)lay.)	 Ievelopment.	 e.g.. belief training did not
A 4:0-13:0,	 mprove emotion perception or
______________ /MA 5:0-11:0
	 ________________________ retend play).
Slaughter &
	 Study 1: 11) 3-year- Lndividual.
	 Sig. improvement on both self and
opnik (1996) lds in 3 groups of 3elief: Feedback on A-R FB ther DB FB tests in both belief
11 (trained on belief, asks. 	 nd desire/perception groups. No
lesires/perceptions )esire/perception: Feedback ffect of control (number
nd number	 n perspective taking and
	
onsewation) training on ToM
onservation).	 lesire tasks,	 asks.
A 3:1 - 4:4.	 Fwo sessions over two
____________ JMA not given	 weeks.	 __________________________
Slaughter &
	 Study 2:	 Same at study 1.	 dig. improvement in both belief
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Abbs: ASD = Autistic spectrum disorder. FB False Belief, ToM = Theoiy of Mind. UT = Unexpected Transfer
FB task. DB = Deceptive Box FB task. S-K = Seeing Leads to Knowing task, A-R = Appearance Reality task.
Feedback on FB tasks.
Straightforward feedback has had limited success with children with ASD, but
appears to have been more useful with children with Down Syndrome or young ID
children. Swettenham (1996) found that feedback from a computer on an unexpected
transfer scenario enabled children with ASD to pass that task on the computer or the
same task with dolls, but that they did not improve on a deceptive box task, unlike the
TD children or those with Down Syndrome. There is additional evidence that
feedback may be successful with young normal children. Slaughter and Gopnik
(1996) describe a study in which three-year-old children were given feedback on
appearance-reality type tasks. Two weeks after the training session, 54% of the group
who were given feedback (referring to the beliefs of the characters) passed a FB task,
whilst only 14% of the control group did.
Photographs or pictures in the head.
More elaborate intervention schemes have aimed to teach children with ASD
strategies to enable them to pass FB tasks. Photos or pictures in the head have been
used as an analogy for thoughts in several studies. Swettenham et al. (1996) trained
eight children with ASD on a programme that involved teaching them that people
have photo-like thoughts in their heads. None of the children in this study managed to
learn the rules for linking the photos with a mental state, although 7 of the eight
children learnt rules linking the photos with the character's actions. Post-training, 7/8
of the children passed the 'Sally-Anne' FB scenario (from a baseline of all of them
failing), 3/8 passed the Smarties FB test and 6/8 passed a 'Seeing leads to Knowing'
task. The number who passed an appearance-reality task remained unchanged at 3/8.
These results indicate a certain level of generalisation from training of this type,
although since the children were not tested again at a later date we cannot tell whether
they retained their understanding for any substantial length of time, nor whether the
children are able to use the strategy outside the experimental situation.
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McGregor et al. (1998a) also used a training programme that involved
learning that people have thoughts in their heads like pictures. In a follow-up to that
study, McGregor, Whiten and Blackburn (1998) trained 10 individuals with ASD on
scenarios using real people. They used videoed versions of the FB tasks. The
participants were initially asked to choose the photograph that showed the person's
thoughts, then were helped with verbal prompts, and finally were shown a version
with no prompts at all. At post-test, three (novel) videoed FB tasks were presented,
and most of the adults (3/5) and children (4/5) passed two or more of these tasks. The
authors interpret this as evidence that people with ASD can be helped to apply the
'thoughts in the head' technique to a real-life setting. However, there are several
problems with this study. One is that only two FB tasks were administered at pre-test,
and half of the participants passed one of these tasks. It is impossible to tell whether
these participants would have passed or failed a majority of FB tests had they been
given another task. If the five participants who passed one test at pre-test would in
fact have passed 2/3 tasks had they been given the chance, only 2/10 participants
would have gone from failing the majority of tasks administered to passing. In
addition, although the authors claimed to have refined the technique in order to help
people with ASD carry over their learning to real life scenarios, they made no attempt
to assess this beyond the videoed FB tasks that closely resembled the scenarios used
in the training. However, their findings do show that people with ASD can learn to
apply a 'picture as thought' technique to real people, even though it is not possible to
insert the pictures into real people's heads.
Other studies have used thought bubbles to highlight the thoughts of the
characters involved in the FB scenario. Weliman et al. (2001) trained two separate
groups of children with ASD on a programme that took place over between three and
eight sessions of about 30 minutes each. Again they found improvement in
performance on the unexpected transfer PB scenario, and some degree of transfer to
other tests. Evidence from other studies (e.g. Parsons & Mitchell, 1999) indicates that
children with ASD can learn to use thought bubbles as props to help them represent
mental states.
Rule or principle based training.
Rule-based strategies have also had some success. Hadwin et al. (1996) used
a five stage programme designed to mirror the developing understanding of mind in
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normal children. These five levels were simple perspective taking, complex
perspective taking, seeing leads to knowing, predicting action on the basis of belief,
and finally PB. Tasks assessed understanding at each of these levels, and the children
were only training in the areas where they failed the task at the pre-test. The training
programme took half an hour a day for up to eight days. The children were explicitly
taught the principles underlying each stage, with the aim of improving the potential
for generalisation. At the end of the training there was a significant improvement in
the number of levels passed, and this was still significant, although somewhat
attenuated, at a two month follow-up. However, it is not clear how many of the
children were actually passing FB tasks, and how much of the improvement was due
to improvement on simpler tasks such as a 'Seeing leads to Knowing' task. Hadwin
et al. also trained children on emotion recognition and pretend play. Although the
children in the Emotion group improved on the trained tasks, there was no indirect
transfer of learning between any of the training programmes.
Theory of Mind focused social skills training.
Ozonoff and Miller (1995) used another rule-based approach within the
context of a social skills training programme. The participants acted out role-plays
that illustrated principles such as perception influencing knowledge and second order
perspective taking. The programme also covered other areas such as conversational
skills, and included a range of opportunities for the participants to practice their skills.
ToM measures were used before and after the intervention. The intervention group
improved substantially on the ToM tasks. Somewhat surprisingly, given the highly
practical nature of the training, there was no improvement on parent and teacher rated
social competence in the intervention group. This may reflect the insensitivity of the
measure used to mentalising ability as opposed to social skills - items included
inviting peers to the home, joining in group activities and initiating conversations, all
of which do not necessarily require ToM skills, and may not be improved as a result
of an improvement in mentalising ability.
Theory of Mind training studies with non-autistic groups.
A few training studies have concentrated on non-autistic groups who
demonstrate difficulties on FB tasks. A range of ToM interventions appear to be
remarkably effective in these groups - Steereman et al (1996) found a significant
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improvement of ToM training on real life behaviour in socially anxious and
aggressive children, and other studies have found that those with learning difficulties
show a greater degree of generalisation to other ToM tasks than do children with ASD
(Swettenham, 1996). Given that ToM difficulties are generally not thought to be
fundamental in children with these types of difficulties, it is puzzling that a ToM
intervention should have such wide reaching effect, particularly when the non-ToM
social skills group have shown much less impressive progress (Steerneman et a!.,
1996). These two studies may indicate that difficulties in ToM may be more
widespread than was initially thought, and whilst it may be the case that ToM is a
fundamental deficit in ASD, difficulties may well also be present in other groups.
Alternatively, it may be that individuals with learning difficulties fail these tests for
task-specific reasons, which the training programmes enable them to overcome.
Summary
A range of techniques has been used in an effort to improve performance on
FB tasks. These include straightforward feedback (Swettenham, 1996), rule-based
training (Hadwin et al., 1996), photos in the head or thought bubbles (Swettenham et
al., 1996; Wellman, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and social skills training (Ozonoff &
Miller, 1995). Whilst most of the studies can show improvement in a task similar to
that used to train the children, fewer are able to demonstrate any degree of transfer to
other tasks requiring a ToM. A straightforward feedback paradigm does not appear to
show any degree of transfer to other types of FB task in children with ASD (although
it does with young TD children and children with learning difficulties; (Swettenham,
1996). Other cued techniques are hard to evaluate since a range of tasks are not
included. The strategy based training studies (Hadwin et al., 1996; McGregor et al.,
1998a; Swettenham et al., 1996; Weilman, Baron-Cohen et a!., 2001) discussed here
have demonstrated fairly consistent success in improving the ability of children with
ASD and those with learning difficulties to pass FB tests. The improvement in the
strategy based training studies generally includes some degree of transfer, and the
improvement has been shown in at least one case to be maintained over several
months (Hadwin et al., 1996). Out of the three main strategies taught: pictures in the
head; thought bubbles; and a rule-based strategy; there is no clear evidence that any
one is significantly better than the others. However, there has been little attempt to
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assess whether this improvement generalises to mentalising skills in every day life,
and in many studies there is no assessment of whether the improvement is maintained
beyond the end of the programme. Training programmes have also tended to focus
almost exclusively on FB scenarios, played out by dolls or pictures, and have not
(with the exception of Ozonoff et al; 1995), and some effort by McGregor et a!;
1998b) related these scenarios to everyday life and real people. Additionally, these
strategy based training studies have tended to concentrate on children with ASD
alone, MLD alone, or in one case children with ASD contrasted with young TD
children. This means that the opportunities for examining the differences between
how children with ASD and those with learning difficulties respond to this type of
strategy have not been exploited. Whilst comparisons with young TD children may
be useful, it is debatable whether they provide a fair comparison group for children
with ASD. For a start, they will mostly have no difficulties in learning, whilst most
children with ASD have some degree of learning disability. This may have
implications for how they respond to any training programme, as well as for how
quickly they grasp the concepts involved. In addition, there is the difficulty that
whilst very young normal children will not be able to grasp the requirements of the
training programme, older children are likely to be on the point of passing FB tasks
anyway. They may therefore be particularly receptive to instruction about ToM and
false beliefs. Whilst children with learning difficulties who fail FB tasks are also
unlike children with ASD in many ways, they can at least be matched on verbal
ability with children with ASD, and are more likely to share difficulties in acquiring
general concepts - a factor that may well be of crucial importance when participating
in a training programme.
Training studies with individuals with learning difficulties or social problems
other than ASD (Ashcroft et al., 1999; Steememan et al., 1996; Swettenham et al.,
1996) suggest that they may be highly receptive to ToM based interventions, and
there is growing evidence that many children with learning difficulties do fail ToM
tasks. Comparing these groups may give us more insight into the specific problems
that children with ASD have, as opposed to more general problems common to all
those with a learning disability. They may also give us insight into why some children
with learning difficulties fail FB tasks - is it simply due to task demands such as




In contrast to the ToM training studies, very little has been done in training
executive functioning, and only one study has been done with children with ASD.
Those that exist have concentrated mostly on children and adolescents with ADHD.
Individuals with ADHD often demonstrate difficulties in sustaining attention and
inhibitory control, although the exact nature of their deficits is not clear (see Sergeant
et a!., 2002 for a review). Interventions have been based around building up the
children's visual and auditory attention skills. The EF training studies discussed are
selected for their relevance to, and potential use with, children with ASD.
The only study to date to attempt to train any form of EF in children with ASD
used the Tower of London task (Shimmon & Lewis, 2001). Participants in this study
included children with ASD (12 trained, 12 controls), children with learning
difficulties (9 trained, 9 controls) and TD preschoolers (11 trained, 10 controls). This
study used a very brief training protocol, in which the children were trained on a
single day by extra 'warm-up' tasks inserted before each set of tests, in which the
participants were reminded of the rules and were asked questions such as 'which disc
is best to move now?' or 'can you think of where you might move the yellow one
now?' when they hesitated. The children were also given feedback at the end of each
trial as to how they had performed. The control groups did the same task without the
'warm-up' trials and with no feedback. The post-test consisted of the Tower of Hanoi
and a Card Sort task (a modified version of the DCCS). The children with ASD and
TD children showed an effect of training on their performance on the Tower of Hanoi:
6/12 of the trained ASD group passing the 7-move version, compared to none of the
control group. The effect on the TD children was smaller, with 6/11 of the trained
group passing in contrast to 4/10 of controls. There was no significant effect of
training in the MLD group. There was no generalisation to the card sort task, but this
may have been because both the MLD and the TD groups were at or near ceiling on
this task. A FB task was also administered before and after training (an deceptive box
version before, an unexpected transfer version afterwards). There was no transfer of
learning to the FB post-test. This study suffers from several limitations, most
importantly the lack of a proper pre-testing of the task on which the children were
trained. The pre-test in this study consisted only of a test of inhibition (the Luria
Hand Game) and an deceptive box FB task, whilst the post-test consisted of the
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Tower of Hanoi task and a card sort. The lack of a pre-test on the Tower of Hanoi
makes it impossible to conclude that the trained group would not have performed
better than controls at the Tower of Hanoi tasks before the training. In addition, the
Card Sort and unexpected transfer FB tasks were not administered before training,
meaning that we have to assume that the controls and trained groups would have
performed at equivalent levels before training. The 'training' in this study mostly
consisted of reminding children of the rules of the task and asking them questions that
encouraged them to attend to the task. Whilst these are without doubt methods of
improving task performance, it is debatable whether it actually improves their
executive functioning, or whether it merely improved their attentiveness to the task.
Finally, the scope of the study was very short term, with the children usually doing
pre-tests and training on one day, and the post-tests the next day.
An improvement in performance on EF tests has been demonstrated in two
studies with children with ADHD. Semrud-Clikeman, Nielsen, Clinton et al (1999)
used visual and auditory attention tasks that gradually increased in difficulty over 32
hour-long group sessions. This was a very long term and intensive intervention
project, with the children meeting twice a week in groups of 4 or 5 (with 2 or 3 adults)
for eighteen weeks. The training consisted of the children doing the tasks repeatedly
(whilst being timed) until they were 100% accurate on two consecutive occasions.
Once they reached this level they moved onto the next, more advanced, task. They
were not taught explicit strategies for improving their performance, but the tasks were
discussed within each group and guidance was offered as to possible strategies. After
doing the tasks, the children would verbalise their strategy and evaluate it based on
their performance. Post-training, the group who had received the intervention had
significantly improved on tests of visual attention and auditory attention when
compared to a control group who also had ADHD. Indeed the intervention group's
performance post-test was comparable to a group of controls who did not have
attentional problems (and who did not receive any intervention). No efforts were
made to assess the impact of the training on their everyday behavioural and
attentional problems.
A second study, by Kerns, Eso, and Thomson (1999) also aimed to improve
performance on attentional measures in children with ADHD. In this case the children
were seen individually twice weekly, over eight weeks. The intervention consisted of
training on sustained, selective, alternating and divided attention, and included both
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auditory and visual activities. The visual materials were sets of cards showing
pictures of people divided into 'families' on them. The children were asked to sort the
cards in different ways, for example, by gender, by hair colour, or by family. The
tasks became more difficult as the children progressed, and factors such as speed or
distracting background noises were introduced. The children were not taught any
specific strategies for improving their performance. A control group also met the
experimenter for sessions, but they engaged in a range of computer-based games.
Post-training, both groups improved significantly on a number of measures, but the
intervention group had significantly larger gains on tasks requiring attentional
flexibility (such as the Day-Night Stroop test), tests of selective attention, the Mazes
subtest of the WISC-III, and a maths worksheet. There were no significant
improvements on a symptom severity questionnaire completed by the parents and
teachers of participants (the Attention Deficit Disorder Evaluation Scale, McCamey,
1989), although there was a trend towards improvement in the teacher's report of
inattenion and impulsivity for the intervention group.
The latter two studies discussed here were carried out with children with
ADHD, and as such are not immediately appropriate for children with ASD.
However, they do tell us that training children in EF is feasible, and give some
suggestions as to possible techniques. Children with ASD appear to have difficulties
in set shifting and flexibility (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996), rather than in sustaining
attention. The techniques used are also problematic - the training in the Semrud-
Clikeman et al. study was extremely long term, and demands a very high level of
motivation on the part of the participants, whilst the Kerns et al. study does not give
any explicit instruction as to appropriate strategies to use. Given children with ASD's
difficulties in perseveration and generativity, it is probable that under these
circumstances they would find it very hard to devise strategies of their own. The
Shimmon and Lewis study provides some evidence that children with ASD can be
helped to improve their performance on tests of executive functioning, even with
fairly minimal intervention. Certain aspects of the Kerns et al. study are potentially
useful, and could be applied to training in flexibility and set shifting - for example
having groups of cards which can be sorted by various dimensions. Training the
children in shifting between these domains may help to improve their flexibility. It is
also notable that the children in this group did show improvement on a test of
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flexibility (the Day-Night Stroop task), unlike the children in the Shimmon and Lewis
study.
Summary
In conclusion, a number of studies have attempted to train children in theoiy
of mind. Most of the children included have ASD, but some studies have trained
other groups, including young TD children, children with DS, adults with MLD and
socially anxious and aggressive children. Varying levels of success have ensued. All
of the published studies show some improvement on FB tasks similar to that on which
the children were trained, but there is less evidence for any degree of transfer to other
tasks. Giving repeated feedback on FB tasks, in particular, showed no transfer of
learning in children with ASD. In contrast, young normally-developing children and
children with DS appeared to show a greater level of transfer of learning to other
tasks. The strategy-based training studies were more successful, although neither the
longer term retention of the learning, nor evidence for improvement in every day life
social understanding has been well assessed. Many of the training programmes
discussed also suffer from a lack of real life scenarios used in the training, focusing
instead solely on dolls or mannequins. A lack of adequate controls may also be a
problem; it seems unlikely that young TD children are a suitable control group for
children with ASD.
The field of EF training is far less developed, and it is clear that a new
programme would have to be developed to train children with ASD in flexibility and
set shifting. However, the available studies with children with ADHD suggest some
possible methods for doing so.
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CHAPTER 7
STUDY 3: A TRAINING STuDY OF THEORY OF MIND AND
ExEcuTIVE FuNcTIoN
Introduction
As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the relationship between EF and ToM has
been the object of much recent research and debate. There are clear correlations
between ToM and EF in young TD children, and children with ASD demonstrate
difficulties in both ToM and EF, although these difficulties do not necessarily appear
to be related, at least amongst those who fail FB tasks (Study 2). However, in ASD
there is some argument over whether either EF or ToM is the fundamental deficit
(Baron-Cohen, 1989; Russell, 199Th), and whether the difficulties seen in one area
can account for the difficulties seen in the other. This study aims to investigate this
relationship by training children with ASD in either ToM or EF (particularly set
shifting and inhibition), and thus to look for interactions between the domains. In
order to pursue the general theme of deficit specificity, children with ASD were
compared with children with MLD. The hypothesis was that children with MLD do
not have fundamental deficits in ToM, and therefore that they might benefit more
from the training and show a wider degree of generalisation than children with ASD.
Most training studies to date have failed to assess whether any gains are retained over
time, and whether these gains are reflected in the child's behaviour in everyday life.
This study therefore set out to train children in both ToM and EF, to assess the impact
on experimental tasks both immediately and at follow-up, and to assess any impact on
everyday behaviour, as rated by teachers.
The predictions for this study were as follows. Firstly, both children with
ASD and those with MLD would be able to learn a simple strategy to enable them to
pass FB tasks, but greater generalisation to other, non-trained, ToM tasks would be
seen in the MLD group. Secondly, children with ASD and MLD would be able to
learn a simple strategy to improve their performance on tests of cognitive flexibility
such as card sorting tasks. Then there are four possible alternatives: (i) If ToM and
EF are functionally independent, the training programmes will show no transfer from
one area to the other. This would also be the case if they share underlying cognitive
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factors, not addressed in the training programmes. (ii) If ToM is necessary for EF
(either because of task-specific factors, an online need for a certain competence in one
to facilitate the other, or developmentally), then the ToM training will lead to
improvements in EF. (iii) If EF is necessary for ToM (because of task-specific
factors, online or developmentally), then the EF training will lead to improvements in
ToM. (iv) If ToM is necessary for EF, and EF is necessary for ToM, then the
interactions will go both ways. Obviously this type of short duration training will not
identify genuine long term developmental effects. However, within the 2-month time
span of the follow-up, there may be sufficient time for more indirect (rather than
immediate) effects of the training to become evident.
Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from eight schools for children with special
educational needs in the greater London area. They had all participated in Study 1
and Study 2, and were included on the basis of two criteria. First, that they had to
have a VMA (as assessed by the BPVS II) of over 4 years 3 months. This was in
order to ensure they had adequate language to understand the training programmes,
and that they were over the age at which TD children would be expected to pass FB
tasks. Secondly, they had to fail at least 2/3 FB tasks that involved predicting the
contents of another's mind. These tasks are described in Study 1.
The children formed two groups. Twenty-one had non-autistic moderate
learning difficulties (MLD), and 27 had autistic spectrum disorders (ASD). Twenty
of the children in the latter group had a statement of special educational needs with
ASD or autism as their primary diagnosis, one had a diagnosis of Asperger's
Syndrome. The remaining 6 (who were from a single school and who were all being
educated in classes for children with autistic spectrum disorders) were described on
their records as having social and communication disorders. These children were
assigned to the ASD group after completion of a checklist of symptoms based on
DSM-IV after discussion with their teachers.
Children were randomly allocated to either one of two intervention conditions,
the ToM training group, or the EF training group, or to a control group, who received
no intervention. Children from the same school were distributed across groups, to
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control for any school effects on the training. The CA, BPVS and TROG VMA and
Raven's CPM (raw scores) are given in Table 7.1. The initial aim had been to have
between 8-10 children in each experimental group. It proved very difficult to find
appropriate children with MLD, since few such children with a VMA over 4 years
consistently fail FB tasks, and so some group sizes are lower. Every effort was made
to match for both school and VMA across these groups. However, in several cases
children were allocated to the control group by default, by virtue of their having been
absent from school over the weeks on which the training took place, and therefore the
groups were not perfectly matched.
A one-way ANOVA showed no significant differences between the 3
experimental groups in each diagnostic group on any of the ability measures. As
noted in Study 2, the ASD group as a whole differed from the MLD group in being
significantly younger and having a significantly higher score on Raven's Matrices.
Table 7.1 CA and ability of the six experimental group: mean (&d).
ASD— ASD— ASD—	 MLD—	 MLD—	 MLD-
ToM	 EF	 Controls	 ToM	 EF	 Controls
(n=10)	 (n = 10)	 (n = 7)	 (n = 6)	 (n = 7)	 (n = 8)
CA(years)	 10.50	 10.68	 9.67	 12.03	 11.81	 12.19
(3.02)	 (2.68)	 (1.73)	 (1.77)	 (2.20)	 (1.32)
BPVS VMA
	 7.23	 6.57	 5.44	 7.46	 7.08	 6.90
(years)	 (2.07)	 (1.51)	 (1.14)	 (2.00)	 (2.24)	 (1.81)
TROGVMA	 5.00	 5.35	 4.49	 5.83	 5.57	 5.19
(years)	 (0.61)	 (1.41)	 (0.45)	 (1.83)	 (1.62)	 (0.51)
Raven's CPM 22.90	 24.60	 20.57	 16.00	 16.57	 18.50
(raw scores)	 (7.23)	 (8.07)	 (5.97)	 (5.48)	 (3.10)	 (5.68)
Measures
Pre- and post training measures were administered prior to beginning the intervention
and within 2 days of completing the intervention. Follow-up testing was completed
between 6 and 12 weeks later (mean time 9 weeks 4 days, s.d. 2 weeks 4 days),
according to the schools' schedule and holidays. There were no differences in the
delay between the training or control groups within each diagnostic condition (ASD F
(2,24) = 0.45, p=.64, MLD F (2,18) = 0.91, p=.42). There was a difference between
the ASD and MLD groups (F (1,46) = 15.03, p<z.Ol), with the ASD group having a
longer delay. This was due to a particularly long delay at one school over the summer
holidays. The six children from this school were equally distributed over all three
experimental groups. Table 7.2 gives an overview of the design of the project, whilst
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table 7.3 gives a summary of the tasks used at each time point, and what they were
designed to test. The tasks were not all used at each time point in minimise exposure
to the tasks and thus to lessen the chances of the children learning from task
repetition.
Table 7.2 Overview ofproject design
Screening	 Pre-test	 Training	 Post-test	 Follow-up
Up to a month	 Immediately	 20 minutes per	 1-2 days	 6-12 weeks
before training,	 before training	 day for 4-10 days afterwards' 	 afterwards
Table 7.3 Tasks used at each timepoint
Pre-test and screening	 Post-test	 Follow-up
ToM:	 ToM:	 ToM:
FB unexpected transfer	 FB unexpected transfer	 FB unexpected transfer
FB deceptive box self and other F13 deceptive box self and other FB deceptive box self and other
Pe-hiding deception	 Penny-hiding deception	 Seeing leads to Knowing
Seeing leads to Knowing	 Knowing/guessing self and
Knowing/guessing self and	 other
other
ToM control:	 ToM control:	 ToM control:
False photograph	 False photograph	 False photograph
EF:	 EF:	 EF:
Flexibility and set shifting:	 Flexibility and set shifting: 	 Flexibility and set shifting:
Modified Wisconsin Card Sort Card Sort	 Card Sort
Task ('Card Sort')	 Inhibitory control: Go-NoGo	 Set shifting: Trails task
Set shifting: Trails task
Inhibitoiy control: Go-NoGo
Everyday behaviour: 	 Everyday behaviour:
Teacher questionnaire	 ______________________________ Teacher questionnaire
Screening
The screening procedures are described in the methods section for Study 1 (Chapter
3). An extra unexpected transfer task was administered to those children who failed
either the Sally-David task or the Smarties (other) task (but not both). Children had to
fail either 2/2 or 2/3 FB tasks to be included.
Pre-training testing
Children were given a pre-test to establish baseline measures of ToM, EF and general
ability. Tasks used are showed in table 7.3, and described in full in studies 1 and 2.
The pre-training testing session, which lasted approximately one hour, was
administered by a single researcher in a quiet room in the child's school. In the case
of some of the younger or least able children (ASD N = 16, MLD N = 4) this was
divided into two half hour sessions to maximize their concentration.
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Theory of Mind and Executive Function tiuestionnaire:
Teachers were asked to complete a questionnaire about the children both
before training began and at follow-up This questionnaire was designed using 15
items from previous studies (e.g. Frith et a!., 1994) that had been considered to require
a ToM. These included telling white lies, taking things literally, recognising surprise
or embarrassment and responding to indirect hints. Fifteen items were included that
were designed to be indicative of executive functioning (Booth, Happé, Hughes, &
Chariton, in prep) for example, having an ability to plan ahead, being able to do
mental arithmetic and being able to follow verbally given lists of instructions. An
additional five items were included which were social items that were thought not to
necessitate a ToM, for example having appropriate table manners, and recognising
happiness and sadness. These items went to form the 'general sociability' (G-S)
scale. A scoring system similar to that used by Frith et al. (1994) was utilised: 2 points
for behaviour 'definitely' shown, 1 point if 'sometimes' or 'rarely' shown (and for
don't know answers) and 0 for behaviours shown 'not at all'. These scores were
compiled to give 3 scales, two of which (the ToM and EF scales) ranged from 0-30,
and one of which (G-S) ranged from 0-10. See Chapter 9 for alpha values for these
scales, and for a more detailed account of the questionnaire distribution. See
Appendix II for a list of all items in the questionnaire.
Training programmes
There were two training programmes. Both consisted of 25-minute long individual
sessions held on consecutive days. The training was to criterion, and so the children
could take between 4 and 10 days to complete the programme. At the end of each
day, the child and the researcher discussed what had been learnt, and wrote a sentence
on a 'reminder card'. Each new session began with reading the sentence on the card,
and discussing what had been learnt the previous day. Brief outlines of the training
programmes are given below, and fuller descriptions for each training programme are
shown in Appendix III and IV.
ToM training
This training programme was based on that used by Swettenham et al. (1996).
However, the programme was modified in a number of ways, as follows. A doll was
used instead of a mannequin's head. Illustrative stories about children in similar
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situations to those used in the training that day were introduced at the end of most
stages, and two perspectives were introduced in stage 3. The training was to criterion,
and presentations were unlimited up to a maximum of ten 20-2 5 minute sessions. If a
child failed to reach criterion on one day, the stage was repeated with different
materials the next day until they passed it. The photos were referred to throughout as
'thought-pictures', and were linked explicitly to mental states throughout the training.
Design
The five rules to be learnt at each stage of the training were as follows:
Stage 1: Introduction of camera analogy. 'When a person sees something, they have
a thought in their head and we can say it's like a picture.'
Stage 2: 'Thought pictures can stay in a person's head even if they go away. They
can use the thought picture to look for things.'
Stage 3: 'Different people can have different thought pictures in their heads'
Stage 4: ' Sometimes thought pictures can be out-of-date.'
Stage 5: 'A thought is like a thought-picture, only we can't see it.'
Each of the stages consisted of demonstrations and questions to check the child
understood the principles involved. The child was allowed to move onto the next
stage once they had answered 3 consecutive trials correctly. At the end of some of the
stages illustrated stories were given about real children in scenarios that paralleled the
concepts used at that stage. The children did not have to pass these to move onto the
next stage, but their responses were recorded. The training was designed to last
between 5 and 10 days. In practice, some children completed it in 4 days, as they
completed Stages 1 and 2 in a single session. The longest duration was 8 days.
Materials
Two dolls with plastic heads were adapted for the training. Slots were cut in the top of
the dolls' heads so that Polaroid photos could be inserted. See Appendix III for a
photograph of the dolls. Some Polaroid photos were prepared beforehand; others
were taken during the course of the training. A Polaroid 'JoyCam' was used. Objects
used during the training were a purple cylinder, an orange basket, two coloured boxes,
an Elmo toy puppet, a toy Mr Happy, a toy crocodile, a toy elephant, a small teddy
bear. See Appendix III for pictures of the materials.




No appropriate EF training programmes for children with ASD were found in a
literature search on the topic. Several programmes exist for children with ADHD, and
whilst these programmes are generally not relevant for children with ASD, or are too
long term for the scope of this project, elements from these studies were used, such as
the use of cards which could be sorted by different dimensions (Kerns et al., 1999).
The programme was designed to target flexibility and set shifting, aspects of EF that
appear to be impaired in ASD. The EF training paralleled the ToM programme as
closely as possible, having five stages on which the child was trained to criterion.
Whilst the ToM programme used a 'thoughts as pictures' analogy, this programmes
used a 'brain as machine' analogy, introducing the idea of using different 'brain tools'
for different activities. The five rules to be learnt were as follows:
Stage 1: People can do lots of things. Sometimes they need to change how they do
things. They can do this by changing their brain tools.
Stage 2. Sometimes if we have been doing something for a long time, it's hard to
change our brain tool.
Stage 3. Some brain tools are easier to use than others. Stop-Change-Go sequence for
changing brain tools.
Stage 4. Sometimes we have to change our brain tools before we finish doing
something.
Stage 5. Sometimes we have to decide for ourselves what brain tools to use.
Each session consisted of a demonstration and practice, using cards. The child
had to perform to criterion in order to move on to the next section. These criteria
were set using the binomial distribution, and were calculated so that there was less
than a 5% probability of the child achieving that result by chance alone. The concept
of changing tools was introduced using a toy truck, which had a range of changeable
fitments that could be used to pick up stones, sand etc. There were illustrated stories
at the end of some stages, drawing parallels between the exercises and real life. A
'reminder card' was completed at the end of each session, and was read at the
beginning of each new session to refresh the child's memory of the previous
exercises. A full description of the training is given in Appendix IV.
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Materials
A scale model yellow CAT truck with removable tools was used. A toy plastic car,
some twigs and a collection of small stones were used with the truck. A laminated,
line drawn cross section of a head, showing the brain, was used as the 'brain card'.
'Brain tools' were oval laminated pieces of card with descriptions and illustrations for
those who couldn't read (e.g. shapes on the 'Shape' tool, numbers on the 'Number'
one). Several sets of laminated cards were used. These varied along different and
differing numbers of dimensions. The simplest ones varied along only two
dimensions, e.g. yellow and red circles and rectangles. The more complicated ones
used complex shapes and more dimensions, e.g. card colour, type of animal, number
of animals present. See Appendix IV for pictures of the materials used.
Post-training testing and follow-up
The post-training testing session was administered one or two days after
completion of the training programme, and the follow-up tests were administered
between 6 and 12 weeks later. An outline of the tasks used at each time point is given
in table 7.3. In order not to repeat tasks too many times (and therefore to minimize
practice effects), a reduced number of tasks were administered at this stage. Different
materials were used for each version of the task administered. Tasks were presented in
a single half hour session at each timepoint. Many of the task protocols are described
in the results section of Study 2 (chapter 5).
Results
Results will be reported under subheadings, reflecting the key research
questions. The first issue to be considered is the response to the two types of training.
The second issue concerns the indirect effects of training - whether intervention in
ToM improved performance in EF or vice versa.
Effects of training
Baseline scores
Table 7.4 gives baseline scores for the 6 experimental groups on the ToM total
score (made up of a sum of all seven ToM tasks), the Eyes task and EF measures
(Card Sort aggregate score, Trails Difference score, Go-NoGo A'). The Card Sort
aggregate score was calculated from 5 variables; percentage perserverative errors,
failure to maintain set, percentage conceptual level processing, number of trials to
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complete first category and number of categories achieved. For further details of this
aggregate see Study 2. For a break down of the Card Sort results variable by variable
see Table 7.9.
Table 7.4. Baseline scores on the ToM total score, the Eyes task and EF measures
for the six experimental groups. Mean (&d)
ASD-	 ASD-	 ASD -	 MLD - MLD -	 MLD -
ToM	 EF	 Control	 ToM	 EF	 Control
ToM	 2.40	 2.10	 2.29	 3.33	 3.00	 4.13
aggregate	 (1.51)	 (1.29)	 (0.95)	 (1.63)	 (1.53)	 (1.64)
Eyestask	 3.90	 5.00	 3.86	 4.50	 5.57	 5.13
	
(1.91)	 (3.27)	 (0.69)	 (1.97)	 (2.26)	 (2.30)
Card Sort
	 4.60	 5.80	 3.86	 4.17	 4.57	 4.00
aggregate	 (2.22)	 (3.29)	 (2.79)	 (2.32)	 (2.15)	 (1.51)
Trails	 78.26	 45.88	 36.65	 89.32	 63.43	 63.85
	(48.98)	 (34.73)	 (25.63)	 (93.78)	 (44.31)	 (51.75)
Go-NoGo	 0.82	 0.73	 0.72	 0.74	 0.76	 0.83
	
(0.09)	 (0.12)	 (0.19)	 (0.12)	 (0.10)	 (0.12)
a Due to computer malfunction, Go-NoGo results were not available for 10 of the children in the ASD
group. This affected 3 children in each of the training groups and 4 controls.
One-way ANOVAs were performed to compare the three experimental groups within
each diagnostic category. No significant differences were found between groups (in
the ASD group all p-values >. 16, in the MLD group all p-values >.3 1). Comparisons
of the separate Card Sort variables also showed no significant differences (all p-values
>.24).
Effect of training on ToM performance
Figure 7.1 shows the pre-test, post-test and follow-up scores on the ToM
aggregate for the ASD and MLD groups separately. As slightly different tests were
given at post-test and follow-up, the percentage of tests passed is used rather than raw
scores. Table 7.5 gives these proportions and standard deviations.
Due to the small size of the groups and the non-parametric nature of the data,
one tailed Wilcoxon's Signed Ranks tests were used to compare performance at the
different time points. Significant improvements as compared to the pre-test are given
in table 7.5. Between the post-test and the follow-up, significant improvements were
made by the ASD-EF group (z = -2.12, p<z.O5) and the MLD-EF group (z -2.05, p
<.05).
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Table 7.5. Mean percentage of ToM tasks (s.d) passed at each stage for each
experimental group.
ASD -	 ASD -	 ASD -	 MLD - MLD -	 MLD-
ToM	 EF	 Controls	 ToM	 EF	 Controls
Pre-test	 34.29	 30.00	 32.65	 47.62	 42.86	 58.93
(21.51)	 (18.38)	 (13.59)	 (23.33)	 (21.82)	 (23.46)
Post-test	 60.00**	 37.50	 39.29	 83.33*	 50.00	 78.13*
(24.15)	 (29.46)	 (28.35)	 (20.41) (28.87)	 (20.86)
Follow-up 5333*	 51.67**	 30.95	 69.44*	 66 .67*	 79.17*
(28.11)	 (19.95)	 (15.00)	 (30.58)	 (30.43)	 (24.80)
* p <.05 P <.01 as compared to performance at pre-test.
Generalisation to ToM tasks other than the framed task.
Results on individual ToM tests were compared using one-tailed Wilcoxon's
Signed Ranks tests in order to examine whether the improvements seen in the ToM
group were due solely to improvement on the trained task. The unexpected transfer
task used at post-test and at follow-up was a novel task, but one which had the same
underlying structure as those used in training.
Between the pre-test and the post-test, the ASD-ToM group improved
significantly on 2 out of the 4 tasks administered, the trained 'unexpected transfer'
task (z = -2.65, p<.Ol) and the penny-hiding task (z = -1.89, p <.05). The EF group
improved significantly on the penny-hiding task only (z = -2.24, p=.Ol). The ASD-
Control group improved on the Deceptive box—other task (z = -1.73, p<.O5).
In the MLD groups, the ToM group improved on 3 out of the 4 tasks
administered, the trained task (z = -.2.24, p<.Ol), the Deceptive box - other (z = -2.00,
p<.05) and the penny-hiding (z = -1.73, p<.O5). The EF group did not improve
significantly on any individual tasks; the Controls improved on the unexpected
transfer task (z = -2.45, p<.Ol) and the penny-hiding task (z = -1.89, p<.O5).
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five members of this group had perfonned inconsistently on this task (i.e. passing the
ignorant condition whilst failing the knowledgeable, or vice versa), and one individual
had failed due to refusing to answer. The ASD-Controls improved on nothing.
The MLD-ToM group improved on the trained task (z = -2.00, p<.O5), and on
Deceptive box-other (z = -1.73, p<.O5). The MLD-EF group improved on no
individual tasks, but there was a trend towards an improvement on the Know-
guess/self and Know-guess/other (z=-1 .41, p=.08 in both cases). The MLD-Controls
improved on the (un) trained task only (z = -2.24, p=.Ol). See Appendix V for tables
of the number of children who passed each task at each timepoint. There was no
improvement in any group at any timepoint in the false photograph task, but this may
have been because performance at pre-test was so high in both groups (over 70% of
each group passing).
The percentage of children in each group who improved on at least one ToM
task (i.e. passed more ToM tasks at post-test or follow-up than they did at pre-test) is
shown in Table 7.6. The number in brackets gives the percentage who improved on a
ToM task other that the trained unexpected transfer task.
Table 7.6 Percentage of children in each group who improved on the proportion of
ToM tasks passed between pre-test and post-test or pre-test and follow-up
(percentage improving on a task other than the unexpected transfer task).
ASD— ASD— ASD—	 MLD— MLD—	 MLD-
ToM	 EF	 Control	 ToM	 EF	 Control
Pre-test=>	 80	 50	 43	 100	 57	 88
post-test	 (60)	 (60)	 (29)	 (83)	 (57)	 (75)
Pre-test=>	 60	 50	 14	 50	 43	 63
Follow-up	 (50)	 (50)	 (14)	 (33)	 (43)	 (25)
It may seem counter-intuitive that a higher percentage of the ASD-EF group
improved when the unexpected transfer task was removed from the analysis than
when it was included. This is because the improvement was calculated by subtracting
performance on the tasks at pre-test from that at post-test. A single individual in the
ASD-EF group passed the unexpected transfer task at pre-test and failed it at post-test,
but passed the Deceptive box -self test at post-test, having failed it at pre-test. When
all the tests were included, therefore, he did not appear to have improved as he passed
one test at pre-test and one test at follow-up. However, once the unexpected transfer
task was removed, he appeared to have failed all tasks at the pre-test but have passed
one at post-test, and was therefore counted as having improved.
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Eyes task
The Eyes task was not included in the ToM aggregate, as it has a continuous
rather than categorical score, and did not relate to the other ToM tasks (see chapter 5).
Table 7.7 gives the pre-test and follow-up scores for the Eyes task (it was not given at
post-test).
Table 7.7 Performance on the Eyes task at pre-lesi andfoiow-up: mean (s.iL)
Eyes task	 ASD- AS!)-	 AS!)-	 MLD-	 MLD-	 ML!)-
(max = 14) ToM	 EF	 Control	 ToM	 EF	 Control
Pre-test	 3.90	 5.00	 3.86	 4.50	 5.57	 5.13
(1.91) (3.27)	 (0.69)	 (1.98)	 (2.64)	 (2.30)
Follow-up	 5.10	 5.30	 4.29	 5.33	 6.43	 5.63
(1.60) (2.21)	 (1.38)	 (2.25)	 (2.15)	 (2.20)
Wilcoxon signed rank tests showed no significant improvements in the group
means. To look at improvements on a more individual level, the number of children
who had improved on the task was calculated for each group. Figure 7.2 shows the
percentage of children in each group who improved between pre-test and follow-up.












Fisher's Exact test found a significant difference between the ASD-ToM group and
the ASD-Controls only (p<.OS).
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Effects of framing on EF performance
Card Sort
Table 7.8 gives the groups' scores on the various Card sort measures at pre-test, post-
test and follow-up, and figure 7.3 shows the mean scores on the card sort aggregate at
each time point.
Table 7.8 Scores on Card Sort variables for the six experimental groups at pre-test,
post-test and follow-up









	 30.22	 25.33	 25.62
perserverative ________	 (23.61) (23.93) (22.41) 	 (22.25)	 (20.11)	 (15.08)
errors	 Post-test	 25.19*	 26.72	 32 .90*	 34.67	 17.58	 22.13
(low = good	 (21.41) (23.43) (24.00) 	 (12.27)	 (6.07)	 (15.25)
performance)	 follow-	 26.43	 20.01	 33.57	 32.81	 19.21	 13.18*
up	 (21.55)	 (16.26)	 (23.75)	 (18.88)	 (15.05)	 (7.49)
Number of	 Pre-test	 11.25	 9.67	 6.33	 8.80	 9.40	 11.50
trials to first	 (6.84)	 (4.21)	 (0.58)	 (4.21)	 (3.91)	 (5.01)
category	 Post-test	 9.44	 8.50	 7.00	 8.50	 14.33	 12.50
(low = good	 (4.59)	 (2.56)	 (1.00)	 (3.79)	 (4.50)	 (6.95)
performance) follow-
	 8.30	 9.67	 8.00	 7.50	 8.14	 7.00
up	 (5.58)	 (6.00)	 (3.52)	 (2.74)	 (2.91)	 (1.41)
No. of times	 Pre-test	 0.20	 0.20	 0.14	 0.67	 0.43	 0.50
failed to
	
(0.42)	 (0.42)	 (0.38)	 (0.82)	 (0.79)	 (0.53)
maintain set	 Post-test	 0.40	 0.40	 0.14	 0.33	 0.29	 0.13
(low = good	 (0.52)	 (0.52)	 (0.38)	 (0.52)	 (0.49)	 (0.35)
performance) follow-
	
0.40	 0.40	 0.71	 0.67	 0.28	 0.13
up	 (0.70)	 (0.70)	 (0.95)	 (0.82)	 (0.49)	 (0.35)
No. of	 Pre-test	 1.90	 2.50	 1.29	 1.67	 1.57	 2.13
categories	 (1.29)	 (1.58)	 (1.38)	 (1.21)	 (1.51)	 (1.25)
achieved	 Post-test	 2.20	 2.50	 1.42	 1.17	 2.43	 2.00
(high=good	 (1.39)	 (1.43)	 (1.51)	 (1.17)	 (0.98)	 (0.76)
performance) follow-
	
2.50	 2.90	 2.29	 1.67	 2.43	 2.63
up	 (1.18)	 (1.19)	 (1.38)	 (0.82)	 (1.27)	 (1.19)
% conceptual	 Pre-test	 25.25	 36.05	 16.33	 30.47	 31.09	 28.78
level sorting	 (18.04)	 (26.10)	 (13.89)	 (23.16)	 (26.13)	 (16.41)
(high=good	 Post-test	 43 .64* 40.91	 20.65	 20.25	 38.36	 27.05
performance)	 (31.89) (24.00) (21.28) 	 (11.21)	 (18.88)	 (13.83)
follow-	 39.44	 46.56	 34.25*	 22.14	 44.69	 42.01
up	 (27.16)	 (20.03)	 (23.20)	 (13.24)	 (31.56)	 (27.64)







Figure 7.3. Performance of each ecperimentaI group on the Card Sort aggregate at
each time point
ASD- ASD-EF ASD- MLD- MLD- MLD-
ToM	 Control ToM	 EF Control
Experimental group
To summarise the fmdings in table 7.9 between pre-test and the other time
points:
At post-test: Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests found no improvement on any of the card
sort variables in the ASD-EF group (all p-values> .20). The ASD-ToM group
improved between the pre-test and post-test on percentage perserverative errors (z = -
1.96, p.05), as did the ASD-Controls (z = -2.37, p<.05).
In the MLD group there were no significant improvements between pre-test and post-
test.
At follow-up: In the ASD group, the ToM group improved on percentage conceptual
level sorting (z = -2.09, p<.05), as did the controls (z = -2.37, p<.O5). There were no
improvements in the EF group.
In the MLD group, the EF group had a trend towards improvement on the number of
categories achieved (z = -1.86, p=.06), and the Control group improved on percentage
perserverative errors (z = -2.10, p <.05) and had a trend towards improvement on all
other categories (all p-values <.10).
Card Sort aggregate: There was a trend towards an improvement in the ASD-ToM
group between pre-test and post-test (z = -1.92, p=.O6) and a significant improvement
at follow-up (z = -2.15, p<.05). There was no improvement in the ASD-EF group
and a trend towards improvement between pre-test and post-test in the ASD-Controls













In the MLD group, there was no improvement in ToM group, there was an
trend towards improvement in the EF group between pre-test and post-test (z = -1.63,
p=. 10) and a significant improvement between pre-test and follow-up (z = -2.41,
p<.O5). These results were mirrored by the MLD—Controls (pre-test > post-test, z =
-1.87, p=.06, pre-test => follow-up z = -2.39, p<.05).
In order to look at differences on a more individual level, the percentage of children in
each category who improved on the card sort aggregate between the time points was
examined (figure 7.4).
Figure 7.4 Percentage of each group improving on the Card Sort aggregate
between pre-test, post-test andfollow-up
Experimental group
Fisher's exact test showed no difference between the groups.
Trails and Go-NoGo
The Go-NoGo was given only at post- test and not at follow-up, and the Trails
test was given only at follow-up. Table 7.9 gives the before and afler training scores
for both the Go-NoGo and the Trails differences score (made by subtracting the time
for Trails A from the time for Trails B).
On the Trails task, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests showed a trend towards
improvement in the ASD—ToM group (z = -1.68, p = .09), and the MLD-EF group got
significantly worse (z = -2.02, p <.05).
A fairly large group of children were not included in this analysis because they
had not completed the Trails task within the 300 second time limit at either the pre-
test or the follow-up. In order to include them, an alternative score was created which
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was of improvement between the time points. Children classed as having 'got worse'
either if their time increased from pre-test to follow-up, or if they had completed the
tasks at pre-test but failed to do so at follow-up. They were counted as staying the
same if they completed the task in the same time to within five seconds, or failed to
complete the task both times, and were counted as improving if they either got faster,
or completed the task the second time having failed to do so at pre-test. Table 7.10
gives the percentages (rounded to the nearest unit) of children in each group who
improved, stayed the same or who got worse. Fisher's exact test found no significant
differences between any of the experimental groups.
Table 7.9 Performance on Go-NoGo and Trails atpre-test, post-test or follow-up
	
ASD— ASD— ASD—
	 MLD— MLD— MLD-
ToM	 EF	 Controls	 ToM	 EF	 Controls
Trails	 Pre-test 78.26	 45.88	 36.65	 89.32	 63.43	 63.85
difference	 (48.98) (34.73) (25.63)	 (93.78) (44.30) (51.75)
score	 follow- 60.83	 41.69	 42.06	 71.29	 94.55	 57.77
up	 (46.05) (34.54) (42.87)	 (61.13) (61.09) (34.53)
Go-NoGo	 Pre-test	 0.82	 0.73	 0.72	 0.74	 0.76	 0.83
(0.09)	 (0.12)	 (0.19)	 (0.12)	 (0.09)	 (0.12)
Post-	 0.83	 0.78	 0.72	 0.78	 0.76	 0.83
test	 (0.13)	 (0.19)	 (0.12)	 (0.16)	 (0.13)	 (0.13)
a Due to computer malfunction 10 children with ASD are not included in these scores. These include 3
children in each of the training groups and 4 children in the control group.
b Some children were unable to complete the Trails B within 300 seconds and so the test was
abandoned. This affected 2 children in the ASD-ToM group at pre-test and one at follow-up, one child
in the ASD - EF group and 2 at follow-up, 3 children in the ASD - Control group at pre-test and one at
follow-up, 3 children in the MLD - ToM group at pre-test and one at follow-up, one child in the MLD-
EF group at pre-test and none at follow-up, and one child in the MLD - Control group at pre-test only.
Table Z1O Percentage of children improving or not between pre-test and follow-up



















Wilcoxon's signed ranks test found no significant differences between any groups on
the Go-NoGo A' score (all p-values> .24). Figure 7.5 shows the percentages of each
group who improved on the Go-NoGo task. There were no significant differences
between the experimental groups within each diagnostic category.
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Summary of pre-test, post-test and follow-up results
Theory of Mind
It appears that the ToM training worked in that the children in the ToM group
all learnt how to pass the trained task, and there was some degree of transfer of
learning to other tasks. Both the ASD- and MLD-ToM trained groups improved on
the penny-hiding deception task at post-test, a task in which no training had been
provided. The MLD-ToM group also improved on the Deceptive box-other task,
both immediately and at follow-up. The ASD-ToM group only improved on the
trained task at follow-up - this may have been due to the exclusion of the penny-
hiding task at this time point, rather than due to reduced generalisation of learning
across time. In general there was a slight drop off in the proportion of ToM tests
passed by these groups between the immediate post-test and follow-up. There was
some tentative evidence for a slight improvement on the Eyes task in the ASD-ToM
group.
The EF trained groups, both ASD and MLD, also made significant
improvement on the ToM tasks, but this was over a longer time frame - whilst they
made no significant gains on the ToM aggregate between the pre-test and post-test,
they had made significant gains by the follow-up as compared to the pre-test, and also
made significant gains between the post-test and the follow-up. They thus appeared
to follow a different trajectory to the ToM trained groups, making more gradual gains
over time. Neither of the EF trained groups (ASD or MLD) made gains on the
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unexpected transfer task in which the ToM group had been trained, instead most of
their gains were on the other tasks - the Deceptive box—self in both groups, and the
Deceptive box-other and Seeing Leads to Knowing in the ASD group. The ASD-EF
group therefore showed a wider improvement on a range of ToM tasks than did the
MLD-EF group.
The MLD controls appeared to make consistent improvements without any
training. They started off with the highest mean score on the ToM aggregate (4/7) of
any of the groups, and they made a significant improvement on the unexpected
transfer task. Both the post-test and follow-up unexpected transfer tasks used dolls
rather than the illustrated pictures of the pre-test, and it is possible that this group had
found the illustrations a particularly difficult medium, thus masking their competence
which was revealed in the other tasks. The ASD controls made small gains at post-
test but had reverted back to their earlier levels by the follow-up.
Executive Function
There was no real evidence that the EF training improved performance on any
of the EF post-test or follow-up tasks. Any improvements seen were generally
inconsistent across time and no different to those seen in the control groups. The
ASD-ToM group improved on some of the card sort variables, but this was mirrored
by the ASD-Control group, making it likely this was either spurious or due to task
practice. The EF trained groups did, however, show improvement on the ToM tasks.
This improvement may have been due to chance (although this is unlikely since it was
statistically significant despite very small numbers), or to non-specific aspects of the
training programmes, for example improved familiarity with the experimenter. In
order to investigate whether in fact any specific - i.e. EF related - elements of the
training programme might have lead to the improvement seen in ToM, the
relationship between performance on the EF training programme and the
improvement in performance on ToM tasks was examined.
Executive Function framing and Theor y of Mind
As the children in the EF training group were trained, their responses were
recorded. These responses were used to create two variables that gave a measure of
their response to training. The first was 'Attempts'; a sum of the number of attempts
taken by a child to meet the criterion to pass each stage. There were five different
assessment points, and so the scores could potentially range from 5 (passing on the
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first attempt at each stage) upwards. In reality the overall mean was 6.9 (s.d. = 2.5),
with a range of 5 - 13. The second was 'Generativity'; a measure taken in the final
testing session, when the children were asked ways of sorting a novel set of cards, to
suggest ways that a boy could get to his house, and different options that they
themselves had for activities after school. These were all types of activities that had
been practiced during the training. The number of responses to these three questions
was summed, giving a score with a mean of 8.59 (s.d. = 4.02), and a range of I - l6.
Therefore, children who got a low 'attempts' score could be said to have grasped the
training quickly, and children who got a high 'generativity' score could be said to be
demonstrating flexibility across a range of situations. The MLD and ASD groups
did not differ on either of these scores (Attempts ASD mean = 6.50 (2.12), MLD
mean = 7.43 (4.09), z = -.41, p = .68; Generativity ASD mean 7.40 (3.05), MLD
mean = 10.29 (3.50), z = -1.57, p = .12).
The relationship between these variables and ability was calculated using
Spearman's correlations (due to the small sample sizes); table 7.11 gives the r-values.
It is perhaps unsurprising, given the small size of the groups, that none of these
correlations were significant; however, several of the r-values were moderate to large
effect sizes. The relationship between Generativity and non-verbal ability is
particularly notable for its difference in the groups - in the ASD group it is not at all
related to non-verbal ability, whilst in the MLD group there is a trend towards
significance (p=.O9) and a large effect size.
Table 7.11 Spearman 's correlations between the age and ability measures and the
measures of success during the EF training. ASD group in boliL
	CA	 BPVS TROG Raven's
VMA VMA Matrices
(raw score)
Attempts	 ASD (N1O)	 .24	 .17	 -.42	 -.37
(low = good)	 MLD (N =7)	
-.06	 -.37	 -.23	 -.67
Generativity	 ASD (N10)	 -.29	 .29	 .20	 .01
(high = good)	 MLD (N=7)	 .31	 .47	 .40	 .68
In order to look at the relationship between success on the training and
improvement on the ToM tasks, the group was split into those who improved on the
proportion of ToM tasks passed, and those who did not, and the two groups were
compared on the EF training variables. With the MLD and ASD groups combined,
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those who improved on ToM between the pre-test and the post-test and those who did
not were significantly different on both variables (Attempts, z = -2.46, p<.O5;
Generativity, z = -2.32, p<.O5). With the groups separated the sample sizes become
very small, but there is still a significant difference between the ASD groups on the
Attempts measure (z = -1.97, p<.O5) and a trend on the Generativity measure (z -
1.78, p==.08). In the MLD group there is a significant difference on the Generativity
measures
(z = -1.98, p<.05) and a marginal trend on the Attempts measure (z = -1.67, p .10).
Hence, improvements in ToM appear to be related to degree of success during the EF
training. In the MLD group, those who improved ToM did not differ from those who
didn't improve on age or any of the ability measures (all p-values> .29). In the ASD
group there was a trend towards a difference in the TROG (z = -1.74, p=.08) with
those who improved on ToM having better grammar than those who did not. There
were no other differences (all p-values> .34).
To summarise, degree of success (speed of reaching criteria and a flexibility
measure) during the EF training was significantly related to improvement in ToM in
the EF trained groups.
Who improves in ToM?
Some children obviously benefited from the training more than others, both in
the ToM and EF groups, whilst some of the controls improved without any training.
In order to identify factors that might have influenced improvement, the participants
were divided into those who improved in ToM between the pre-test and post-test (16
ASD, 17 MLD) and those who did not (11 ASD, 4 MLD), regardless of training
groups. These groups were compared on the ability scores, using non-parametric tests
due to the small sample sizes. The only significant difference was in the ASD group
on the TROG (z=-2.60, p<.Ol), with those who did not improve on ToM having
significantly lower TROG scores than those who did improve. All other p-values were
greater than .24. Improving and not improving groups did not differ on Card Sort,
Trails or Go-NoGo performance at pre-test.
Questionnaires
Teachers were asked to complete questionnaires about the children's
behaviour before and after training (at the time of the follow-up). The results of the
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'before' questionnaires will be discussed in detail in chapter 9. Due to a fall off in
teachers returning questionnaires, only a reduced number of the children had
questionnaires for both before and after (22 of the ASD group, 8 in the ToM group, 9
in the EF group and 5 controls; 11 of the MLD group, 3 in the ToM group, 3 in the EF
group and 5 controls).
Table 7.12 gives the mean scores on the 3 questionnaire subscales for each
group, before training and at follow-up. Two-tailed Wilcoxon's Signed ranks test
(non-parametric because of the small sample size) found a trend towards a difference
between the pre-test and post-test on the ToM subscale in the ASD-Control group
only (z = -.183, p=.O7). This was towards them getting worse between pre-test and
post-test. All the other differences were non-significant (all p-values >. 18). In order
to look at the numbers who improved in each group, a difference score was calculated
by subtracting the score at pre-test on each questionnaire from the score at follow-up.
The participants were then divided into groups according to who improved between
the two questionnaire time points and those who did not. The percentage and number
of participants who improved in each scale in each group are given in table 7.13
Table 7.12. Mean (&d) scores on the 3 questionnaire subscales for each
experimental group
ASD-	 ASD-	 ASD -	 MLD - MLD -	 MLD -
ToM	 EF	 Control	 ToM	 EF	 Control
(N= 8)
	
(N=9)	 (N=5)	 (N=3)	 (N=3)	 (N=3)
ToM scale	 13.75	 12.44	 12.60	 17.00	 17.67	 12.80
(pre-test)	 (4.43)	 (5.27)	 (5.73)	 (6.25)	 (2.31)	 (6.02)
ToM scale	 12.88	 13.00	 9.80	 17.67	 18.33	 15.00
(follow-up) (2.90)	 (5.39)	 (3.70)	 (7.02)	 (4.04)	 (1.58)
EFscale	 13.50	 11.67	 9.60	 14.33	 16.00	 11.60
(pre-test)	 (4.72)	 (4.42)	 (2.70)	 (2.08)	 (5.00)	 (3.36)
EFscale	 11.50	 9.89	 10.40	 13.00	 15.67	 10.80
(follow-up) (4.99)	 (4.14)	 (2.97)	 (1.00) (4.62)	 (4.66)
G-S scale	 6.38	 7.22	 6.20	 6.00	 7.67	 5.00
(pre-test)	 (0.92)	 (1.09)	 (1.30)	 (1.00)	 (1.53)	 (0.71)
G-S scale	 6.25	 7.11	 6.20	 7.00	 7.67	 5.20
(follow-up) (1.04)	 (1.83)	 (1.92)	 (1.00) (1.53)	 (0.84)
Numbers in the MLD group are too small to make any real conclusions, but
there does not appear to be a relationship between being in a trained group and
improving on any of the questionnaire scales. However, it is interesting that a
149
majority of the MLD-Control group, (who improved so dramatically between pre-test
and post-test on the experimental ToM tasks), also improved on the teacher ratings of
every day ToM.
Table 7.13 Percentage (number) improving on each scale in the experimental
groups.
ASD-	 ASD-	 ASD—	 MLD—	 MLD— MLD-
ToM	 EF	 Control	 ToM	 EF	 Control
(N=8)	 (N=9)	 (N=5)	 (N=3)	 (N=3)	 (N=3)
Improved on 50%	 56%	 0%	 67%	 33%	 80%
ToM scale	 (4)	 (5)	 (0)	 (2)	 (1)	 (4)
Improved on 50%	 33%	 40%	 0%	 33%	 20%
EF scale	 (4)	 (3)	 (2)	 (0)	 (1)	 (1)
Improved on 25%	 22%	 40%	 67%	 0%	 20%
G-S scale	 (2)	 (2)	 (2)	 (2)	 (0)	 (1)
In the ASD group, about 50% of both the ToM and EF trained groups
improved between pre-test and follow-up on the ToM scale, whilst none of the
controls did. Fisher's exact test was done to test for a significant difference between
the groups, there was a marginal trend between the ASD-ToM and the ASD-Controls
(p .10) and a trend towards a difference between the ASD-EF and the ASD-Controls
(p=.06).
Discussion
I will start by discussing the direct effects of each training programme and
their implications, and will then move on to discuss the indirect effects of training and
the implications of these.
Theory of Mind training
In line with my predictions and with a growing number of studies (Hadwin et
al., 1996; McGregor et al., 1998a; Swettenham, 1996; Swettenhani et al., 1996;
Weliman, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), this study demonstrated that children with ASD
(and those with non-autistic learning difficulties who fail FB) can be taught to pass
standard ToM tasks. This improvement was still evident 6-12 weeks later, also in line
with other studies that have assessed the maintenance of such learning over time
(Hadwin et al., 1996; Swettenham, 1996). All training scenarios were supported by
the 'photo in the head' strategy, and therefore the post-test and follow-up tasks
differed from the training tasks in this important particular. It is therefore more likely
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that children in this study were genuinely learning to use a strategy for themselves,
rather than learning a fixed response from feedback, as may have been the case in
some earlier studies. Generalisation to other ToM tasks was more evident in the
MLD group than in the ASD group, also in line with predictions. This study differs
from earlier work in a number of particulars. A wide range of ToM tasks was
included in the study both at pre-test and after training, and some generalisation of
learning to other tasks in the ASD and MLD groups was evident, particularly on the
Penny Hiding deception task. This is the first time, to my knowledge, that this task
has been used as a transfer task in training studies. However, it is not hard to see how
the 'thought-picture' strategy might help to improve performance on this task, since
the training focuses on how seeing something leads to knowing about it, and this is a
crucial element in passing the penny hiding task, where the child must hide the penny
without the experimenter seeing. The very different context of the penny biding task
(as compared to the trained unexpected transfer task) may indicate that the children
are genuinely intemalising the taught strategy to some extent. The ASD-ToM group
also showed some improvement on the Eyes task at follow-up (70% of the group
improved on this task as compared to only 14% of controls), in which it is harder to
see how a 'photo in the head' strategy might help performance. It is possible that
drawing the children's attention to the existence of mental states results in an
increased interest in facial expressions and greater efforts to interpret the mental states
behind them, however, this is entirely speculative. Other, more frequently used,
transfer tasks such as the Deceptive Box (self and other) were also included, but there
was no evidence of transfer of learning to these tasks in the ASD group (although
there was in the MLD group). Strenuous efforts were made to minimise children's
repeated exposure to FB tasks, and there were no occasions during the training in
which children were given feedback on a standard unexpected transfer PB task. This
was to minimise the chances of the children simply learning a strategy by rote, which
previous studies have found to be effective in improving performance on the trained
task, but which have not shown any generalisation in children with ASD
(Swettenham, 1996).
The MLD-control group in this study proved something of a puzzle. They
showed a significant improvement on the standard PB task both at post-test and
follow-up, despite no access to training. This group had the highest mean pre-test
ToM score (4/7), and it is possible that for some reason the unexpected transfer PB
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task used at pre-test was particularly difficult for this group (it was illustrated as
opposed to acted out with dolls, as were both the tasks used after training). This does
highlight the need for control groups in this type of study, as it appears that, in
children with MLD particularly, performance may not be at all consistent across tasks
or across time. This finding also makes interpretation of the results in the MLD
group more problematic, since the MLD control group improved as much on the
unexpected transfer task as did the group who had been trained on that task.
However, there was more evidence of generalisation in the trained MLD groups, both
of which also started off at a lower baseline, which indicates that the training may
have had some effect.
As in Study 2, the False Photograph test was relatively easy for all
participants, and there were no significant differences between the ASD and MLD
group on this task. There was no significant improvement in any of the groups on this
task, but this may have been due to ceiling effects. This lack of an association
between the False photo and false belief tasks may have interesting implications. If
this task is properly matched to the FB task in extraneous task factors such as
language and EF as has been argued (Zaitchik, 1990), then these results indicate that
the MLD group did have specific difficulties with the 'belief element of FB tasks
rather than the general processing and executive demands. However, the false photo
task may well be easier than the PB task, due both to the repeated exposure that
children have to photographs and videos nowadays, and to the temporal grounding
provided by actually taking the picture: Mitchell and Lacohée (1991) and Charman
and Lynggard (1998) found that providing a photo representing a mental state for
children to post during a FB task facilitated performance, and seeing the experimenter
take the photo and place it face down to develop may be similar in its facilitatory
effects on the task. Slaughter (1998) found that false photo tasks were significantly
easier than PB tasks in preschoolers, and that performance on the tasks was not
correlated.
Executive Function Training
Contrary to my predictions, there was no direct effect of the EF training on the
EP tasks in either the ASD or the MLD groups. This was not due to a failure to learn
the strategy in the training programme, as all children passed all the stages of the
training. It may be due to an inability to use this strategy in a test situation without
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support, an inability to see how the strategy might be useful in the test situation, or it
is possible that the training programme simply trained the wrong strategy, and did not
target the specific aspects of the trained tasks with which the children had difficulties.
This training programme was deliberately strategy based (rather than simply
repetitively training children on the tasks, which has been successfully used in some
other studies with children with ADHD e.g. Semrun-Clikemean, Nielsen et al. 1999)
because it was felt that this was both more comparable to the ToM training
programme and more likely to lead to genuine improvement in EF rather than to an
improvement in experimental tasks only. In retrospect, the training programme might
have been more effective in improving EF performance if it had focused more
explicitly on the trained tasks, providing opportunities to practice this task without the
support provided by the experimenter during the training. However, it was felt that
children with ASD would be unlikely to extract their own strategy from a training
programme in which this was not made explicit. Another factor which may have led
to the lack of significant improvement in the EF trained groups was that the ASD-EF
groups started off with slightly (if non-significantly) better EF than the controls or
ToM group —3 of the ASD-EF group got 9 or 10 on the Card Sort aggregate score at
pre-test, whilst no one from either of the other ASD groups scored more than 8.
These children therefore had very little scope for improvement on this task. The
participants were assigned randomly to the groups, without reference to their Card
Sort performance, so this possible ceiling effect was unavoidable, if regrettable.
It is also possible that the EF tests used were not simple enough to show an
improvement - including more basic tasks such as the Day-Night Stroop task, for
example, might have shown an improvement in the trained groups. The Trails task
was very hard for a significant subset of the group, who could not complete Trails B
at all (in which it is necessary to switch between numbers and the alphabet).
However, it would be premature to cast this training programme as a failure, since the
children did improve on tasks during training and progressed through the stages of the
programme, and it appeared to have had a significant effect on ToM performance,
which will be discussed in the next section.
Indirect effects of framing
None of the four projected scenarios described in the introduction occurred,
because the EF training did not improve performance on the EF tasks. However, there
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was a significant improvement on the ToM tasks in the EF trained groups, both those
with ASD and those with MLD. This improvement was qualitatively different to that
seen in the ToM trained group - there was no improvement on the unexpected transfer
task in the EF trained groups, instead improvement at post-test was on the Penny-
Hiding task in the ASD group only, and at follow-up on the Deceptive box-self in
both ASD and MLD groups, and on the Deceptive box-other, and Seeing Leads to
Knowing in the ASD group only. The ASD-EF group also got significantly worse on
one task - the Know/guess-self task. The Knowing/guessing tasks are not
conventional ToM tasks - the child must distinguish between whether someone
(either themselves or the experimenter) knows what is in a box or must guess. The
question is forced choice between knowing and guessing. Participants must
understand the term 'guess' as well as 'know' (which the training did not involve in
any form) in order to pass the task, and there is a 50% chance of answering each
question correctly without any genuine understanding of mind. Performance on these
tasks is therefore more likely to reflect a substantial element of chance, as compared
to the standard FB tasks or the penny-hiding task, where lacking a ToM is likely to
lead to consistent task failure. No other groups show a significant improvement or
got worse on this task.
There was a much greater generalisation at follow-up in the ASD—EF group
than that seen in the ASD—ToM group, who in the final test stage improved on the
trained task only. In addition to the improvement in the EF trained groups being on
different tasks to those seen in the ToM trained groups, the trajectory of improvement
over time was different. At immediate post-test there was no significant improvement
in the overall proportion of ToM tasks passed (although there was improvement on an
individual task in the ASD-EF group, see above), however, by follow-up there had
been a further improvement which was both a significant improvement as compared
to the pre-test, and when compared to the post-test. In the ToM group, there was a
significant improvement at post-test that was then attenuated at follow-up. This
different trajectory of improvement may reflect the differing impact of the training
programmes. The ToM training programme had an immediate impact on ToM
performance, which is unsurprising given that it targeted those tasks specifically. The
attenuation at follow-up suggests that the children may be using a strategy which
some of them then forget over the next couple of months. In contrast, the EF training
has only a small impact at immediate post-test, but significant differences are evident
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at follow-up. It may be that because the effects of the EF training on ToM
performance are more indirect, a 'trickle-down' effect is occurring, where the children
are gradually processing the information learnt in the EF training programme, and
learning to apply it in ways which benefit their ToM performance. It is possible, for
example, that the set shifting which the children were trained on in EF training
programme enabled them to begin to make use of their experiences of seeing different
perspectives, and that this in turn lead to improvements in their ToM. It is also
possible that this could be linguistically mediated - improved set shifting may enable
children to begin to use their language more flexibly and to therefore use their
grammatical knowledge to construct some understanding of mind. It is striking that,
in the EF trained group, the only difference between those who improved in ToM and
those who didn't was a trend towards those with ASD who improved having better
grammar. This finding is echoed in the whole ASD group, where those who improved
in ToM were significantly better at grammar than those who failed to improve,
regardless of training group. Once again, it seems that grammar is crucial for children
with ASD in developing an understanding of mind, and that it may be a mediating
factor when training ToM. In the MLD group this was not the case, and the EF
training was in fact less effective in this group - although they improved at follow-up
the improvement was in fewer tasks than in the ASD group. This is in contrast to the
ToM training, which generalised more in the MLD than the ASD group.
The improvement in ToM in the EF trained groups was unexpected because
the EF trained groups did not improve on the EF trained tasks, and therefore it might
have been assumed that the training had failed to work. There are a number of
possibilities as to why the EF trained groups may have improved on ToM tasks.
Perhaps the most obvious explanation is non-specific training effects on ToM. It is
possible that one-to-one sessions with the experimenter over a series of days is what
improved performance on ToM tasks in both the ToM trained and the EF trained
groups, and that it did not matter very much what was actually taught to the children
in that time. Against this is that other non-ToM training programmes in the past have
failed to improve performance on FB tasks. For example, Hadwin Ct al. (1996)
trained children with ASD on Emotion and Pretend Play, neither of which improved
performance on belief tasks. Similarly, Steememan et al. (1996) found no
improvement on ToM tasks in a socially anxious group trained with a cognitive—
behavioural social skills programme. In addition, there seems no reason why non-
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specific training effects should particularly affect ToM tasks whilst not affecting EF
tasks. In addition the profile of improvement in the EF group was quite different to
that seen in the ToM group, indicating that different factors may be at work. Finally,
and perhaps most convincingly, those who improved on ToM differed significantly
from those who didn't on measures of success during the EF training. It seems likely,
therefore, that something specific about the training programme is affecting the
children's ToM performance.
If this is the case, what might it be about the EF training programme that
improved ToM without improving performance on EF tasks? There was no reference
in the EF training to mistaken belief, or even to true belief, to knowledge or to any
kind of mental state. The training focused on the concrete metaphor 'brain tools'
which the child had to physically change in order to shift between sets, and around a
'Stop-Change-Go' traffic light sequence to aid inhibitory control and remind the
children stop using one sorting strategy and shift to another. The child's attention was
therefore drawn to the existence of the brain, but only in terms of its flexibility and
usefulness as a tool. This training programme was focused on the child's own brain,
in contrast to the ToM training programme which focused almost exclusively on the
content of other's minds. It may be significant, therefore, that the Deceptive box-self
task is the only one on which both the MLD and ASD EF trained groups improved at
follow-up.
Exactly how the EF training affected performance on ToM without
significantly affecting performance on the EF tasks is intriguing. There are three
basic possibilities: (i) The EF training may be inadvertently teaching ToM rather than
EF; (ii) the EF training might be boosting the children's EF skills sufficiently to
overcome executive difficulties in ToM tasks (which may have been impairing their
performance), but not sufficiently to improve EF skills to the extent that we would see
an improvement in EF tasks; (iii) at a more developmental level, it is possible that an
improvement in EF is necessary for ToM development, and the strategies which the
children learnt during the training were sufficient to enable them to make leaps in
ToM understanding (although it seems unlikely that such short term training as this
would have a developmental impact on understanding), or, a related suggestion, that
both ToM and EF may be sharing common cognitive structures at this point in
development which the EF training teaches as effectively as the ToM training.
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However, if both shared common structures, we would surely expect to see an
improvement on EF tasks as well as on the ToM measures.
It is possible that the EF training programme was inadvertently training ToM.
In particular, the 'real life' examples of flexibility (which included scenarios such as a
child getting their brain tool 'stuck' and therefore going to the wrong place out of
habit) had elements of FB - the brain tool was stuck because the child had failed to
acquire a new belief in place of the old one. The difference was that brain tools were
couched in terms of actions rather than mental states. It is possible that this might be
a particularly effective way to help children with ASD think about mental states, since
actions are something that they have direct experience of and can easily understand -
Swettenham et al (1996) found that whilst children with ASD could use the photo
analogy to predict behaviour, they could not use it to answer questions about beliefs.
If we consider how the children might be using the 'brain tool' strategy to pass FB, it
may be that they were able to pass tests such as the Deceptive box-self by considering
their previous state of mind as a previous brain tool - which they have now changed,
but which they can still reflect upon due to the concrete nature of the brain tool
strategy. However, if they are genuinely doing this it is a huge leap from the card
sorting tasks used in the training programme, and it seems strange that a training
programme which is so far removed from FB tasks could effect an improvement
across a range of tasks whilst the ToM programme, which was so much more closely
related to mental states, did not improve performance on transfer tasks such as the
Deceptive Box in the ASD group.
Alternatively, it is possible that a slight improvement on EF enabled the
children to overcome executive problems on the tasks that therefore enabled them to
pass ToM tasks. This would imply that EF problems had previously been masking a
competence in ToM in both groups, but particularly in the ASD group who improved
across a wider range of tasks than did the MLD group. From my earlier literature
review on the relationship between EF and ToM (chapter 4), it does not appear likely
that this is the case in children with ASD, and there is a much less clear case for a
relationship between ToM and EF in children with MLD. It is also the case that there
was no correlation between ToM and EF in this sample before they embarked on the
training programmes (Study 2; Chapter 5). The specific tasks on which the children
improved may be informative here, as ToM tasks differ in their executive demands.
Both EF trained groups improved at follow-up on the Deceptive Box-self task, and the
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ASD group also improved on the Deceptive Box-other and the Seeing Leads to
Knowing. Since the task demands for the 'self and 'other' sections of these tasks are
virtually identical, it seems that if the improvement in task performance was due to
overcoming executive problems on the task, then there should be a similar magnitude
of improvement on both halves of the task - but in the MLD group, there is an
improvement on the Deceptive Box-self but not Deceptive box-other. In addition,
the 'Seeing Leads to Knowing' task on which the ASD group improved does not
appear to have a significant executive component. There is no obvious response that
is more salient than the other, as the child is being asked to choose between two
present toys, rather than to repress their knowledge of reality in favour of a mental
state.
The third possibility is that EF and ToM are inter-related to the extent that
training children in EF will necessarily improve their ToM. For this we have to
assume that the training is in some way improving EF, even though this was not
evident in the EF post-tests. How this might be working is not clear. Russell (1996)
suggests that self action monitoring (and therefore very early EF) is necessary for the
development of a ToM, and it is possible that these children have difficulties in action
monitoring which have been helped by the training programme. This fits with the
finding that it is the 'self tasks that appeared to be more susceptible to improvement
than the 'other' tasks, as action monitoring is presumably initially a matter of self-
awareness. However, more recent work by Russell and colleagues indicates that self
monitoring is in fact unimpaired in ASD, and thus it seems unlikely that it is the cause
of any ToM deficits (Russell, 2002). Russell now suggests that executive problems
in ASD are a result of a failure to follow and shift between arbitrary rules or cognitive
frameworks, such as sorting cards by colour rather than shape in the WCST. He
suggests that this might be linked to mentalising because every day thinking involves
moving between cognitive frames, and an inability to do so would constrain thinking
and thus make the first person experience of thinking highly abnormal in ASD. The
EF training in this task did train children to shift between arbitrary rules, and it is
theoretically possible that it might be helping them to learn to shift between cognitive
frameworks, and therefore improve their mentalising abilities. However, it is equally
possible, as Perner (1998) argues, that ToM is an integral part of EF, and that training
on EF helped ToM because in fact the elements of EF which the training programme
targeted were so close to ToM. Perner argues that inhibiting undesirable action
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schemas requires the representation of these schemas as representations with causal
efficacy, and that this representation is in fact meta-representational and therefore
ToM. The EF training programme certainly encouraged the representation of
schemas - making them into concrete 'brain tools' that influenced action and
therefore had causal efficacy. It is possible that learning about this form of
representation enabled the children to begin to meta-represent. It is therefore not
possible from this study to distinguish between Russell's (e.g. Russell, 2002) and
Perner's (e.g. Perner & Lang, 2000) theories.
In addition, both of these latter options leave us with the open question of why
the children did not improve on the EF tasks if they were learning to represent causal
schemas as representations, or shift between cognitive frameworks, which is
presumably what is needed for tasks such as the Card Sort. It may be that the tasks
are of differing levels of difficulty - certainly the EF tasks used would be hard for TD
4-year-olds, whilst the ToM tasks are developmentally appropriate for that age group.
In addition, the EF tasks require the child to demonstrate their abilities repeatedly
(e.g. the multiple trials of the Card Sort), or to maintain them over a period of time
(e.g. sustaining inhibition on Go-NoGo), whilst the ToM tasks only require a single
trial. As others have argued (e.g. Leslie & Polizzi, 1998) a true control for the
executive demands of a ToM task would be a single trial of an EF task, not repeated
trials. It may be that limitations of the tasks also account for the lack of a direct
effect of training - variation in performance between testing sessions was wide in all
of the experimental groups, and it is possible that these EF tasks were simply a less
stable measure than the ToM tasks in these groups, and that therefore it was much
harder to discern any improvement.
Indirect effects in the opposite direction were far less marked. There was a
slight tendency on the part of the ASD-ToM group towards improvement on the EF
tasks, however, this only reached significance in the Card Sort, where the ASD-
Controls group also improved. It therefore seems unlikely that this was directly to do
with the ToM training - unlike the MLD-Controls, there is no reason to think that the
ASD-Controls were under performing on the pre-test. In the MLD group there were
no effects at all of ToM training on EF, and the MLD-ToM group were the most
responsive to the ToM training, demonstrating generalisation to untrained tasks both
at post-test and at follow-up. It therefore seems that this type of ToM training did not
improve performance on these EF tasks in children with MLD or with ASD.
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Responses in the ASD and MLD groups
Part of the reason for including both ASD and MLD participants in this study
was to compare the effects of training in the two groups, with the aim of investigating
possible differences in difficulties underlying FB failure in these groups. The
hypothesis was that the MLD group's difficulties would be due to factors other than
genuine problems in ToM, and that therefore training them might be particularly
effective, and also that EF training might selectively improve their ToM performance
(as opposed to the ToM performance of the ASD group). These predictions were
partially supported. The ToM training was particularly effective in the MLD group,
not only did the children learn to pass the trained unexpected transfer task but they
also showed generalisation to both the Penny Hiding deception task and the Deceptive
box-other. This was wider than the generalisation seen in the ASD group, and was
maintained at follow-up. This is in line with other studies, which have found that
young TD children and those with non-autistic learning difficulties showed a greater
degree of transfer to other ToM tasks than did children with ASD (McGregor et al.,
1998a; Swettenham, 1996). However, the EF training improved ToM performance in
both the ASD and MLD groups, and in fact appeared to be particularly effective in the
ASD group, which goes against my prediction. As I have discussed above, there are
several possibilities as to why the EF training might have had this effect on ToM
performance, but there is no evidence from this study to suggest that it was more
effective for participants with MLD.
The group that really stands out as being quite different to other participants in
this study was the MLD-control group. They were the highest achieving group on
ToM tasks at the pre-test and showed a significant improvement on unexpected
transfer tasks both at post-test and at follow-up. Whilst it seems likely that the
training effects seen in the other MLD groups are genuine, since they mirror those
seen in the ASD group and also show a degree of generalisation not seen in the
controls, the performance of the MLD controls serves as a warning to studies that do
not include control samples, or who assume that performance on a single FB task
indicates a stable cognitive ability. Evidence from my previous study of ToM and
language (Study 1: Chapter 3) as well as from this study indicates that performance on
FB tasks in children with MLD may be particularly vulnerable to task factors.
However, the fact that the changes in MLD trained groups mirrored the pattern of
improvements seen in the ASD group suggests that it would be premature to conclude
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that children with MLD's difficulties with ToM tasks are entirely different in nature
to those of children with ASD. Taken with the results of Study 2 (Chapter 5), which
found a particularly high alpha value between ToM tasks in children with MLD, it
may be that some children with MLD do have difficulties in representing other minds,
and that these difficulties are not due simply to difficulties in reflecting on
representations in general (as they had no problems on the false photograph task), nor
are they due to executive problems (as executive tasks did not relate to performance
on FB tasks in Study 2). However, these difficulties are clearly quite different to
those seen in people with ASD, both in the proportion of individuals affected (see
Study 1: Chapter 3) and in the severity of these problems - children with MLD who
failed FB tasks performed much better on a range of other ToM tasks than children
with ASD (Study 2: Chapter 5).
Real life measurements
The 'before' and 'after' questionnaires for teachers (who were blind to group
assignment) were completed over a relatively short time scale (in most cases 2
months), and it seemed unlikely that any changes in real life behaviour would be seen
over this time, particularly since the same teachers were completing the
questionnaires and so would probably have quite a strong idea of how they thought a
particular child behaved. However, there was some tentative indication in the ASD
group only that those who were trained were more likely to improve on the ToM
scale, with over half of the trained children (50% of the ToM trained groups, 56% of
the EF trained group) showing some improvement over time, as compared to none of
the control group. However, a much larger sample size is needed over a longer period
of time in order to really investigate this issue. Study 5 (Chapter 9) will examine the
relationship between performance on ToM tasks and real life behaviour in more
depth.
Numbers with questionnaire scores both before and after were so small in the
MLD group that it is not possible to make any conclusions, but there was no evidence
for a relationship between improving on experimental tasks and improving on the
questionnaire scales. However, a high proportion of the controls (who improved on
experimental tasks), also improved on the real life ratings.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, this study shows that after a relatively brief intervention
programme, children with ASD and MLD are able to learn to pass FB tasks and to
show some degree of generalisation to other, non-trained tasks. This learning was
sustained at follow-up. There was tentative evidence from this study that in those
with ASD some cases both the EF and ToM training programmes were associated
with a real life improvement on behaviours thought to require a ToM. The success of
this intervention in stimulating some generalisation of learning relative to other
studies may be due to the use of an alternative strategy for mentalising (as in
Swettenham et a!. 1996), as opposed to using straightforward feedback on FB tasks
(Swettenham, 1996) or a rule based learning procedure (Hadwin et al, 1996). Children
with MLD showed more generalisation to other ToM tasks than children with ASD.
This may indicate that the ToM difficulties demonstrated by the children with MLD
were less profound than those seen in the ASD group, and were thus more easily
overcome, or it may indicate that the MLD group were simply better at generalising.
Given that children with ASD are known to have difficulties in generalisation (e.g.
Plaisted, 2001), but also that studies 2 and 5 of this thesis indicate that children with
MLD who fail FB tasks do have less profound problems in social interaction than do
children with ASD, some combination of the two may account for the superior
improvement of the MLD group. This superior generalisation was also in line with
previous studies, which have found some transfer of ToM learning with children with
DS (Swettenham, 1996), and with social anxiety and MLD (Steememan et al., 1996).
The trajectory of improvement in the two diagnostic groups was very similar,
somewhat unexpectedly. This may indicate that there are some similarities between
children with ASD and those with MLD who fail FB tasks, and that the ToM
difficulties of those with MLD should not be dismissed as artefactual or irrelevant,
although these difficulties do appear to be both less pervasive and less severe than
those seen in children with ASD (Studies 1 and 2, chapters 3 and 5).
Training in EF improved children's performance on a range of ToM tasks,
despite not improving their performance on EF tasks. This may be because the
training programme itself inadvertently trained some aspects of ToM, or because EF
is causally related to ToM, either as a precursor or because ToM is an integral part of
EF. This indirect transfer of learning from the EF training to ToM was evident in
both the ASD and MLD groups, with the ASD group showing a wider degree of
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generalisation than did the MLD group. Group differences, therefore, showed the
reverse pattern to that seen in the ToM trained groups, and quite why that might be is
something of a puzzle. It may be that the EF training programme inadvertently
targeted some aspect of EF that children with ASD find hard about ToM tasks, and
harder than do children with MLD. Possibilities could be flexibility or inhibitory
control (although again we have the problem that there was no improvement on tasks
measuring these abilities). These suggestions are purely speculative at this stage.
There are a number of unanswered questions from this study. However, it
does appear to indicate that children with both ASD and MLD can be taught over a
short-term intervention programme to pass FB tasks, and that this can generalise to
untrained tasks in at least some children. This leads us to ask what exactly it means
for a child with ASD or MLD to pass, rather than fail, a PB task, and whether it has
any implications for their social interactions in everyday life. Up to this point this
thesis has focused on failure on PB tasks, and what that might mean in children with
ASD or MLD. The focus will now shift to look at those who pass PB tasks - a
minority of children with ASD, but a majority of those with MLD. This group of
children will be investigated in greater depth in chapter 8, and the everyday social
behaviour of both PB passers and failers will be examined in chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 8
STUDY 4: WHAT DOES FB TASK SUCCESS MEAN IN
________ INDIVIDUALS WITH ASD?
Introduction
As discussed in chapters 1 and 3, a certain proportion of individuals with ASD
pass first order FB tasks (e.g. Baron-Cohen et a!., 1985; Happé, 1995), and some of
those also pass second order FB tasks (e.g. Bowler, 1992). Despite this, there has so
far been relatively little investigation of what it actually means for people with ASD
to demonstrate an understanding of FB, and what it might be that enables them to do
so. It is possible that passing FB tasks in ASD demonstrates little more than problem
solving ability, 'hacking' out a solution with no genuine understanding of mind (Frith
et a!., 1991). Alternatively, this group may genuinely have better socio-cognitive
skills than the majority of children with ASD, in which case we would expect this to
be demonstrated in other experimental tasks and in real life. These better socio-
cognitive skills may well not be achieved in the same way as TD children develop
their skills, however, and the relationships between ToM tasks, verbal and non-verbal
ability may inform us as to whether there are differences in the way that individuals
with ASD solve ToM tasks as compared to individuals with MLD.
There are some clues as to the characteristics of this group. Happé (1995)
identified high verbal ability as a shared characteristic of individuals with ASD who
pass FB tasks, and Study 1 of this thesis found that receptive grammatical ability was
a particularly good predictor of performance on FB tasks in children with ASD,
perhaps suggesting that good language skills are necessary for the development of
ToM, rather than vice versa. There is also evidence that, at least in some cases,
superior real-life socio-cognitive strengths are associated with passing FB tasks.
Frith et a!. (1994) found superior performance on teacher ratings of social behaviour
requiring some consideration of mental states in individuals with ASD who passed FB
tasks as compared to those who failed, indicating that passing a FB task does indicate
some degree of competency in social behaviour in everyday life. The present chapter
focuses on the performance of children with ASD who pass FB tasks on a range of
advanced tests of ToM, with the aim of identifying strategies they may be using, and
of identifying features which make a ToM task easier for individuals with ASD. The
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specific issue of the relationship of everyday life behaviour to performance on ToM
tasks will be addressed in study 5 (chapter 9).
Experimentally, differences between those who pass FB tasks and those who
fail have been found on experimental tasks such as the Strange Stories, in which
participants are asked questions requiring the attribution of a mental state to the
protagonist in a short story (Happé, 1994). Happé (1994) compared three groups of
individuals with ASD, those who failed FB, those who passed I order FB only, and
those who passed 211(1 order PB as well as 1 order. Both groups of passers
outperformed the failers, and those who passed 2nd order FB outperformed those who
passed 1 order. This group who passed 2nd order PB still performed worse on the
Strange Stories task than normal adult controls, however. They performed
indistinguishably from young TD controls and controls with MLD, despite having a
large verbal IQ advantage. It is also true that very able individuals with ASD (who in
most cases will pass at least I order FB tasks, although this is not assessed in every
study) still have difficulties in other advanced ToM tasks such as recognising social
faux pas (Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999), recognising
mental states from the eye regions of the face (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone, &
Rutherford, 1999) and spontaneous social reasoning about animated shapes (Abell,
Happe, & Frith, 2000; KIm, Schultz, & Cohen, 2000). All the studies cited above
found deficits in individuals with ASD when compared with normal adults or
children, rather than to people with learning difficulties. The problem of choosing
appropriate controls for high-functioning participants with ASD will be discussed
later.
From the literature to date, we are left with a picture of an able group of
individuals with ASD, who pass 1st order FB and in some cases order FB tasks.
Some of these individuals demonstrate superior social insight in everyday life, and on
other ToM tasks, when compared to individuals with ASD who fail FB tasks, yet they
still show some of the social difficulties associated with ASD, and are impaired on
some experimental ToM tasks when compared to normal controls. This chapter
investigates the performance of this group further, in particular assessing whether
there are certain experimental manipulations that make the tasks easier or harder for
participants with ASD that might shed light on how they may be solving these tasks.
In this introduction I will first discuss what might account for the superior
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performance of this group, in particular discussing the potential role of language in
the understanding of mind in ASD, and will then outline the predictions for this study.
Firstly, what might be accounting for the superior performance of these high-
functioning individuals? The obvious place to start is with their shared strength, their
language. Several studies (reviewed in chapter 2), and Study 1 (chapter 3) of this
thesis indicate that individuals with ASD who pass FB have a higher level of verbal
ability (vocabulary and grammar) than those who fail, and a higher level than children
with MLD or TD children who pass FB tasks. This has led to suggestions that
language itself might be facilitating FB performance in people with ASD, that they
might be using their superior language skills to provide the structure for a rudimentary
understanding of mind (Happé, 1995; Tager-Flusberg, 2002). Exactly how a high
level of verbal ability might lead to a better ToM ability has not received much
experimental investigation to date.
How might language enable individuals with ASD to form a better
understanding of mental states?
In chapter 2, the role of language in the typical development of ToM was
discussed in detail. The case of those able individuals with ASD who appear to have
some understanding of mind may be quite different, to that seen in typical
development, and will be discussed below. From a reading of the literature to date it
seems there are four alternative proposals for the way in which language may enable
an individual with ASD to pass ToM tasks, and possibly develop a genuinely better
understanding of minds. These proposals will be briefly outlined in turn.
The first option is that language may be important developmentally, as a prop
to enable children with ASD to develop some degree of understanding of mental
states. Its importance may be due to the pathway it provides into learning about
mental states, providing access to a great deal of explicit information or rules of
thumb about thoughts and beliefs. Anecdotally, people with high-functioning ASD
are often observed to appear to be following learnt social rules that are sometimes
even explicitly verbalised, and to have difficulties when the situations change and
more flexible behaviour is required. Experimentally they have difficulties in tasks
where the conventional social rules do not apply, or can be misapplied (e.g. Baron-
Cohen Ct al., 1999; Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare, & Hatton, 2001). If individuals
with ASD are using language in order to acquire verbal rules about mental states, then
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tasks that allow the participants the opportunity to access schemas of previously
learned information should be relatively easy, whilst tasks that require a more
immediate and fluid type of mental state processing should still be difficult.
An alternative form of this developmental hypothesis argues that the structure
of language itself could itself provide individuals with ASD with the context to start
to distinguish between different perspectives. As I have discussed elsewhere (chapter
2), De Villiers (e.g. De Villiers, 2000) argues that the complement syntax structure
inherent in mental state verbs is crucial in coming to understand the differing
perspectives of other minds. If this were to be the case, then those people with ASD
who have a high enough level of language should be equally unimpaired on all ToM
tasks, regardless of their language demands, since in De Villiers' account language is
important as a developmental stepping stone to a ToM, rather than as a prop during
the online use of a ToM.
Tager-Flusberg (2001) has a different approach to ToM which speaks
directly to the issue of those with ASD who pass ToM tasks. She argues that ToM
can be dissociated into two components. These are a 'social-perceptive' component
which refers to the online immediate judgement of a person's mental state, based on
the information available in their faces, voices and body posture, and a 'social
cognitive' component, which refers to the capacity to make complex cognitive
inferences about mental states, requiring the integration of information across time
and events. Tager-Flusberg argues that in the case of TD children, the social
cognitive component builds on the social perceptive component, but that in the case of
ASD the social perceptive component is impaired. In most individuals with ASD this
means that the social cognitive component will also be impaired. It is possible,
however, for some high-functioning people with ASD to develop some of the social
cognitive component of ToM, but they have to do it via a different developmental
pathway, relying exclusively on language (Tager-Flusberg, 2000, 2002) or,
alternatively, on more general logical reasoning skills to 'hack out' a solution (Frith et
al., 1994). Tager-Flusberg argues that communication verbs in particular may be
important in enabling individuals with ASD to draw the distinction between belief and
reality and to bootstrap themselves into a better understanding of mind - i.e., whilst
an individual with ASD may not understand that someone has a mistaken belief, they
can understand that someone has said something mistaken and therefore they can
begin to get an idea of differing perspectives. Tager-Flusberg argues that the
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understanding of minds that individuals with ASD gain in this way will not be as
intuitive or as fast as that of TD children, but will nevertheless enable individuals with
ASD to make some accurate attributions about mental states. Tager-Flusberg (2002)
used the analogy of making lists of street directions in order to get from one place to
another as a compensatory strategy for a lack of spatial awareness. In the case of ToM
this compensatory strategy could involve constructing a verbal narrative from the
situation - 'talking it through' in rather the same way as a TD child might find talking
through a maths problem helpful. This would lead to the prediction that tasks that
have a well defined verbal structure would be relatively unimpaired, as these tasks
provide a substantial element of the linguistic structure already and therefore much of
the work is done, in comparison to every day life where there is no narrator, and no
one to point out salient features of the situation. Tager-Flusberg's model would
suggest that whilst individuals with ASD will be able to do relatively well on social
cognitive tasks (such as the Strange Stories; (Happé, 1994)), they will remain
impaired on social perceptual tasks such as the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997).
This brings us to the fourth alternative explanation for the importance of
language in ToM performance. Language may be important as an online tool,
enabling the individual with ASD to solve problems involving mental state
attributions by verbal means. In the example above, the use of language to construct
a verbal narrative would be an online strategy, even though the ability to do so may
have developed due to superior language skills (and therefore language is implicated
both developmentally and online). Using learnt rules to solve tasks would also be an
online strategy, although acquiring the rules would be a developmental process. It is
also possible that high-functioning individuals with ASD have a non-verbal online
strategy - they may be able to tap into mental models, for example, constructed
through learnt rules. All theories that postulate the use of online strategies would
predict slower and less accurate mental state attributions as compared to controls.
Bowler (1997) tested this with a small sample of adults with ASD, recording their
reaction time for 2nd order FB tasks. Although the ASD group had a longer reaction
time than controls on the FB questions, this was equally evident in questions that did
not involve mentalising. However, it may well be that 2' order FB tasks (which are
passed by TD 6-year-olds) are not sensitive enough to pick up these differences in
able adults with ASD. Any online strategy for such relatively straightforward tasks
may be so overlearnt that it is no longer notably time consuming or prone to error.
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Online strategies have the added feature that they may or may not be helpful in real
life - Frith et at. (1994) suggest that some individuals with ASD may use 'hacking',
non-ToM strategies which, though they may enable individuals to solve some ToM
tasks, would not be very useful in every day life. If online strategies are being used, it
is likely that two groups exist - individuals with ASD who use task-specific online
strategies to help them pass experimental tasks, and those individuals who use online
strategies that also enable them to improve their everyday functioning. It is also
possible that some individuals with ASD may be attributing mental states in a post
hoc fashion, when the need becomes apparent (as it often does in ToM tasks, but
maybe does not so often in real life).
This study was designed to test several related hypotheses about the way in
which high-functioning individuals with ASD may be overcoming some of their
difficulties in ToM tasks. The first prediction was that high-functioning children with
ASD would not have difficulties on ToM tasks in which they could potentially tap
into internal sources of learned information and rules. These tasks included a
vocabulary test of mental states and emotion terms, and a task asking the participants
to report their ability not to think (Flavell et al., 1997). Knowing that it is not possible
to stop thinking appears to be something that children can learn, as scientific fact.
Paired tasks were included which shared certain similarities with the above tasks, but
which did not appear to be so open to rule use. These included the Children's Eyes
task (Baron-Cohen et al., in press), which used the same mental state and emotion
terms as the Eyes vocabulary task, but required the child to pair those terms with a
photograph of a person's facial expression, identified only by the eye region, and a
task in which children were asked to report their thoughts (Flavell et al., 1997).
The second prediction was that ToM tasks with a well-defined verbal structure
would be less problematic for high-functioning individuals with ASD than tasks with
no verbal narrative. The verbally structured tasks were second order FB tasks, and
stories requiring mental state attributions (Happé, 1994). A range of tasks which were
not thought to be soluble by learnt rules, and which did not have a verbal structure,
were also included, with the prediction that impairments would remain on these. A
non-verbally structured task was included, on which it was predicted that the children
with ASD would have difficulties. This task involved inferring mental states from
cartoon pictures (Happé et al., 1999).
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The third prediction was that people with ASD would calculate mental states
as and when they were required rather than as an ongoing process; in a rather 'post-
hoc' fashion. In order to test this, a variation of a task designed by Paul Harris was
developed. Harris (Harris & Martin, unpublished) designed a task that used the
relative reading speed for sentences containing an emotion to test whether the reader
judged the appropriateness of various emotional responses from the protagonist's
standpoint or from their own standpoint. Readers will take less time to read a
sentence containing an emotion which is congruent with the story they are reading
(called 'appropriate' throughout this account) than one containing an non-congruent
(and thus 'inappropriate') emotion, and this can be used to assess what the reader
judges to be an appropriate emotion in the case of a knowledgeable or ignorant
protagonist. Harris's aim was to investigate whether mental states were attributed
throughout a story, or whether they were attributed when it became necessary to do
so, and he therefore compared reading times for appropriate emotions when the
protagonist had a false belief with times for when the protagonist was fully
knowledgeable about the situation. In normal adults, he found that mental states were
attributed throughout the story, it did not take any longer to read an emotion sentence
based on a false belief than one based on a true belief. A variation of this task was
designed for the children in this study, which involved stories in which the emotional
content of a situation changed (e.g. Jane had thought she would be going to the
cinema, but actually would be going to the dentist instead). In four stories, the
protagonist was informed of the situation (e.g. Jane's dad told her they would be
going to the dentist instead), whilst in the other four they were kept ignorant (e.g.
Jane's dad had not yet told her and so Jane still thought she was going to the cinema).
Each story ended with a sentence containing an emotion term about the protagonist.
The sentence containing the emotion term (she/he felt happy/sad) was appropriate for
half the stories (e.g. Jane was sad because she was going to the dentist), and
inappropriate for the other half (e.g. Jane was happy because she was going to the
dentist). The reading times for the various conditions tell us which the reader judges
to be appropriate or inappropriate. For example, if Jane doesn't know she will be
going to the dentist instead of the cinema she should be happy, but if the reader fails
to take account of her lack of knowledge then he will assume she would be sad as this
would be congruent with the actual situation as opposed to Jane's perspective on the
situation. This task thus provides an 'implicit' measure of perspective taking through
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reading time. In addition, if the reader is not taking the mental standpoint of the
protagonist throughout the story (as did the normal adults in Harris's study), but is
instead waiting for the emotion sentence and then computing the mental state in a
somewhat post hoc way, reading times for the appropriate emotion in the ignorant
condition (i.e. when Jane doesn't know she will be going to the dentist's) will be
slower than that in the knowledgeable condition (where there is no conflict between
the protagonist's and the reader's knowledge state). The prediction is that this will be
the case for some members of the ASD group.
In order to test whether there was any evidence for individuals with ASD
using a specifically verbal online strategy, a task was designed which involved
interfering with the participants' inner speech through articulatory suppression.
Children had to repeat the word 'baa' whilst ordering picture sequences that told a
story involving a FB. In the control condition they tapped on the table instead of
saying baa. Mechanical stories were also included as a control for the other (non-
ToM) demands of the task. If children with ASD were using a verbally mediated
strategy at the time of doing the task, then the verbal interference condition should
selectively impair their ability to sequence the stories involving mental states.
There were therefore 4 main questions in this study. First, are tasks that allow
access to learnt rules (versus those that don't) easier for individuals with ASD?
Second, are tasks with a well-defined linguistic structure easier for individuals with
ASD? Third, is there evidence that individuals with ASD are using post hoc
strategies in mental state attribution? Fourth, is there evidence that strategies are
verbally-mediated?
A final, subsidiary, question, and one which will be discussed further in
chapter 10, is the role of executive function in ToM in individuals with ASD. A
range of EF measures were not included in this study, however, a working memory
task was included, in order to test the prediction that an alternative strategy for ToM
would require a certain degree of 'holding in mind' which would need working
memory. If this is the case, then working memory should be related to ToM
performance in children with ASD, and this should be less evident in children with
MLD.
Since there are no standardised scores for the ToM tasks used, there is no way
of comparing results between the various tasks, and it is not possible to directly assess
whether the participants with ASD find one task easier than another. We therefore
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used comparisons with a control group to give an indication of which tasks the groups
are impaired or unimpaired on. Selecting a control group for high-functioning people
with ASD has long been regarded as problematic. Many studies have used normal
adults, or TD children (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Blackshaw et al., 2001) as
controls for high-functioning individuals with ASD. This study used individuals with
MLD, since a theme of this thesis has been the comparison of the ToM performance
of individuals with ASD and MLD. It is also the case that a matched sample of TD
children would have been practically impossible to find. The range of verbal ability
(as measured by the BPVS) in the present sample of high-functioning children with
ASD went from 52 to 156 (VMA ranging from 5.92 - 17.00). Had we matched on
VMA alone the TD group would have had to include individuals who were both much
younger than the youngest participant with ASD (who was nearly 10 years old) and
individuals who were significantly older than the oldest participant (who was 15 years
old). The tasks were designed to be appropriate for the range of CAs included in the
ASD group. Therefore a group of children with moderate learning difficulties of
similar CAs to the participants with ASD were used, although, due to the nature of
their difficulties, this group had a lower mean VMA and ability level than did the
ASD group. This was inevitable given that passing ToM tasks in autism is associated
with a much higher verbal ability level than in those with MLD (Happé, 1995). Since
this study predicts that the MLD group should outperform the ASD group on certain
tasks, this difference is less problematic than it might have been. In order to examine
whether any whole group differences (or lack of differences) were due to differences
in developmental level or IQ, smaller, ability matched, subgroups were created and all
analyses were repeated with these groups as well as with the full sample.
Method
Participants
22 children with MLD and 19 children with ASD took part in this study. The
children with MLD had all participated in Study 1 (Chapter 3), and were chosen for
this present study because they passed at least 2/3 of the basic unexpected FB tasks
described in this study. 12 of the children in the ASD group were participants in
Study 1, and an extra 7 participants with ASD were also recruited. These children
had participated in a previous unrelated study and were known to pass standard FB
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tasks of the type administered in Study 1. Ten of the ASD group had a diagnosis of
autism or ASD, whilst 9 had a diagnosis of Asperger's Syndrome. Table 8.1 gives
their relative ages and ability levels. In the MLD group there were 18 boys and 4
girls, and in the ASD group there were 17 boys and 2 girls.
Table 8.1. Age and ability measures for the two groups; mean (&d.)
	ASD (N = 19)	 MLD (N = 22)
CA (years)	 12.13 (1.37)	 12.79 (0.91)
BPVS VMA (years)
	
12.16 (2.97)	 9.05 (0.96)
BPVS standardised	 102.32 (22.14)	 76.55 (5.35)
TROG VMA (years)
	
9.18 (2.17)	 7.39 (1.60)
TROG age-adjusted 	 134.79 (24.98)	 109.22 (20.13)
Raven's CPM (raw score) 	 29.89 (5.44)	 26.95 (5.30)
Non-parametric tests were used to compare the groups, since the variances were not
homogenous. The groups differed significantly on all the ability measures (all p-
values <.05) but did not differ significantly on CA (p=.10). Miller and Chapman
(2001) argue that it is not possible to control for variables (such as ability) which
differ systematically between groups by covarying out these variables using
ANCOVA, particularly when the groups are not randomly assigned and when the
disparity is itherent in the groups, as in this case. To check the effects of ability
differences, therefore, subgroups were selected that were more closely matched on
ability. The aim of these groups was to maximise the numbers included whilst
creating groups who were comparable in their developmental level, as assessed by the
VMA scores and the raw score on Raven's CPM. This was done by excluding the
most able children in the ASD group (those with a BPVS VMA of more than 13
years) and the least able in the MLD group (those with a BPVS VMA of less than 8.5
years). Again, non-parametric tests were used to compare the two groups since the
variances were not homogenous. These groups did not differ significantly on BPVS
VMA (p= .09), TROG VMA (p=.49) or Raven's CPM (p=.89) although they differed
on the BPVS standardised score (p<.01), the TROG age-adjusted score (p<.05 ) and
CA (p<.0l). All analyses were repeated with these groups in addition to using the
whole sample. Table 8.2 gives the ability and age of these subgroups.
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Table 8.2. Age and ability of ability matched subgroups; mean (standard deviation)
	ASD(N=11)	 MLD(N=17)
CA(years)	 11.54 (1.31)	 12.99 (0.92)
BPVS VMA (years)
	 10.17 (2.09)	 9.38 (0.73)
BPVS standardised 	 90.64 (18.37)	 77.59 (5.01)
TROG VMA (years)
	 8.41 (2.48)	 7.81 (1.55)
TROG age-adjusted 	 132.20 (31.45)	 111.69 (21.67)
Raven's CPM (raw score) 	 27.45 (5.84)	 27.82 (5.14)
Procedure
Participants were seen in a quiet room in their school or home by a single
researcher. The testing session took approximately two hours. In the case of those
participants seen at school, this was split into two or three shorter sessions to fit in
with school timetables. In the case of those seen at home, the session was split into
two with a short break in the middle. The tasks were presented in one of two fixed
orders, there were no order effects.
Measures
Ability measures
British Picture Vocabulary Scale: This task is described in Study 1 (Chapter 3).
Test of Reception of Grammar: This task is described in Study 1 (Chapter 3).
Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices: This task is described in Study 2 (Chapter
5).
Working memory: Digit Span: The forwards and backwards digit span tasks from the
WISC (Wechsler, 1974) were administered.
The forwards digit span measures the number of digits the child can repeat back in
order, and taps into the phonological loop of the working memory system.
The backwards digit span requires the participant to repeat back digits in order, and so
taps into the working memory element of the central executive.
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Theory of Mmd measures
Table 8.3 gives a summaly of the tasks used in this study, with the area that
they were designed to test. The tasks are described in detail underneath.









Tasks which could be solved by learnt information
(paired task which could not be solved with rules)
Tasks with a well-defined linguistic structure
(paired task without a linguistic structure)
Tasks designed to assess post-hoc mental states
attributions
Picture sequences	 Tasks designed to interfere with verbal online strategies
Children's Version of the 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes' task (Baron-Cohen et al., in
press): This task was included as a task on which the participants could not use learnt
rules. In addition, it is a task without a well defined linguistic structure. It is
described in Study 2. All 28 items were administered to the participants in this study.
Scores could therefore range from 0-28.
Eyes vocabulary test: This task was designed to check that the children understood all
the words used as correct answers in the Eyes task, and also to give a contrast task for
the Eyes tasks that could be solved using learnt rules or information (and was
therefore more of a social cognitive than a social perceptual task). Therefore a new
vocabulary test was devised, using the correct answers from the Reading the Mind in
the Eyes task. Participants were asked what a series of words meant, having first
been told they could explain what the word means, give another word which means
the same thing, or describe a time when they had felt like that. An example was given
as follows. 'IfI asked you 'What does angry mean? you could say 'It means when you
are very cross because someone has done something you do not like.' And for an
example, you could say, 'I got very angry when my brother kicked me, because he
hurt me".
Participants were asked what 16 words meant. There were fewer words than
items on the Eyes task because of repetitions of some words within the Eyes task.
These words were: jealous, thinking, remembering, friendly, relaxed, worried,
interested, sad, kind, believe, happy, serious, nervous, hoping, sure and pleased.
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Their answers were coded as follows: 2-points were awarded for a correct definition,
an appropriate synonym (e.g. miserable for 'sad'), or an example which made it clear
that the child understood the word (e.g. we were sad when my granddad died because
we missed him). 1-point was awarded for a partial definition, appropriate use in a
sentence that did not completely clarify the meaning of the word (e.g. you remember
to go out to play when the bell rings), or a definition that included some inaccuracy as
well as some accuracy. 0-points were awarded for a wrong answer, a non-informative
or simply repetitive sentence (e.g. thinking is when you think about something) or 'do
not know'. These scores were summed to give a total score that could range
potentially from 0-32. Twenty randomly selected scripts (49%) were double coded by
two independent raters. Kendall's tau-b was .76 for the task, indicating a very good
level of agreement.
Think/Not-think task: These tasks were included as quite a different measure of the
understanding of mind than those usually used with participants with autism, and as
measures of introspective ability. They were taken from Flavell (1992). The tasks
started with a short pre-training to get the child used to the procedure. In this, the
child was first asked to say the first thing that they thought in response to a word
spoken by the experimenter. They were then asked to close their eyes, think of two
things that a spoken word made them think of, but not to say anything until they were
asked by the experimenter. They were then told that people sometimes have thoughts
they do not try to have, and sometimes thoughts happen so fast that it is hard to notice
or remember them. The Think task was then administered. The participant was asked
to move to a chair or corner labelled 'think' and told to close their eyes and think
about something they would really like to do. Following 5-10 seconds of silence they
were asked to think about something they really did not like to do. Following another
period of silence they were asked to return to their original chair and were asked to
tell the experimenter all the thoughts they had had. Once they had done this they
were asked if they had any other thoughts, and then were asked to recount their
thoughts one by one (the experimenter asked 'what was your firstlsecondlthird etc
thought?' until the child said they had had no further thoughts). They were finally
asked if they had thought about what they had had for breakfast, as a measure of their
suggestibility.
The Not—think task was then administered. Participants sat in a chair or corner
labelled 'Do not think', closed their eyes and were asked to try not to think of
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anything at all, to try to keep their mind completely empty of thoughts. After 20-25
seconds they were told to open their eyes and move back to their original chair. They
were asked about their thoughts during their time in the 'Do not Think' chair. If they
said they had had some thoughts they were asked to recount their thoughts in order
(the experimenter asked 'what was your first/second/third etc thought?' until the child
claimed to have had no more thoughts). They were then asked if it had been easy or
hard to stop themselves having thoughts (with the order of easy/hard counter-
balanced). They were then asked why and what they had done to try and stop
themselves having any thoughts.
Scoring followed a five point scale for each task. In the 'Think' task,
participants were given one point for recounting both a like and a dislike, one point
for placing the 'like' thought first in their recollection (either spontaneously or when
asked to recount their thoughts one by one), one point if they showed evidence of
genuine recollection of visualisation and imagination rather than simply saying
something they liked or disliked (e.g. saying 'I thought about being a professional
football player and winning the cup, holding it up high and feeling great' would get a
point, whereas 'Football' would not). They got another point if they used mental state
terms other than repeating the phraseology used by the experimenter, and one point if
they did not say they had thought about what they had for breakfast. These five
points were then summed to give a total score ranging from 0-5.
The 'Not-think' task was scored as follows. Two points were awarded if a
child said they had had thoughts and reported some content. A single point was
awarded if the child either said they had thoughts but were unable to report their
contents, or if they denied having thoughts but then reported some (e.g. if they said
'No I did not have any thoughts, I just thought of a black room'.). A further point
was awarded if they said it had been hard to stop themselves having thoughts, another
point if they reported a mental strategy for doing so, and a final point if they gave an
appropriate explanation of why it was hard to stop themselves having thoughts (e.g.
because your thoughts just keep going, or because you can't stop yourself thinking,
your brain keeps working). These points were summed to give a total 'not think'
score out of five.
Twenty (49%) of the scripts (10 from each group) were double scored by an
independent rater. Kappa's for the Think task ranged from .86 -1.0 and from .76-1.0
for the Not-think task indicating an excellent level of agreement.
177
2 order FB: These were included as standard tasks used to assess advanced ToM,
and as an example of ToM tasks with a well-defined linguistic structure. Two 2'
order FB tasks were administered, illustrated by line drawings. These tasks were
based on Baron-Cohen (1989) and Bowler (1992). Both tasks included a 1st order
question, a 2nd order question and a 2nd order justification question. All participants
passed the 1st order question, and so scores were calculated as follows: Participants
were given a point for passing the order FB question, and an extra point if they
also passed the corresponding justification question. These two scores were summed,
giving a potential range of scores of 0-4 for the FB tasks. Participants were not given
credit for their performance on the justification question if they failed the FB
question. An example script is given in Appendix VI.
Strange Stories (Happé, 1994): The experimenter read six of the children's version of
the Strange Stories out loud to the child, each of which was followed by a test
question. The stories were left in front of the child so they could read them again if
they wished. Three stories (the ToM stories) involved mental state attributions
(persuasion, double bluff and deception) and three involved deductions about physical
events (the Physical stories). Example stories (to which the example answers below
refer) are given in Appendix VI. The ToM and Physical stories were matched in
difficulty from the results of a sample of 52 TD eight-year-olds (Fisher Ct al.,
submitted).
For both types of story, answers were coded on a 0-2 scale. The maximum
score of 2-points for a story indicated a full answer, in which the child explicitly made
the correct inference about events (e.g. for a ToM story - Because he's a liar but he
told him there; he knows that he is a liar and he done it; for a non-ToM story -
Because the furiy thing was in there and he touched the beam which made the alarm
go off). 1-point was given for answers which referred to the correct facts, but were
not explicit (e.g. for a ToM story Because he lies; for a non-ToM story Because the
animal set the alarm off). A score of 0-points was given for responses that referred to
irrelevant facts, fabrications or simple reiteration of the story (e.g. for a ToM story -
Cos it might be there. Can you tell me any more about that? But it ain't there, it ain't
there, it's near his bed; for a non-ToM story - Because really most people in these
shops have lots of alarms so that nothing can be burgled and that's why). Twenty
randomly selected scripts were scored by two independent raters, and the Kendall's
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tau-b of the inter-rater reliability was .78 for the physical stories and .80 for the ToM
stories, indicating a good to excellent level of agreement.
Cartoons (Happe, Brownell, & Winner, 1999). This task was included as a ToM
measure with no verbal structure and minimal verbal input. Six cartoons (with no
text) from popular magazines were used. See Appendix VI for examples (which the
answers below refer to). Three (the 'ToM' cartoons) involved mental state
attributions and three (the 'non-ToM' cartoons) involved physical anomalies and were
the control condition. The cartoons selected were matched in difficulty using data
collected by the author from a sample of 52 TD eight-year-olds (Fisher et al.,
submitted). The cartoons were presented to the participant one by one, and they were
asked 'Why is this funny?' The cartoon was then left in front of them as they
answered. Non-specific prompts (e.g. Can you tell me any more about that?) were
used if necessary.
Children's answers were coded on a 0-3 scale. A score of 3-points indicated a
full answer, with explicit reference to the target part of the cartoon (e.g. for a ToM
cartoon 'Because the dog's barking into here and the man thinks the hose is talking';
for a non-ToM cartoon 'Because of Minnie Mouse looks at the toilet and it's got the
ears that she 's got on the toilet A score of 2-points was awarded when the child
referred implicitly to the relevant features of the cartoon without making the
connections between areas clear (e.g., for a ToM cartoon 'Cos the dog's speaking
through the thing and it's coming all the way through and it's coming out of the end
bit. 'And what's funny here? 'He can hear the dog'; for a non-ToM cartoon - 'Cos it
looks like it's got ears on the toilet seat'.) One point was awarded when the child
referred to relevant areas of the cartoon without referring, even implicitly, to the
anomaly or mental state which makes the cartoon funny (e.g., for a ToM cartoon
'Because the dog's shouting through the hosepipe and it's going all the way through
when he 's not even barking in the hole'; for a non-ToM cartoon 'Because it 's got two
of them bits') A score of 0-points indicated reference to irrelevant detail, simple
description of the cartoon or 'do not know', (e.g. for a ToM cartoon 'Cos there 's the
big tree and the man 's got glasses and he 's looking up and the dog's going 'rurr,
rurr"; for a non-ToM cartoon 'Cos is there something strange in the loo and she
doesn 't like it?'). A 3-point coding system was developed because of the range in
children's answers and because it was felt to be important to distinguish between
those children who clearly understood the point of the cartoon, and those who, whilst
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they implicitly referred to the target section, did not make explicit the crucial features
of the cartoon.
Twenty randomly selected scripts (49%) were scored by two independent
raters, Kendall's tau-b was .86 for the physical cartoons and .75 for the ToM cartoons,
indicating a good to excellent level of agreement.
Unexpected Stories (based on Harris & Martin, unpublished): This task consisted of
eight short stories, written by the author after the six stories written by Harris. Each
of the stories involved a situation that changed (for example a girl who was planning
to go to the cinema but then had to go to the dentist instead). In 4 of the stories the
protagonist knew about the altered situation, in the other four they remained ignorant,
(e.g. a girl went to the doctor thinking she would have an injection, and no one
informed her that in fact she would be given the immunisation on a sugar lump). The
feelings of the protagonist were described in a simple sentence, either 'She/he felt
happy' or 'She/he felt sad'. All the stories are given in Appendix VI. In half of the
tasks the emotion was appropriately matched to the situation as seen by the
protagonist, in the other half the emotion was inappropriate given the knowledge state
of the protagonist. There were therefore four categories of story:
1. Expected-appropriate (EA) where the story protagonist knew all the events in the
story and the emotion term used was appropriate, given the situation and the
protagonist's knowledge of the situation.
2. Expected-inappropriate (El), which has the same story set up except that the
emotion term used was inappropriate (e.g. Jane might feel happy because she was
going to the dentist's instead of the cinema).
3. Unexpected-appropriate (UA) where the protagonist did not know about a change
to events (e.g. Anita did not know that in fact she would be given a sugar lump
rather than an injection) and the emotion term used was appropriate given the
protagonist's lack of knowledge (so in this case, sad).
4. Unexpected-inappropriate (UI) which was the same type of story except that the
emotion term is inappropriate, given the protagonist's lack of knowledge. In the
Unexpected version of the stories, the appropriateness of the emotion given the
protagonist's knowledge state is opposite to the appropriateness of the emotion
given the situation.
To control for any differences in story complexity, two versions of this task
were used, with the appropriateness or not of the emotions reversed for each story.
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Half of the participants received each version. Stories were presented in a randomised
order. Initial analyses found no difference between the times for the two story sets,
and so data from the two sets were collapsed.
The stories were presented sentence by sentence on a computer, in yellow on a
blue background, font Ariel size 24. They were programmed in SuperLab 2.0.
Participants clicked on a mouse to move to the next sentence. In between each
sentence was a barely discemable break of 150 ms to try and prevent participants
inadvertently double clicking over a sentence. A practice story was included which
the participants read aloud to the experimenter. If they were unable to read
sufficiently well the task was discontinued. This was the case for five members of the
MLD group. A simple question about each story was asked after its completion in
order to provide participants with motivation to attend to it. Reading times were
recorded for each sentence. Due to large individual differences in reading time, a
baseline mean reading time was calculated for all participants. This mean reading
time per sentence was calculated from 52 neutral sentences that were read by all the
participants, and which did not include sentences which changed the situation in the
story (in case these sentences were longer for some participants to read due to the
change in the direction and meaning of the story). The time to read the final target
sentences (i.e. she/he felt happy/sad) was then expressed as a proportion of this mean
reading time. This was done in order to minimise differences due to variation in
reading speed.
Picture Sequences: This task used picture sequences designed and used by Langdon
and Coltheart (1999), after Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1986) There were 8
picture sequences comprising 4 PB stories (involving scenarios such as sweets falling
out of a bag without a boy noticing) and 4 mechanical stories (involving scenarios
such as a door slamming, shaking a table and causing a glass to fall off). Stories were
depicted in 4-card picture sequences using a simple black and white cartoon style. A
set of pictures was used as a practice story, with no interference task. During the
articulatoiy suppression or verbal interference (VI) condition participants were asked
to repeat 'baa' and to hold onto a soft toy with their non-dominant hand (in order to
control for the effects of having to tap with one hand during the control condition)
whilst ordering four of the sequences (two FB, two mechanical), and during the
control condition were asked to tap softly on the table with two fingers whilst
ordering the picture sequences (two FB, two mechanical). The picture sequences for
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which participants tapped or baaed were counter-balanced, and were matched for
difficulty after piloting on 10 normal adults. A position score was calculated for each
sequence by awarding 2 points if the first card was positioned correctly, 2 points if
the last card was positioned correctly and 1 point for each of the second and third
cards being positioned correctly. Position scores per sequence ranged from 0-6 for
each participant. A run score was also calculated, to reflect the number of pictures
that the participants had placed in the correct order, regardless of their positioning
within the sequence. This was included in order to compensate for the fact that if a
participant ordered 3 out of 4 pictures correctly, but then placed the first or last picture
at the wrong end, they would score nothing on the 'position' score. Participants were
given a score for their longest correct run (4, 3 or 2). Therefore a participant who had
the sequence perfectly right would score 6 on the position score and 4 on the run
score. However, it was possible for a participant to score 0 on the position score and
3 on the run score, if three of the cards were in the correct order but were out of
position by one. The run score therefore could equal 0, 2, 3 or 4 for each sequence.
These scores were summed to give a total score for each picture sequence ranging
from 0—lO.
Results
Due to the inequality in language ability between the two groups, all
comparisons were repeated with the VMA matched subgroups. The findings from
these are reported after each whole group comparison. Since these subgroup
comparisons were inevitably linked with a loss of power, effect sizes will be reported
for these VMA-matched group comparisons where appropriate. Findings are reported
as pertaining to the motivating research questions, outlined in the introduction. The
tasks used, and the reason for their inclusion, are summarised in table 8.3.
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Are tasks that allow access to learnt rules easier for individuals with ASD Las
compared to those which cannot be solved by rules)?
Eyes and Eyes vocabulary task
The prediction for these tasks was that the participants with ASD would be
relatively unimpaired on the Eyes vocabulary test (which allows the use of learnt
rules), whilst still showing deficits on the Eyes task. Table 8.4 gives the means and
standard deviations for the ASD and MLD groups on the Eyes task and the Eyes
vocabulary test. One child (who had ASD) refused to attempt the Eyes task.
Table 8.4 Performance on the Eyes task and the Eyes vocabulary test in the ASD




16.72 (2.74)a	 15.86 (3.69)
Eyes vocab task (max = 32)	 24.74 (5.33)	 24.64 (2.97)
a	 18
There were no group differences on either measure (Eyes vocab F (1,39)
O.006, p = .94), Eyes F (1,38) = 7.30, p = .42). When the analysis is repeated with
the verbal ability matched groups, there were still no significant differences. (Eyes
task; ASD mean = 16.70 (s.d. = 2.63); MLD mean =16.76 (s.d. = 2.63); Eyes vocab
task; ASD mean = 24.55 (4.84), MLD mean = 25.18 (2.96)). The effect size for the
Eyes task was 0.02, and for the Eyes vocab test it was 0.16. These effect sizes were
both very low, below that which Cohen (1969) suggests should be considered small
effects. It seemed important to identif' whether both groups were performing badly
on this task, or whether the ASD group was performing particularly well. Baron-
Cohen et al. (in press) give results for a group of 15 males with Asperger's Syndrome
(AS), as well as TD children aged from 6-12. The males with AS (whose mean VIQ
was 102.4, almost exactly the same as the ASD group in this study) had a mean score
of 12.6 on the Eyes task. The ASD group in the present study performed 1.24
standard deviations (from the Baron-Cohen et al. data) better, with mean score of
16.7. The ASD group in the present study had a mean CA of 12.13, and a mean
BPVS VMA of 12.16. TD children of a comparable CA (the closest are the 10-12 age
group in Baron-Cohen's study) scored on average 20.6 (averaged across males and
females). The ASD group are therefore performing 1.63 standard deviations worse
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these TD children. The MLD group, in contrast, were best compared to the 8-10 year
old average, since their average BPVS VMA is 9.05. The average for this group in
Baron-Cohen's study is 17.90, and the MLD group performed less than half of one
standard deviation worse than this at 15.90. If the matched subgroups were used (and
therefore both groups could be compared to the same normal data), then the
comparison is between the ASD group with a mean of 16.70 and the MLD group with
a mean of 16.80. The best comparison group (taking into account both BPVS VMA
and TROG VMA) are the 8-10 year olds in Baron-Cohen et al's study, who had a
mean of 17.9. The ASD and MLD groups are both .29 standard deviations below
them. However, these are very small groups (both in the present study and the Baron-
Cohen et al. study). If we look at all available data, it seems that the ASD group in
the present study are performing between the AS and the TD groups from the Baron-
Cohen et al. (in press) study, whilst the MLD group perform comparably with TD
children of a similar VMA.
Performance on the Eyes task and the Eyes vocabulary task were correlated in the
MLD group only (r (22)= .53, p<.O5). In the ASD group r (18) = -.01, p .97).
Think and Not-think task
The prediction from these tasks was that participants with ASD would be
relatively unimpaired on the 'Not-think' task, which could be passed using learnt
information, whilst being impaired on the 'Think' task, which requires reflection on
own mental states.
Table 8.5 gives the percentage of children in each group who were able to do
each of the aspects of the Think task. One child in the ASD group refused to do both
the Think and the Not-think task. Chi-square tests showed no significant differences
in the percentage who could do each individual item (all p-values> .13). Children
were awarded a point for each item that they had completed successfully and these
were summed to give a total score out of five. There was no group difference on this
'Think' score (ASD mean = 2.61, MLD mean = 3.05, F (1, 38) = 1.20, p.28).
However, the VMA-matched groups had a highly significant difference on the Think
task (ASD mean - 2.00, MLD mean = 3.18, F (1,25) = 8.90, p<.Ol). The effect size
for this difference is 1.18, which is very large (Cohen, 1969). Thus, children with
autism performed very badly on this task when compared to participants with MLD of
a similar verbal ability.
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Statedalikeandadislike 	 72	 91
Recalled the like first 	 72	 91
Said they weren't thinking about what they had for breakfast 	 72	 77
Showed evidence of visualising or recalling their thoughts. 	 22	 23
Used mental states tenns other than repetition of 'think' or 37	 18
'thought'?
Table 8.6 gives the percentage of each group able to do each section of the Not Think
task, in which children were asked not to think for 25 seconds. There were no
differences between the groups on the percentage for each of these individual scores
(all p-values >.12). When the scores were summed to give an aggregate ranging from
0-5, there was no group difference (ASD mean = 2.89, MLD mean = 2.64, F (1,3 8) =
.21, p = .65). When the VMA - matched subgroups were compared there was still no
significant group difference (ASD mean = 2.20, MLD mean = 2.88, F (1,25) = 1.00, p
= .3 3). The effect size of the difference was .40, which is a small effect, according to
Cohen (1969).
Table 8.6 Percentage of children in each group able to do each aspect of the Not
think task
Measure	 ASD (N=18) MLD (N=22)
Said they had thoughts and reported some.	 50	 59
Reported some mental activity (including those who were 56	 68
assessed as passing the previous category)
Mental strategy reported for stopping thoughts. 	 67	 46
Said it was hard to do.	 78	 55
Gave general explanation of why it was hard to do. 	 39	 36
This task had a potential problem in that those who were the most suggestible
might answer that they did not have any thoughts in the hope of fulfilling the
expectations of the experimenter. For this reason, the children were asked during the
Think task whether they had thought about what they had eaten for breakfast. Those
children who said yes were considered particularly suggestible, and so the analyses
were repeated with them excluded. This made no difference to the results.
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Are tasks with a well-defmed linguistic structure easier for individuals with ASD
(as compared to tasks without a linguistic structure)?
The prediction for these tasks was that the ASD group would be relatively
unimpaired on the Strange Stories and 2 order FB (which have a clear linguistic
structure), whilst still demonstrating deficits on the ToM cartoons.
ToM cartoons and stories
Table 8.7 gives the mean scores for the ToM and control Physical cartoons
and the ToM and control Physical stories. One child in the MLD group refused to do
the Stories task. A MANOVA looking for group x condition interaction was
performed for the Cartoons task. In the whole group there were no main effects of
group on either section of the Cartoons (ToM cartoons F (1,39) = .35, p = .56,
Physical cartoons F (1,39) = 2.31, p=.14). There was also no significant interaction
(p=.12), although inspection of the data reveals that there was a tendency towards an
interaction, with the ASD group doing better on the Physical cartoons than the ToM,
and the MLD group showing the opposite pattern.
Table 8.7 Mean scores on the Cartoons and Stories for the ASD and MLD groups;
mean (s.d)
ASD (N = 19)	 MLD (N=22)
ToM cartoons (max = 9)
	
5.21 (2.34)	 6.05 (2.07)
Physical cartoons (max = 9)	 5.64 (2.24)	 4.86 (2.82)
ToM storiesa (max = 6)	 3.05 (2.58)	 1.76 (1.34)
Physical storiesa (max = 6)	 3.94 (1.58)	 2.71 (1.38)
aN21 forMLD group
With the VMA-matched subgroups, there were still no group differences on
the two sections of the task, although there was a moderate effect size (0.64) for the
ToM cartoons and a small effect size (0.42) between the Physical cartoons. There
was, however, a significant interaction between cartoon type (ToM versus physical)
and group (F (1,26) = 4.27, p<.OS). Figure 8.1 illustrates this interaction.
On the Strange Stories, a MANOVA looking for a group x condition
interaction found a main effect of group with the ASD group performed significantly
better than the MLD group in both conditions (TOM stories F (1,38) = 7.82, p<.Ol,
Physical stories F (1,3 8) = 6.92, p<.O5). There was no significant interaction between





no significant group differences on either condition, effect sizes were 0.51 for the
ToM stories (a small to moderate effect) with the ASD group performing slightly
better than the MLD group, and 0.02 for the Physical stories. There was no
significant interaction between group and story type.













Initially the two 2" order FB tasks were analysed separately. Participants
were given 1 point for answering the FB question correctly and an additional point if
they then justified their answer correctly. There was no significant difference on
either task (both p-values >.37). Table 8.8 gives the percentage of each group who
answered each question and justification, as well as the percentage who failed a
control question and were therefore excluded from that task.
Table 8.8 Percentage of each group who passed each FB task, passed the
justification question or failed the control question.
ASD (N=19)	 MLD (N=22)
Chocolate story passed FB 	 94.8%	 81.8%
Chocolate story passed justification 	 78.9%	 77.3%
Chocolate story failed controls
	 5.2%	 13.6%
Circus story passed FB	 63.2%	 86.4%
Circus story passed justification	 57.9%	 63.6%
Circus story failed controls	 2 1.1%	 13.6%
Physical
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There were no significant differences between the groups. The scores were
then combined to create a FB aggregate score, in which the participants were given
one point for each FB question and one point for each justification question that they
answered correctly. The FB score therefore ranged from 0-4. Initially those who
failed a control question were credited with their score for only the tasks on which
they passed the control. There was no significant group difference on this score (ASD
mean = 2.95 (s.d = 1.26), MLD mean = 3.09 (s.d. =1.23) F (1,39) = 14, p = .72). This
was still the case if those who had failed control questions for one task were credited
with double their score for the task on which they had passed controls questions.
When the VMA matched groups were used, 2/11 of the ASD group and 8/17
of the MLD group passed all the FB questions and justifications. This difference did
not reach significance (Fisher's Exact test p = .23). However, the effect size of this
difference is very large (1.64) indicating that had the sample size been larger
this magnitude of difference would have reached significance.
Is there evidence that individuals with ASD are using post hoc strategies in
mental state attribution?
Unexpected Stories
The prediction for this task was that the children with ASD would make
mental state attributions only when these were clearly required, and hence do so in a
post hoc fashion. This would be evident in their reading times (as a measure of
processing speed), which would be longer when based on a misinformed protagonist's
mental state as compared to an informed protagonist's mental state, since the children
with ASD would not be keeping track of the protagonist's mental states online. Five
children with MLD were not able to read well enough for this task to be carried out.
Initial inspection revealed that reading times differed significantly between the
two experimental groups (with the ASD group reading faster than the MLD group),
but also that the standard deviations for these reading times were very large, and
different in the two groups. Therefore, a baseline mean reading time per sentence
score was calculated for each child from the 52 'standard' sentences that formed the
structure to all of the stories. The ASD group were significantly faster readers (ASD
mean = 4105 secs, MLD mean = 6941 sees, F (1,34) = 26.54, p <.001). The reading
times for the target sentences (those containing the emotion term) were then expressed
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as a proportion of this total reading time. All reading times less than or equal to 200
ms were excluded, as they were assumed to be due to a participant skipping a
sentence, or over-enthusiastically clicking the mouse (2 occurrences out of 988
sentences in the ASD group, and 17 occurrences out of 936 sentences in the MLD
group). Table 8.9 gives the mean times (expressed as a proportion of the mean reading
time for the 52 'standard' sentences) for each story condition. There were two stories
in each condition and thus each mean represents the average of the two stories. If a
participant's time for one story was excluded due to being less than 200 ms, their time
for the other story of the same condition was used in place of the mean.
Table 8.9 Mean reading times for each story condition as a proportion of total
reading time: mean (s.d)





	 .61 (.55)	 .37 (.08)
Unexpected-appropriate (UA)
	
•49* (.23)	 •3Ø* (.27)
Unexpected-inappropriate (UI)
	
•5Ø** (.27)	 •34** (.10)
Group differences * p <.05, ** p <.01
Several of these scores violated the normality assumption as tested by the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. In addition, the assumption of homogeneity of variance is
violated in several cases. Therefore, non-parametric tests were used. An initial
Mann-Whitney test found that the groups differed significantly, (with the ASD group
taking longer to read the sentences) on all of the conditions apart from El. With the
VMA-matched groups there were no significant differences on any of the conditions
(all p-values >.14).
Failing to perform as expected on certain features of this task make later
comparisons meaningless - for example, if there is no evidence that a participant is
attending to and understanding the stories, then a difference in reading time between
conditions is likely to be spurious. Participants can be divided into four groups.
Those who did not read the sentence referring to the appropriate emotion faster than
the inappropriate emotion in the Expected condition make up a group who did not
appear to be taking the emotional content of the story into account; we therefore have
no evidence that they were engaging with and understanding the story. Of those
remaining, those who read the inappropriate emotion faster than the appropriate
emotion in the Unexpected condition did not appear to be taking the protagonist's FB
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into consideration. In the final group (who appeared to be both understanding the
story and taking account of the FB) the relative speed of reading the appropriate
emotion sentence in the Expected or Unexpected conditions tells us, potentially,
whether participants are attributing mental states as the story progresses, or are only
calculating the characters' thoughts when emotional information that conflicts with
reality occurs. If they were building up the mental model as the story progresses, the
emotion sentence should not come as a surprise in either story type, and reading time
for the emotions sentences should not differ. If, however, participants are calculating
mental states in a 'post hoc' fashion, then it should take them longer to read the
emotion sentence in the 'Unexpected appropriate' condition than in the 'Expected
appropriate' condition. Figure 8.2 gives the numbers who fit into each of these groups
in the ASD and MLD groups.
As can be seen from figure 8.2, similar numbers of those with ASD and those
with MLD do not appear to be understanding the story properly (6 ASD, 5 MLD).
Four children in each group do not appear to be taking account of the FB. Of the
remaining children, 7/9 of the ASD group are slower to read the appropriate emotion
in the Unexpected condition, indicating that they may be using a post hoc strategy,
whilst only 3/8 of the MLD group show the same pattern. This difference in numbers
was not significant. However, if we compare the group mean reading times for just
those remaining children (who are the only ones for whom the comparison is really
valid), the time to read the appropriate emotion sentences in the Unexpected and
Expected conditions are significantly different in the ASD group (Z = -2.07, p<.O5)
and not in the MLD group (Z = -0.98, p=.33).
Since the unexpected condition is effectively a FB task, those who read the
appropriate term slower than the inappropriate term are effectively failing an implicit
FB task (as they are treating the emotion term as appropriate for the situations rather
than for the protagonist's perspective). All four individuals in the ASD group who
read the unexpected appropriate term slower than the unexpected inappropriate term
passed both questions and both justifications of the 2" order PB tasks. None of the 4
individuals in the MLD group did.
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Figure 8.2 Performance on the Unexpected Stories task
Read and understood stories? 	 NO
	
ASD6
(EA time < El time) 	 MLD5
ASD 13
YES MLD 12
Takes account of character's false 	 NO
belief?





Tracks FB online?	 NO	 ASD 7




Is there evidence that any online strategies are verbally-mediated?
The Picture Sequences task used articulatory suppression with the aim of
interfering with any verbal strategies that the ASD group might be using to solve ToM
tasks. The prediction was, therefore, that the ASD group would be selectively
impaired on the FB scenarios (as compared to mechanical scenarios) in the verbal
interference (VI) condition, as compared to a control tapping condition.
Picture sequences
Two children with ASD and one child with MLD did not complete this task.
The picture sequences were presented in pairs of FB or Mechanical sequences
matched in difficulty after piloting on 10 normal adults. There were two pairs of FB
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and two pairs of Mechanical sequences. The condition (i.e. VI or tapping) for each
picture sequence was counterbalanced across participants, as was the order that they
were presented in. There were no differences according to which condition or order
the pictures were presented in (all p-values >.39), and therefore the data were
collapsed so there were four categories, a FB VI condition (in which the participant
had to repeat the word baa), a FB control condition (in which the participant had to
tap on the table), a Mechanical VI condition and a Mechanical control condition.
Each picture sequence was scored out of 10. These scores, and effect sizes comparing
performance on the two FB and Mechanical conditions within each group are given in
table 8.10. There were no group differences on any of these scores (all p-values
>. 11). A repeated-measures ANOVA found no differences within groups between the
VI or control conditions of each task, or between the FB and Mechanical picture
sequences. When the VMA-matched groups were used there were still no group
differences (all p-values> .37).
Table 8.10 Scores for the Picture Sequences task for the ASD and MLD groups:
mean (s.d)
ASD(N=17)	 MLD(N=21)
FB verbal interference (max = 10)	 7.76 (2.70)	 7.02 (3.08)
FB control (max = 10)	 8.50 (2.34)	 7.21 (2.56)
Mechanical verbal interference (max = 10) 	 8.03 (2.86)	 8.00 (2.71)
Mechanical control (max = 10)	 8.26 (2.30)	 8.14 (2.55)
Effect size-FB	 0.29	 0.07
Effect size- Mechanical
	 0.09	 0.05
It may also be informative to compare the number of individuals in each group
who were able to complete both sequences correctly within a particular condition.
Figure 8.3 shows the percentage of participants who ordered both sequences correctly
in each condition.
There were no significant group differences between the numbers who passed
both or those who failed one in any of the conditions, but there was a marginal trend
in the FB control condition (x2 (1) = 2.66, p=.lO), with the ASD group performing
better than the MLD group. Again there was a small effect size between the FB
conditions in the ASD group (0.23), and no effect in the MLD group (0.09 for both
FB and Mechanical) or between the Mechanical condition in the ASD group (0.00).
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Figure 8.3 illustrates the comparison between conditions - verbal interference (baa)
and control (tap) in the two different groups.





















Again there is evidence that there is a small difference between the verbal
interference and control condition in the ASD group only, but that the sample size of
this study is too small for this to be significant. In order to look more closely at
individual performance, the number of sequences completed correctly in the verbal
interference condition was subtracted from the number completed corrected in the
control condition to give a difference score, indicating whether the individual
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• Better on VI condition
• Same on both conditions








performed better on the verbal interference or control condition. Figure 8.4 illustrates
the number of participants in each group who performed better in the VI condition or
control condition, or the same in both conditions. Only a single participant in the
ASD group performed better on the VI condition on the FB sequences, whilst 6
showed this pattern on the mechanical sequences. This difference is not significant.
Figure &4. No. ofparticipants who performed better on each condition in the S4SD
and MLD group.
ASD-	 ASD-FB	 MLD-	 MLD-FB
Mechanical	 Mechanical
Group and type of picture sequence
How does performance on the ToM tasks relate to abifity?
In line with previous work looking at the relationship between ToM and
language in ASD (Happé, 1995; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994 and Study 1, this
thesis) a prediction of this study was that performance on the ToM tasks would be
related to verbal ability (particularly in the ASD group). If this reflects task-specific
factors only, the ToM tasks with high language demands (e.g. the Strange Stories)
should be more strongly related to measures of verbal ability than those with lower
language demands. If language is developmentally linked to performance on these
ToM tasks, then performance on less verbal ToM tasks (e.g. the ToM cartoons and
Eyes task) may be just as strongly linked to language as the more verbally based
tasks.
Correlations between the individual tasks and ability measures were not easily
interpretable due to the large number of tasks and therefore the inflated risk of a Type
1 error, as well as the small sample size. To examine the relationship between tasks
and with ability, four groups of tasks were created, on the basis of the theoretical
questions motivating this study. These were: ToM tasks with a strong language
structure (ToM stories, 2' order FB); ToM tasks which are soluble by rules (Eyes
vocab, Not-Think); ToM tasks without a strong language component (ToM cartoons,
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Eyes); Non-ToM control tasks (Physical cartoons and stories). The range for each
task varied greatly, and so, for comparability, the scores were divided up by quartiles
for the whole group. Those in the top 25% for each task were awarded 3 points, those
in the 50th75th percentile were awarded 2, those in the 25th to 50th percentile were
awarded 1, and those below the 25th percentile were given 0. The scores for the two
tasks in each set were then summed to give a score ranging from 0-6. This score
therefore gave a measure of how well a particular participant had done as compared to
all the other participants in this study.
These scores were correlated with the age, ability and working memory
measures. These values are given in table 8.11. The VMA scores alone were used for
the TROG and BPVS to ease comparison.
Table 8.11 Correlations between task aggregates and ability measures in the ASD
and MLD groups (ASD in bold)
ToM with	 ToM -	 ToM - nile based Non-ToM controls
language structure no/minimal
language input	 -
Diagnostic ASD MLD ASD MLD ASD MLD ASD MLD
group	 (N=19) (N=22) (N=19) (N=22) (N=19) (N=22) (N=19) (N=22)
CA (years) .48*	
-.12	 .42	 .56** .33	 .40	 .39	 .09
Raven's	












.27	 -.19	 .11	 .17	 .06	 .48*	 49*	 .23
digit span
Backward .50*	




Language and ability were strongly related to the rule-based ToM tasks in both
the ASD and the MLD groups. However, in the case of those ToM tasks with a
strong language structure, the relationship was much more evident in the ASD than in
the MLD group. In the ToM tasks without language input, non-verbal ability, verbal
ability and working memory were related to performance in the ASD groups, but not
in the MLD group (where only CA was significantly correlated with this variable),
although BPVS VMA had a moderate effect size. On the Non-ToM control tasks,
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language and ability were again more strongly related in the ASD group, with the
notable exception of the TROG.
Overall, the relationships with ability are more consistent and of larger
magnitude in the ASD group than the MLD group, with the exception of the rule-
based tasks. Working memory (as measured by the backwards digit span) appears to
be much more important in the ASD group than in the MLD group, particularly on the
language and non-language based ToM tasks. The TROG showed a particular pattern
of associations in the ASD group, strongly associating with all the different ToM task
aggregates, but not at all with performance on the non-ToM control tasks. Fisher's z-
transformation found significant differences between the correlations between the
TROG and ToM—rule based tasks, and the TROG and the non-ToM control tasks (z =
2.32, p<.05) and the ToM-no language input v. the non-ToM control tasks (z = 2.06,
p<.O5). The difference between the correlations between the TROG and the language
based ToM tasks and the TROG and the non-ToM control tasks was not significant (z
= 1.53, p>.lO). The TROG was the only task to show such a strong difference
between the ToM groups and the non-ToM controls within a group, in all other cases
the magnitude of the correlations were not greatly different. It is striking that
language, ability and working memory are so strongly related to the no-language ToM
tasks in the ASD group - there are tasks (the Cartoons and the Eyes) in which the
language input is minimal and it is hard to see how verbal strategies may be used.
Relationships between ToM and Non-ToM control tasks
Again, to minimise the chance of the Type 1 error, the same aggregates of
tasks were used to look at the relationships between different types of tasks. Table
8.12 gives the correlations between the different sets of tasks, by group.
Table 8.12 Correlations between groups of ToM tasks and the non-ToM control






ToM with ToM - ToM - no
a language rule based language
structure
ToM with a language structure	 .63**	 .42




Physical controls	 20	 .02	 .37
*p<.05, **p<.Ol
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In the ASD group there are strong relationships between the three sets of ToM
tasks - although the relationship between the ToM—no language set and the ToM-
language set is not significant, it is of a moderate effect size. In contrast, the non-
ToM control tasks related (non-significantly again, but with a moderate effect size)
only to the language-structured ToM tasks.
In the MLD group the pattern is quite different, there are no differences in the
relationship between the ToM tasks and the non-ToM control tasks. The correlations
between the ToM-language tasks and the ToM-rule based tasks are significantly
different in the two groups (z = 2.30, p<.O5). The differences between the other
correlations do not reach significance (all z- values <1.06).
Discussion
I will address each of the key theoretical questions posed in the introduction in turn.
Are ToM tasks that allow access to learnt rules or information easier for
participants with ASD?
A prediction of this study was that, if able individuals with ASD are using
their language skills to accumulate a set of learned rules for social situations, enabling
them develop some understanding of mental states, then tasks that potentially allow
access to learnt information (such as asking for definitions of mental states) should be
easier for them. Tasks in which learnt rules are insufficient (e.g. the Eyes task and
the 'Think' task) should be harder. The prediction was partially supported. There
were no differences between the ASD and MLD groups (whether the whole sample
was used or just the VMA-matched subgroups) in the Eyes vocabulaiy task and the
Not-think task, both of which could potentially be solved by learnt rules. There were
group differences on the Think task, but, unexpectedly, not on the Eyes task itself.
However, comparisons with data for TD children of a similar VMA (from Baron-
Cohen et al, in press) suggested that the ASD group were performing worse than the
MLD group, However, the ASD group are also performing better than the group with
Asperger's Syndrome from the Baron-Cohen et al. (in press) study, indicating that
they are less impaired than might have been expected from previous studies. This may
be because the present sample was pre-selected for their (relatively) good ToM
ability, having all passed 1 order FB.
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The other paired tasks on which there was a difference on one task but not on
the other were the Think and Not-think tasks. We might have expected the Think task
to be easier than the Not-Think task, since in this task there is no conflict between
what the participant is being asked to do and what it is possible for them to do.
Certainly in Flavell's original work (Flavell et a!., 2000) the five- and eight-year-olds
had more success on the Think task than on the Not-Think task. The MLD group in
this study showed a similar pattern. However this was not the case in the ASD group
- in fact scores on the Not-think task were slightly higher than those on the Think
task. Given that the results of the Think task indicated that participants in the ASD
group did have difficulty reflecting on the content of their thoughts, it seems odd that
they were not more disadvantaged in the Not-think task, unless we assume that they
were able to use learnt rules with this task, but not with the Think task. It is possible
to see how a child may have learnt that it is not possible not to think, and therefore
would report back that they were unable to stop thinking, without actually reflecting
on their mental states. To date, there has been very little research on the ability of
individuals with ASD to 'read their own minds', and this data provides some evidence
that it may be an area in which deficits remain even in those who are able to develop
some understanding of other minds.
Are tasks with a verbal structure easier for individuals with ASD?
As predicted, on tasks which had a well-defined verbal structure (Strange
Stories and FB), the participants with ASD were unimpaired (or, in the case of the
Strange Stories, much better) when compared to the MLD group. By contrast, on a
task with no verbal scaffolding (the Cartoons), the VMA-matched subgroups showed
an interaction between task and group, with the ASD group finding the ToM cartoons
harder than the Physical cartoons, and the MLD group showing the opposite pattern.
Thus the present group of participants appeared to be relatively unimpaired on
ToM tasks (as compared to non-ToM control tasks) with a verbal structure, whilst still
showing impairment on non-verbal tasks. This is consistent with the idea that
individuals with ASD are using a verbal strategy, application of which is greatly eased
by presentation of a verbally defined task. However, it is also possible that the verbal
tasks are easier for a different reason - for example, individuals with ASD are known
to have a tendency towards weak central coherence (Shah & Frith, 1993), which
might make it hard for them to bring together the elements in a cartoon picture and
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extract meaning from it. However, this would not explain why the participants with
ASD were able to perform well on the Physical cartoons, which presumably make the
same demands on central coherence as the ToM cartoons. Alternatively, it is possible
that individuals with ASD were not using a verbal strategy spontaneously, but were
able to make use of a verbal structure when one is provided.
Are individuals with ASD using a post hoc strategy for attributing mental states?
Evidence from the Unexpected Stories task indicates that some individuals
with ASD may be using a post hoc strategy for attributing mental states, rather than
taking the perspective of the protagonist throughout a story as it appears that normal
adults do (Harris & Martin, unpublished). This task did not ask participants any
questions about mental states, all analyses were based on the relative reading times for
sentences with emotional content. It therefore avoided cuing the participants by
asking a leading question, and did not draw their attention towards the mental states
as a key part of the story. This task aimed to investigate the strategies that children
with ASD use spontaneously, when they are not explicitly asked to make any
deductions or predictions about mental states. The participants split into 4 groups in
this task. About a quarter of both groups did not appear to be reading the stories for
meaning (insofar as reading times did not reflect congruency effects of emotion and
story), and they were therefore disqualified from further analysis. Four individuals in
each group appeared to be ignoring the protagonist's lack of knowledge, and instead
judged emotions to be appropriate or not by the emotional content of the situation.
These individuals could be said to be failing implicit first order FB tasks. Of course,
all participants were chosen for this study because they passed standard FB tasks, and
therefore it is quite striking that some did not demonstrate this knowledge in a more
implicit task. In addition, all four of the individuals in the ASD group who failed to
demonstrate integration of the mistaken belief in the Emotional stories passed both 2'
order FB tasks and their justification questions, whilst all four of the individuals in the
MLD group failed at least one of the 2 order FB questions or justifications. Those
individuals with ASD would appear to be a group who, whilst they can make accurate
mental state attributions in explicit tasks such as these, do not do so spontaneously or
without prompting, even in fairly simple verbal tasks. This may indicate that the ASD
group are using a different route to passing the tasks than are the MLD group, one
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which comes into play when they are asked a question but not when they are not
explicitly asked about mental states.
This may indicate that some individuals with ASD are slowed by the need to
make sense of emotional information that matches the protagonist's (false) belief,
rather than reality. This contrasts with young children (Rail & Harris, 2000) and
adults (Harris & Martin, unpublished), who appeared to integrate mental states online,
as did most of the individuals with MLD in this study. It appears that ToM in most
people (including those with MLD) may be something that almost seems to be
obligatory, occurring without the need for effort or intention, whilst in individuals
with ASD it may be a cognitive, intentional and effortful process.
Are individuals with ASD using a verbal strategy online?
Some researchers have suggested that individuals with ASD are solving FB
tasks using a verbal online strategy (Tager-Flusberg, 2002, Happé, 1995), for example
talking themselves through a task. The Picture Sequences task therefore included an
articulatory suppression condition, designed to interfere with verbal strategies, to see
this selectively impaired performance on a non-verbal FB task. There was some
preliminary evidence for the effectiveness of this interference in the present study.
The verbal interference task selectively impaired performance (as compared to a
'tapping' control condition) on FB scenarios in the ASD group only.
However, this difference was not significant, and as such firm conclusions
cannot be drawn. Looking more at individual performance, there was only a single
individual with ASD who performed better on the verbal interference condition than
the control condition of the FB sequences, whereas on the Mechanical sequences (and
in the MLD group in both FB and Mechanical conditions) numbers were spread quite
equally between those who performed better on each condition. These results need to
be repeated with a larger sample size.
How do ToM tasks relate to ability and to each other?
The ToM tasks were divided into 3 types of task to look at the relationship
with ability and with each other. The sets were ToM-language (ToM stories and 2'
order FB), ToM—rule based (Eyes vocab and Not-Think) and ToM—no language input
(ToM cartoons and Eyes). A Non-ToM control aggregate was also formed for
comparison (Physical cartoons and Physical stories). The rational for dividing the
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tasks was that if there was a strong relationship between language and the ToM-no
language input tasks, this would suggest a developmental role for language in ToM
(as compared to a relationship between language and the more language based ToM
tasks, which could equally well reflect task factors, or an online strategy).
Non-verbal and verbal ability were strongly related to all four groups of tasks
in the ASD group. There was no evidence that this relationship was specific to the
language based tasks. In the case of grammatical ability the relationship was specific
to ToM tasks, there was no relationship with the physical control tasks. Verbal and
non-verbal ability was related much less strongly to task performance in the MLD
group, with the exception of the rule-based ToM tasks. This indicates that in the ASD
group, the relationship between language and ToM is likely not to be due solely to the
language demands of the tasks, or even due to verbal strategies used online (since it is
hard to envisage how verbal strategies might help performance on non-verbal tasks
such as the Eyes task). Instead, it indicates, in line with the findings from Study I
(chapter 3), that language - and particularly grammar - is important developmentally
in the acquisition of some understanding of mind in ASD.
There was also evidence that working memory is important in ToM task
performance in ASD - both the language based and non-language based ToM tasks
were significantly correlated with working memory in the ASD group, whilst there
was no evidence for a relationship in the MLD group. This may again support the
hypothesis that individuals with ASD are using an alternative strategy for ToM, one
that makes more cognitive demands upon the individual.
Conclusion
The results of this study indicate that high-functioning children with ASD
were unimpaired as compared to a control group of children with MLD on ToM tasks
that had a defined linguistic structure or that allowed the application of learnt rules.
Differences between VMA and non-verbal ability matched ASD and MLD subgroups
remained on tasks which had no external verbal structure or which required the
participants to reflect on and report their own recent mental states. However, these
differences were only apparent when the VMA-matched subgroups were used,
indicating that a high verbal ability can help individuals with ASD compensate for
many of their ToM difficulties across all types of task. Of course, there was no TD
control group and so it remains a possibility that the MLD group performed badly on
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the ToM tasks, rather than that the ASD group performed well. There is no specific
reason, however, to assume that this MLD group were particularly impaired in their
socio-cognitive skills or understanding - nor that they would be specifically impaired
in tasks with a well-defined verbal structure or tasks on which learnt rules could be
used. In addition, many of the comparisons looked at the relative performance on
different tasks within (rather than between) groups (e.g, ToM stories vs. Physical
stories). It therefore seems that, with some qualification, we can conclude that
difficulties in advanced ToM persist in this group of high-functioning people with
ASD, when compared to verbal age and non-verbal ability matched MLD controls,
and that their success on some tasks relies on a strong verbal structure or the potential
to use learnt rules. Language was related to performance in all sets of ToM tasks in
the ASD group, indicating that language is important developmentally as well as
online. This was particularly true of grammatical ability, which was not related at all
to performance on the physical control tasks, but which was strongly related to
performance on all groups of ToM tasks. However, it is also the case that areas of
surprising strength exist in individuals with ASD, and any compensatory strategy they
may be using to solve ToM problems is quite effective, and works over an impressive
range of tasks.
There was evidence that some individuals with ASD were attributing mental
states only as and when required, rather than taking the perspective of a protagonist
throughout a story, as TD individuals appear to do (Rail & Harris, 2000). There was
some tentative evidence that some individuals may be using verbal strategies during
tasks which can be disrupted by concurrent articulatoiy suppression. These results
emphasis the diverse nature of high-functioning individuals with ASD - a range of
different strategies are likely to be used. Both of these results would benefit from
replication with larger sample sizes.
In conclusion, a group of high-functioning individuals with ASD were
remarkably unimpaired on many ToM tasks when compared to controls with MLD.
However, group differences remained, particularly on tasks with minimal verbal
scaffolding and on which learnt rules were not useful. There was also some evidence
that some individuais with ASD were integrating mental states in a post hoc fashion
only, or using verbal strategies. Along with studies 1 and 3, this study found that
language, and particularly grammar, appears to be very important in enabling
individuals with ASD to develop a better understanding of mind. It appears more
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likely that this is developmental progression from language to ToM rather than due to
either the language demands of the tasks themselves or due to better ToM allowing
the development of better language. It may be that high-functioning individuals with
ASD have a general tendency not to compute or take account of mental states, but can
do so in many circumstances when and if required, and particularly if supported by
verbal scaffolding. This post hoc processing would presumably be more useful in
experimental tasks than in real life behaviour, since real life situations do not wait
around for answers to be computed, nor necessarily cue such problem solving, but
instead require immediate reactions. We would expect, therefore, that even
individuals with ASD who pass tests of FB will continue to be impaired on more
naturalistic measures of ToM understanding as compared to individuals with learning
difficulties. This hypothesis was tested in study 5, reported in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 9
STuDY 5: THEORY OF MIND AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTION IN
REAL LIFE
Introduction
This thesis has so far investigated ToM in children with ASD and MLD, and
its relationship to EF and language. This chapter looks at teacher ratings of the real
life behaviour of children with ASD and MLD, in relation to performance on
experimental tasks.
As discussed in chapters 3 and 8, we know that some individuals with ASD
pass ToM tasks, and some individuals with MLD fail these same tasks. We also know
that those individuals with ASD who pass basic ToM tasks show experimental
evidence of better mentalising ability on other tests. However, we cannot tell from
this whether there is a genuine difference in the degree of real life social impairment
between those who pass and fail in either group, or whether their superior
performance on ToM tasks is simply due either to luck or to a non-ToM problem-
solving strategy used by some individuals with ASD. Equally, FB task failure in
MLD groups may be due to problems with task-specific demands, and hence not
reflect real life functioning.
The relationship between real life social impairment and experimental
performance on ToM tasks in ASD has received surprisingly little investigation to
date. As discussed in chapter 8, Frith et al. (1994) found a significant group
difference on teacher ratings of behaviours that appeared to require a ToM between
individuals with ASD who passed ToM and those who failed. They did not find a
corresponding difference between individuals with MLD who passed and failed ToM
tasks. However, their sample sizes were small, particularly in the MLD group.
Hughes, Soares-Boucaud, Hochmann and Frith (1997) found a relationship between
teacher and therapist ratings and mentalising abilities in a group of 21 French children
with PDD, some of whom had autism. Fombonne, Siddons, Achard et al. (1994) also
found a relationship between passing socio-cognitive tasks and performing better on
scales of social (and anti-social) behaviour requiring mentalising in a group of French
adolescents and adults with autism. This difference became non-significant when the
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difference in verbal ability between the passers and failers was accounted for.
However, since differences in verbal level appear to be inherent between groups of
ToM passers and failers with ASD, controlling for such differences may well be
theoretically problematic, as discussed in chapter 8 (see also Miller & Chapman,
2001).
The everyday demonstration of executive functioning in ASD has received
only limited investigation to date. Turner (1997) found that repetitive behaviour in
ASD was related to performance on EF tasks - specifically to tasks of generativity
and perseveration. Turner also found no difference in repetitive behaviour between
individuals with ASD who passed ToM tasks as opposed to those who failed,
indicating that the difficulties in ToM seen in ASD are unlikely to account for
repetitive behaviour. In addition, despite much research (discussed in chapter 4) on
the relationship between experimental measures of EF and ToM, to date there has
been no investigation of whether measures of everyday ToM functioning relates to
everyday EF, as opposed to experimental measures of ToM.
This study therefore had two main questions: Are there differences between
individuals with ASD and those with MLD on teacher ratings of everyday behaviour
thought to require a ToM, or on behaviour thought to be indicative of good executive
functioning? Secondly, how do teacher rating on scales of everyday ToM and EF
relate to performance on experimental tasks, specifically FB tasks, and to each other?
Method
Participants: Participants had all taken part in either Studies 2 and 3, or Study 4.
They therefore all had a VMA as measured by the BPVS of more than 4 years 3
months. All of the MLD group, and all but 6 of the ASD group were recruited from
schools for children with special educational needs in the greater London area. An
additional 6 children with autism and Asperger's Syndrome were volunteers from a
previous study. Out of the ASD group, 24 had a diagnosis of autism or an autistic
spectrum disorder, 8 had a diagnosis of Asperger's Syndrome and the remaining 5
(who were from a single school and who were all being educated in classes for
children with autistic spectrum disorders) were described on their records as having
social and communication disorders. These children were assigned to the ASD group
after completion of a checklist of symptoms based on DSM-IV after discussion with
their teachers.
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Table 9.1 shows the participant characteristics of the two groups who
participated in this study. The groups differed significantly on CA (F (1,67) = 6.51,
p<.O5), BPVS standardised score (F (1,67) = 9.14, p<.Ol) and the Raven's Matrices
raw score (F (1,67) = 8.44, p<.Ol). There were no differences on the BPVS VMA (F
(1,67) = 1.91, p = .17), the TROG VMA (F (1,67) = .18, p=.68) or the TROG age-
adjusted score (F (1,67) = 2.51, p=.l2).
Table 9.1 Characteristics ofparticipants in the ASD and MLD groups: mean (&d.)
ASD (N=37)	 MLD (N=32)
CA (years)	 10.95* (2.35)
	
12.17* (1.45)
BPVS VMA (years) 	 8.77 (3.70)	 7.77 (1.90)
BPVS standardised	 84.43** (23.86)
	
70.56** (10.94)
TROGVMA(years)	 6.51 (2.50)	 6.29(1.81)
TROG age-adjusted	 106.33 (35.63)	 94.35 (25.53)
Raven's CPM (raw score)	 25.92** (7.42)
	
20.84** (7.01)
Ratio of ToM passers: failers 	 14: 23	 15:17
Group comparisons * p<.O5 **p.<.ol
The groups were constructed so as to be able to compare participants who
failed FB tasks with those who passed. This meant that a disproportionately large
number of the MLD group were FB 'failers' as compared to the percentage in the
population at large, and a disproportionately large number of the ASD group were FB
'passers'. As a result, the MLD group has a significantly lower verbal IQ as
measured by the BPVS. However, the groups were well matched on TROG VMA.
Procedure
Each child was tested on the BPVS 2 Edition (Dunn et al., 1999), the TROG
(Bishop, 1989) and on Raven's CPM (Raven et al., 1998) in the course of the earlier
studies. They were also given FB tasks as described in Study 1, and tested on the
modified version of the WCST, as described in Study 2. Those who passed a
majority of the FB tasks they were given were allocated to the 'FB passers' group.
The remaining participants were allocated to the FB failers group.
Theory of Mind and Executive Function questionnaire
This questionnaire was designed using 15 items from previous studies (e.g.
Frith et al., 1994) that had been considered to require a ToM. These included telling
white lies, taking things literally, recognising surprise or embarrassment and
responding to indirect hints. Fifteen items were included that were designed to be
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indicative of executive functioning (Booth et a!., in prep) for example, having an
ability to plan ahead, being able to do mental arithmetic and being able to follow
verbally given lists of instructions. An additional five items were included which
were social items that were thought not to necessitate a ToM, for example having
appropriate table manners, and recognising happiness and sadness. These items went
to form the 'general sociability' (G-S) scale. See Appendix II for a list of all items in
the questionnaire.
The questionnaire was distributed, in most cases personally, to the form
teachers of all the children who participated in studies 2, 3 and 4. The teachers were
given the option of completing the questionnaire themselves, doing it as a face-to-face
interview, or as a phone interview. The researcher's phone number and a stamped
addressed envelope were included with the questionnaire. If teachers did not respond
within 4 weeks, a reminder letter was sent, and if they did not respond within a further
4 weeks, a phone call was made to the school and in some cases further questionnaires
were dispatched. In the case of the children who were recruited through volunteers,
their parents and teachers were both given a copy of the questionnaire. If both were
returned, the teacher's questionnaire was used in preference, but if the teacher did not
return it then the parent's answers were taken (this happened in 4 cases, all of the
children involved had ASD). Fifty-six questionnaires were completed individually by
teachers (25 in the ASD group, 31 in the MLD group), often after consultation with
the researcher, 8 (7 in the ASD group, 1 in the MLD group) were completed as face-
to-face interviews, and one (in the ASD group) was completed as a phone interview.
In total, 78% of the questionnaires distributed were completed (80% in the ASD
group, 74% in the MLD group).
Scales: A scoring system similar to that used by Frith et a!. (1994), based on that for
the Vinelands Adaptive Behaviour Scales was utilised. If the respondent said the
child could do a particular behaviour 'definitely', they were awarded a score of '2'.
If they said the child could do it 'sometimes', 'rarely' or if they said they did not
know, this scored '1'. If they said the child could do it 'not at all' then the child was
awarded a score of 'O'for that item. These scores were compiled to give 3 scales, two
of which (the ToM and EF scales) ranged from 0-30, and one of which (G-S) ranged
from 0-10. The alpha-values for the ToM scale was .81 in the ASD group and .78 in
the MLD group, whilst for the EF scale they were .77 in the ASD group and .77 in the
MLD group, all of which indicate very good levels of consistency. The alpha-values
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for the G-S scale were .08 for the ASD group and .41 for the MLD group. The lower
values for the G-S scale reflect the diverse nature of the items in this scale: there was
no theoretical reason why these items should hang together other than by virtue of not
being thought to require a ToM.
Results
The diagnostic groups will be compared on their ratings on the questionnaire
scales. Next, the ratings of FB passers and failers will be compared within each
group, and then the relationship between the questionnaire scales and performance on
the card sort task will be reported. Finally the role of ability and the relationship
between the different questionnaire scales will be discussed.
Do the MLD and ASD groups differ on ratings of ToM. EF or general
sociability?
Table 9.2 gives the mean scores of the two groups on the 3 scales. A
univariate ANOVA found a significant difference between the groups (with the MLD
group outperforming the ASD group) on the ToM scale (F (1,65) = 4.02, p<.O5).
There was no difference between the groups on the EF scale (F (1,65) = 0.93, p=.34),
or on the general sociability scale (F(1 ,65) = 0.10, p =.75).
Table 9.2 Mean score on the 3 questionnaire scale& Mean, (s.d.), range
ASD (N=37)	 MLD (N=32)
ToM scale (max =30)	 14.22*, (5.20), 4-25	 16.75*, (5.02), 8-27
EF scale (max = 30)	 12.65, (5.06), 5-25	 13.78, (4.63), 7-23
G-S scale (max = 10)	 6.76, (1.19), 4-9	 6.66, (1.43), 4-9
Group comparisons, * = p<.O5
Do those who pass or fail FB tasks differ on ratings of real life behaviour?
Table 9.3 gives the mean scores on the scales for the ToM passers and failers
as well as the verbal and non-verbal ability of each group. Figure 9.1 graphically
illustrates the different scores for the subscales for MLD FB passers and failers, and
ASD FB passers and failers.
One-way ANOVAs found differences between the passers and failers in both
groups on all ability measures (ASD all F-values (1,35)> 11.4, all p-values <.01,
MLD all F-values (1,30)> 8.5 all p-values <.01). The ASD group also differed on
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age (F (1,35) = 5.90, p<.05), and there was a trend towards an age difference in the
MLD group (F (1,30) = 3.62, p=.07).
Table 9.3 Scores for FBpassers andfailers on age, verbal ability and non-verbal
ability, and the ToM, EF and Sociability questionnaire scales (mean (sL) for
ability and age, mean, (s.d.) range for scales)
ASD (N = 37)	 MLD (N=32)
	
Passers	 Failers	 Passers	 Failers
(N=14) (N=23)	 (N=15)	 (N=r17)
CA(years)	 12.08*	 10.26	 12.67	 11.73
	
(1.45)	 (2.55)	 (.92)	 (1.70)
BPVSVMA(years) 	 12.46**	 6.53	 8.97**	 6.71
	
(3.22)	 (1.53)	 (1.00)	 (1.88)
BPVS standardised 	 105.36** 71.70	 76.80**	 65.06
	
(24.15)	 (11.77)	 (5.91)	 (11.51)
TROGVMA(years)	 8.89**	 5.07	 7.18**	 5.50
	(2.39)	 (1.03)	 (1.77)	 (1.48)
TROG age-adjusted	 133 .22** 89.96	 107.46**	 82.78
	
(28.19)	 (29.46)	 (23.19)	 (22.11)
Raven's CPM raw	 30.57** 23.09	 26.00**	 16.29








































* p <.05, ** p <.01
ANOVAs showed significant differences between passers and failers in the
ASD group on the ToM questionnaire scale only (ToM scale F (1,35) 4.47, p <.05,
EF scale F (1,35) = 1.14, p = .29, G-S scale F (1,35) = .16, p=.69). There was a trend
towards a difference in the MLD group on the ToM scale only (ToM F (1,30) = 3.36,
p =.08, EF F (1,30) = 1.97), p = .17, G-S F (1,30) = .18, p=.68).
In order to look at the relationship between passing or failing FB and
performance on the various questionnaire subscales on a more individual level, the
questionnaire ratings were split by the median score (15 for the ToM scale, 13 for the
EF scale, 7 for the general sociability scale), and the number of participants scoring at
or above this median score was calculated for each group (see table 9.4).
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The chi-square tests showed there was a strong association between
performing at or above the median on the ToM scale and passing FB in the ASD
group only. However, it was not the case that all the FB failers did badly on the scale,
8/23 (35%) received ratings above or at the median. In addition, 21 % (3/14) of the
ASD FB passers received ratings below the median on the ToM scale.
Does performance on a test of executive function relate to ratings of real life
behaviour?
All participants were given a modified version of the WCST (as described in
Study 2, Chapter 5). Table 9.5 gives the mean scores for the two diagnostic groups
for percentage perserverative errors, percentage conceptual level sorting, no. of trials
to complete first category, failure to maintain set and no. of categories achieved.
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Table 9.6 gives the correlations of the individual variables of the card sort with the
questionnaire subscales. A card sort aggregate was also created by taking the means
for the 5 card sort variables of the entire sample, assigning a value of 2 to those who
were above the 75th percentile, 0 to those who were below the 25th and 1 to those
between the 25th and 75th• These scores were then summed to give a score that could
potentially range from 0-10. This aggregate therefore gave participants a score
relative to other participants in the sample. Correlations with this variable are given
in the last column of Table 9.6.
Table 9.5. Mean scores for the card sort variables for the ASD and MLD groups;
mean (s.d.)
ASD (N = 37)	 MLD (N=32)
Percentage perserverative errors 	 28.01 (27.35)	 24.44 (18.55)
Percentage conceptual level sorting 	 43.57 (30.71)	 40.50 (26.09)
No. of trials to complete first category 	 9.71 (4.76)	 8.96 (3.51)
Failure to maintain set (no. of times) 	 0.11 (0.31)	 0.41 (0.61)
No. of categories achieved.	 2.65 (1.46)	 2.47 (1.44)
Card sort aggregate
	
5.40 (2.84)	 4.72 (2.82)
Both the ToM and the EF questionnaire scales related to the Card Sort task -
most significantly in the MLD group, but with a small to moderate effect size in the
ASD group as well. This relationship was particularly with the percentage conceptual
level processing and the number of categories achieved, both measures of general
success on the task. It seemed likely that these associations could be due to the
relationship of ability with both the questionnaire subscales and performance on the
card sort tasks, and so Raven's Matrices (as a non-verbal ability measure) was
partialled out of the correlations. These values are given in brackets in table 9.6. The
relationship between the ToM scales and conceptual level sorting remained significant
in both diagnostic groups, whilst the relationship with the EF scale (which had been
significant in the MLD group only) fell below significance in the MLD group and
became much lower in both groups.
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Table 9.6 Correlations between questionnaire subscales and card sort variables in
the ASD and MLD groups (values with Raven's partialled out). ASD in boliL
Percentage	 Percentage	 Failure to Number	 Number of	 Card sort
perseverativ conceptual level maintain 	 of trials to categories 	 aggregate
e errors	 processing	 set	 complete	 achieved
fi
category
ASD	 ToM	 .24	 39*	 -.07	 -.30	 .12	 33*
(N 37) scae	 (-.19)	 (39*)	 (-.11)	 (-.23)	 (.15)	 (.33)
EFscale	
-.11	 .26	 -.08	 -.05	 .05	 .21
(.03)	 (.13)	 (-.10)	 (.05)	 (-.13)	 (.05)
G-S scale 
-.08	 .11	 .22	 .09	 -.02	 -.02
(-.3 1)	 (.20)	 (.26)	 (.15)	 (.13)	 (-.02)
MLD	 ToM	 3Ø	 45*	 .01	 -.25	 39*	 .36*
(N=32) Sc e	 (-.19)	 (39*)	 (-.11)	 (-.23)	 (.15)	 (.33)
EFscale	
-.31	 .46**	 -.09	 -.39	 .36*	 43*
(.03)	 (.13)	 (-.10)	 (.05)	 (-.13)	 (.05)
G-Sscale	
-.30	 .22	 .05	 -.21	 .21	 .18
(-.31)	 (.20)	 (.26)	 (.15)	 (.13)	 (-.02)
*p <.05, **p<Ø1
The role of ability
The ToM passers and failers in each group differed significantly on verbal and
non-verbal ability, as did the MLD and ASD groups. This is a possible cause of
differences on the questionnaire scales. However, ToM task performance is so
closely linked with verbal ability in ASD that it does not make sense to control for
this factor, since if the FB passers and failers were equivalent in verbal ability they
would in all likelihood no longer be PB passers and failers.
In order to look at the relationship between ability and performance on the
questionnaire scales without controlling for these inherent group differences, the
relationship between ability and performance on the questionnaire scales was assessed
separately within each group (ASD passers and failers, MLD passers and failers). This
was done by a series of simple linear regression analyses in each group successively,
using Raven's Matrices as an estimate of non-verbal ability. Non-verbal ability did
not predict performance on the ToM scale in any of the groups (all R 2 <.11, all F
values < 1.5, all p-values >.23). On the EF scale, non-verbal ability predicted
performance in the ASD passers only (R 2 = .30, F = 2.29, p<.O5). All other R2 <.03,
all other F values <0.56, all p-values> .46). On the G-S scale, non-verbal ability did
not predict performance in any of the groups (all R2 < .02, all F values <0.18, all p-
values <.68). Therefore, it appeared that the relationship between performance on the
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questionnaire scales and non-verbal ability was restricted to one scale in one group.
This means that adjusting for differences in ability between groups is probably
unnecessary in the case of the ToM and G-S scales (since there is no evidence for a
relationship between performance and ability in the separate groups). It also makes
any sort of controlling or adjusting for ability in the case of the EF scale problematic
since an assumption of such group comparisons is that the linear relationship between
the potential covariate (in this case non-verbal ability) and the outcome variable (in
this case the EF scale) is the same, and in this case this assumption is not met.
The difference in non-verbal and verbal ability between the MLD and the
ASD groups could also be considered to be problematic, since again it is an inherent
part of the groups' identity - the ASD group is of higher ability because it includes a
high proportion of individuals who pass ToM tasks, which in individuals with ASD is
strongly associated with having high verbal ability. In contrast, the ability range of
the MLD group is restricted by the very fact of their having moderate learning
difficulties. However, this difference is not really problematic for the interpretation of
the results, since the group difference on the ToM questionnaire scale between the
ASD and MLD group goes in the opposite direction to that which would be predicted
by the ability measures (i.e. the MLD group outperform the ASD group, despite the
latter's an ability advantage). Therefore, were we to control for ability, we would
expect the difference to increase in magnitude, rather than decrease.
How do the questionnaire subscales relate to ability, age and each other?
An aim of this study was to look at the relationship between real life ratings of
ToM and EF, as opposed to the relationship between experimental ToM and EF tasks.
Table 9.7 gives the correlations between the ability measures and performance on the
3 subscales of the questionnaire for the two groups.
With the G-S scale partialled out (as a measure of tendency of the teacher to
rate a certain child particularly high or particularly low), the correlations between the
ToM and EF scales remained significant in both groups (ASD r (37) = .48, p<.Ol:
MLD r (32)= .63, p=.001).
The correlation between the ToM and EF scales also remain significant with
CA, BPVS VMA, TROG VMA and Raven's CPM were partialled out in addition to
the G-S scale (ASD r (37) = .52, p<.005, MLD r (32)= .57, p<.00S). It is possible
that this relationship is an artefact of some participants having relatively good EF and
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ToM, whilst others perform poorly on both (rather than being due to a linear
relationship between EF and ToM). In order to look at this, correlations were
calculated separately for the FB passers and failers in each group
Table 9.7 Correlations between the questionnaire subscales and ability measures
ASD group in bold).
	
EF scale G-S	 CA	 BPVS	 BPVS std TROG	 TROG Ravens
	
scale	 (yrs)	 VMA	 VMA	 std
ASD	 ToM	 55** .32	 .03	 .22	 .24	 .32	 .32	 .12
scale(N=37) EFscale	
.40*	
.13	 .21	 .24	 .14	 .09	 .19
G-S scale	
.21	 .10	 .09	 .15	 .06	 .03
MLD	 ToM	 68** 33	 12	 45** 51**	 34	 .44	 23
scale(N=32) EFscale	
.46*	
.17	 .30	 .27	 .16	 .30	 .24
G-S	
-.38	 -.12	 .17	 -.01	 .18	 .05
* p<.05, ** p<.Ol
In the ASD failers, but not the passers, the correlation between the EF and
ToM scales was significant (failers r(23)= .63; p<.00l; passers r(14) = .42; p = .13).
In the MLD group, both passers' and failers' ToM and EF ratings were correlated
(failers r(17) = .74; p<.001; passers r(15) .63; p<.OS). When the G-S scales, age and
ability were all partialled out, these correlations were: ASD failers r (23) = .64,
p<.Ol, ASD passers r (14) = .18, p=.65, MLD failers r (17) = .56, p=.O6, MLD passers
r (15) = .60, p=.06. Therefore the relationship appears to hold up in all groups except
for the ASD passers, with large effect sizes in all three of the other groups (Cohen,
1969).
Discussion
Do the ASD and MLD groups differ on real life measures of ToM. EF and
general sociability?
The children in this study were in some ways exceptional. The ASD group
had an uncharacteristically high percentage of individuals who passed FB tasks,
whilst the MLD group had a particularly high percentage of individuals who failed.
Therefore, the fact that a significant difference was found between the ASD and MLD
groups (with the MLD group outperforming the ASD group) on the ToM scale of the
questionnaire is striking, particularly since the ASD group had an advantage in non-
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verbal ability (and of verbal IQ) over the MLD group. This is in line with the
previous experimental findings of this thesis (Study 2: Chapter 5), which found that
even when only children who fail FB tasks were included in the study, children with
MLD still performed better on a range of other ToM tasks than did children with
ASD.
There were no differences on measures of executive functioning in everyday
life between the ASD and MLD groups. This again is in line with the experimental
findings reported in chapter 5, which found no major group differences in
performance on EF tasks amongst those who failed FB tasks (although there were
differences in the card sort once non-verbal ability was accounted for). This may
indicate that both children with ASD and those with MLD have real life executive
difficulties, or that neither do. Without normal controls it is impossible to tell,
however it is clear that the data indicate that there was no specific ASD deficit in real
life exectuve functioning as measured by the present questionnaire. This may seem
to contradict the findings of Turner (1997). However, the present questionnaire did
not assess repetitive behaviour and as such was quite different to that used by Turner.
There were also no differences on a general sociability measure, indicating
that individuals with ASD are not necessarily pervasively impaired on all social
activities, but appear to have particular difficulties with those that require a ToM.
This is in line with other studies using questionnaire ratings (e.g. Frith et al., 1994),
which have found that children with ASD were unimpaired on sociability items which
do not require mentalising.
How do ratings on scales of ToM and EF relate to performance on experimental
tasks?
There was a relationship between passing and failing FB tasks and ratings on
the ToM scale of the questionnaire in the ASD group only. FB passers performed
significantly better than failers on this scale, and a higher proportion of them
performed above the median score. There was a trend towards a difference on the
ToM scales between FB passers and failers in the MLD group, but this did not reach
significance and there was no difference in the proportion of passers and failers who
performed above the median. As mentioned in the results section, the groups differed
significantly on ability, and it is a matter of some debate whether this should be
controlled for in some way. At least one previous study has controlled for a group
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difference (between ToM passers and failers) in verbal ability and has found that
group differences on questionnaire ratings are no longer evident (Fombonne et a!.,
1994). In the present thesis, it was decided for theoretical reasons that the group
ability difference was so fundamental to the nature of the groups that it would be
unreasonable to attempt to control for this difference. It is not possible to envisage a
group of FB passers with ASD who are matched in ability to a group of FB failers -
they would in all probability no longer be groups of passers and failers. By the same
token, it is fundamental to the nature of the MLD group that they are of lower ability
than the ASD group, since if they were of higher ability they would no longer be
described as having learning difficulties.
General measures of success on the card sort task were related to ratings on
the ToM and EF questionnaire scales in both the ASD and MLD groups. Once non-
verbal ability was partialled out the relationship was only significant with the ToM
scale. This may indicate that EF as measured experimentally is important for the
expression of every day ToM - it may be, for example, that a lack of flexibility limits
the ability of children to shift between perspectives and conversational topics. Turner
(1997) found a relationship between questionnaire ratings of everyday EF and
experimental performance, however her questionnaire scales were much more focused
on repetitive behaviour, and it may be that the EF scale used in the present study was
too general to relate to specific EF tasks. In a future, it would be helpful to measure
more specific elements of everyday EF - for example, having subscales to measure
working memory, planning, or flexibility, rather than the general scale used in this
study.
There was a very robust relationship between the EF and ToM questionnaire
scales, which held up even when age, ability and the 'general sociability' scale were
partialled out. This is in contrast to the experimental findings of chapter 5, which
found no relationship between performance on EF and ToM tasks in those who failed
FB. One possibility for this inconsistency was that including both FB passers and
failers may create the illusion of a linear relationship because some children perform
well on both, whilst others performance badly on both. To test this, the relationship
between the EF and ToM questionnaire ratings was assessed separately in FB passers
and failers. There was a large effect size in all groups except for the ASD FB passers.
Therefore it seems that the inclusion of both passers and failers is not necessary for
this relationship to be evident, and indeed that the relationship is not restricted to
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higher-functioning individuals (as it was suggested in chapter 5 might be the case
with experimental measures), but might even be more evident in those who are lower
functioning. This may be preliminaiy evidence for a relationship between the two in
real life.
Conclusion
The findings from this study replicate those of Frith et a!. (1994) who found a
significant difference on teacher ratings of real life ToM between individuals with
ASD who passed and failed tests of FB understanding. In contrast to Frith et al.
(1994), however, there was some tentative evidence in this study that real life ratings
of ToM are related to FB task performance in children with MLD as well as in those
with ASD. Frith et al. (1994) identified three subgroups of children with ASD: those
who failed FB tasks and perform poorly on ratings of everyday mentalising ability;
those who passed FB tasks but still show poor performance on ratings of everyday
ToM; and those who passed FB and show superior performance on ratings of
everyday ToM. In this study a fourth group was evident, those who failed FB tasks
but showed relatively good performance on everyday ratings of ToM. This group is
puzzling. Do they have some understanding of mind that is underestimated by
experimental tasks - or have they worked out some strategies that work in every day
life but which do not help on experimental tasks? There is much evidence that ID
young children, for example, have mentalising abilities that are underestimated by
ToM tasks (e.g. Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). However, children with ASD are quite
different to TD young children, and their mentalising abilities are generally not
thought to be underestimated by their frequent failure on FB tasks (e.g. Leslie, 1994).
It is possible to envisage rule-based strategies that would not generalise to
experimental situations with dolls, but which are useful in some real life situations.
However, the items on the questionnaire were specifically designed to require flexible
socialisation rather than fixed routines, which is what would be expected if children
were using a rule-based strategy. There was no clue from this study as to how these
different subgroups of children with ASD might be distinguished - ability did not
relate to performance on the ToM scale, for example.
It is possible that the existence of FB failers who performed well on everyday
mentalising measures is an artefact of the way that the data were collected. The
passers and failers in the ASD group in this study came from almost entirely different
217
schools, and therefore the teachers may have had different baselines to which they
were comparing them. In a school where most of the children have very low social
functioning, a child with a slightly higher level of language and therefore some
capacity to interact may be scored disproportionately highly, since the contrast to the
remainder of the group is so stark. In contrast, in a school where most children have
good language levels and some degree of social interaction, the comparisons are
likely to be made with a different baseline level of what would be expected. This is in
contrast to the MLD group, all of whom came from schools with both passers and
failers. In the Frith et al. (1994) study, all the children came from schools with both
FB passers and failers. Further studies, using other methods to assess everyday life
ToM and EF are needed.
The overall picture from this study was one of the ASD group performing very
badly in relation to the MLD group specifically on ratings of ToM (as opposed to EF
or general sociability) in everyday life, despite an overall ability advantage, and
regardless of their performance on experimental tasks. In addition, whether a child
passed or failed tests of FB was related to their ratings on everyday mentalising ability
in the ASD group. There was no real evidence for a relationship between
performance on an EF task and ratings of everyday EF, although there did seem to be
a relationship in both the ASD and MLD groups between experimental measures of
EF and ratings of real life mentalising ability. The ToM and EF ratings were related
in all the groups except for the ASD passers. There was evidence that a group of
children with ASD may exist who fail FB tasks but are rated relatively highly for
ToM in everyday life, although this may be an artefact of the teacher ratings and
needs further investigation. This could be done through observational methods, or
multi-report questionnaires rather than relying on a single teacher. It might also be
useful to assess whether environmental factors, such as intervention programmes that
schools may be using, have an impact on adaptation in the ASD group, and may




This thesis has investigated a number of topics relating to ToM in individuals
with ASD and MLD. This discussion chapter will briefly summarise the most
important findings, and then will offer a theoretical perspective on these results and
suggestions for future work.
Summary of Results
All five studies in this thesis compared children with ASD to those with MLD.
Study 1 looked at the relationship between language and performance on FB tasks in a
large sample of children. It found a highly significant difference between the
proportion of children with ASD and MLD who passed FB tasks, with a higher
proportion of children with ASD failing. It also found a strong relationship between
language and performance on PB tasks, particularly in those with ASD and
particularly with receptive grammar. Study 2 looked at the relationship between EF
and ToM in a sample of children who failed FB tasks. It found no relationship
between EF and ToM in either ASD or MLD, and no pervasive deficit in EF in the
ASD group as compared to the MLD group, although the ASD group had a tendency
towards making more perseverative errors.
Study 3 was a training study of ToM and EF, aiming to examine the direction
of the relationship between the constructs. Children with both ASD and MLD were
successfully trained on an alternative strategy for ToM, which generalised to a
deception task in both groups, and to other tasks in the MLD group. ToM training did
not improve performance on EF tasks. The EF training programme (which focused on
set shifting, inhibitory control and flexibility) did not improve performance on
executive tasks, however, those trained showed a significant improvement in ToM
two months later.
Study 4 looked at children with ASD who passed FB tasks, asking whether
their performance on a range of advanced ToM tasks provided clues as to how they
might be achieving their relative success on FB tasks. The performance of these high-
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functioning children with ASD was remarkably strong across a range of ToM tasks.
However, they were still impaired (when compared to \TMA matched controls) on
reflecting on their own thoughts, and on attributing mental states in response to non-
verbal stimuli. There was evidence that some individuals with ASD may have been
using a post hoc strategy for attributing mental states, rather than computing them
online, and there was very tentative evidence that some children with ASD may be
using verbal strategies to solve FB tasks.
Finally, Study 5 looked at teacher ratings of everyday behaviour in children
with ASD and MLD. Despite groups that contained an abnormally high level of FB
passers (in the ASD group) and FB failers (in the MLD group), there was still a
significant difference between the groups on ratings of behaviour requiring mental
state attribution, with the ASD group showing less of this type of behaviour than the
MLD group. This was despite a VMA advantage in the ASD group. There was no
difference on ratings of behaviour requiring executive control, or on a general
sociability measure. Those individuals with ASD who passed FB tasks performed
significantly better on teacher ratings of behaviour requiring mental state attributions
than those who failed. In the MLD group there was a trend towards a similar
relationship. Again, there were no differences on the other questionnaire scales.
Ratings of real life behaviour requiring mental state attribution and ratings of
behaviour requiring executive control were strongly and robustly related in both
groups.
Discussion of Results
Theory of Mind in children with ASD
One of the aims of this thesis was to look at the relative degree of impairment
in ToM in children with ASD and MLD, and to look for factors other than genuine
variation in the understanding of mind that might account for FB task success or
failure.
This thesis found strong evidence that ToM deficits in children with ASD
were both more common and more extensive than in children with MLD. When
children who failed standard FB tasks were compared on a range of ToM tasks, those
with ASD were more severely impaired than those with MLD. Those who failed FB
tasks did not appear to be failing due to executive demands of the tasks, since
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performance on EF tasks did not relate to performance on ToM tasks. In addition, FB
task performance was related to ratings of everyday social insight.
From my reading of the literature (see chapter 1), it appears that all the current
theories of ToM postulate the existence of some sort of predisposition to, or an innate
basis for ToM, and many suggest that those with ASD have a deficit in this innate
basis. Given this, the existence of a subgroup of individuals with ASD who pass ToM
tasks is intriguing. It might be tempting to write this group off as simply having
developed task-specific tactics that enable them to pass. However, previous findings
of their superior everyday life social insight and their success on a range of other
experimental tasks (see chapter 8), suggests that their success is due to something
more than luck or a task-specific strategy, and therefore merits further investigation.
What then, is the nature of the understanding of mind in children with ASD?
There are two main possibilities. They may be delayed in their acquisition of a ToM,
or their development of the understanding of mind may be qualitatively different to
that seen in other groups. This is harder to test than one might think, since we know
very little about normal socio-cognitive development of ToM over the age of 5, and
the discrepancy in ability levels means that tasks that seem appropriate for high-
functioning children with ASD are not appropriate for TD 5- or 6-year-olds. In
addition, Fisher et al. (submitted) found that, in a sample of TD 8-year-olds, variation
in performance on advanced ToM tasks (such as the Strange Stories or the ToM
cartoons) appeared to reflect differences in language ability rather than genuine
differences in the understanding of mind, indicating that elucidating normal social
development may not as straightforward as giving advanced ToM tasks to a range of
ages of normally developing children. There may well be quite a narrow window in
normal development when a particular advanced ToM test actually assesses variation
in the understanding of mind, as opposed to other, more general processes. Having a
metric of the developmental progression of performance on tests of understanding of
mind would enable us to identify exactly where children with ASD are relative to
their typically developing peers, and whether their socio-cognitive development is
taking a delayed or deviant pathway.
Given the present paucity of information about the normal development of
social cognition over the age of 5 years, is there any other way in which we could test
for delayed, rather than deviant, ToM ability? Variation in performance across tasks
may be informative, and the results of study 4 suggest that the ASD group did show a
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different profile of strengths to that seen in the MLD group. The ASD group did not
show deficits in everything when compared even to the YMA matched MLD group -
there were no problems on the Strange Stones (Happé, 1994), for example, or in
defining mental states. However, they did display deficits on attributing mental states
to non-verbal stimuli, and reporting back their own thoughts. Study 5 suggested that
those 'FB passers' with ASD were most comparable to 'FB failers' with MLD on
ratings of real life behaviour requiring mental state attribution, again suggesting that
the development of understanding of mind in ASD is not simply delayed. Perhaps
the most convincing argument against the delay hypothesis is that high-functioning
individuals with ASD do not appear to ever quite catch up, and most remain clearly
'autistic' throughout life - as were even the most able and oldest children with ASD
in these studies.
The alternative is that any understanding of mind gained by children with
ASD is quite different in nature to that shown by TD children and children with MLD.
It is possible that individuals with ASD have an innate deficit underlying their
difficulties in representing mental states, which will inevitably mean that their social
development is different to TD children. In the case of high-functioning children
with ASD, the notion of 'child as scientist' may well be appropriate, with children
having very little or no innate basis for or predisposition towards understanding other
minds, and instead having to painstakingly construct a theory of representational
mental states. For children with ASD, unlike ID children, the predictions from such
an account in terms of individual differences seems to hold; not all children with ASD
come up with a ToM at the same time (and in fact many never do), and there is no
reason to assume that those who do have all formed the same theory. Subgroups of
children with ASD may exist, with differing profiles of social strengths and
weaknesses, according to the particular understanding of mind that they have
constructed. This of course makes research into their difficulties much more
complicated, and it may be that the only way forward is to use much larger samples of
children with ASD who pass FB tasks, in order to identify subgroups who may have
specific patterns of performance on ToM tasks. Alternatively it might be possible to
select subgroups who demonstrate particular difficulties in real life behaviour and to
group them together, looking for characteristic deficits on experimental tasks.
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Language and ToM
Much of the evidence of this thesis points to one thing; language appears to be
crucially important in the development of an understanding of mind in children with
ASD. Language ability (and particularly grammar) predicted who would pass and fail
FB tasks, and related strongly to performance on more advanced ToM tasks in those
who did pass FB.
Given that language appears to be a very likely candidate for an alternative
route to ToM in able individuals with ASD (Happé, 1995; Tager-Flusb erg, 2002),
there are two main theories as to the route that this might take. Language may
provides access to social relationships and conversations, which provide the child
with experience of and subsequently an understanding of mental states (Peterson &
Siegal, 1995; Dunn & Brophy, 2002), or specific aspects of language such as
complement syntax may provide a child with the structure within which they can
represent other perspectives (De Villiers, 2000). The findings reported in this thesis
suggest that grammar is, indeed, especially important to the development of ToM in
ASD (see studies 1 and 4). The measure in this study did not include complement
syntax, and this may indicate that the relationship is in fact more general than that
suggested by De Villiers, or that the grammar measures used may in fact have
operated as a proxy measure of complement syntax ability. This point could be
clarified by including more extensive measures of grammar in the future, as well as
looking specifically at which aspects of grammar children with ASD who fail FB
tasks find hard. However, it appears unlikely that an association with complement
syntax can account for the entire relationship seen between grammar and ToM in this
thesis. This is because the relationship is just as evident in the 'FB passers' group, all
of whom passed l order FB, and therefore presumably could use complement syntax.
The importance of grammar suggests that improved access to conversations and social
interactions alone cannot account for the relationship with FB since vocabulary
should surely be equally important in that case (as, in fact, it appears to be in those
with MLD), and provides some indication that the structure of language itself might
be crucial. It is possible that the embedded structure even of non-mental states terms
may be helpful to individuals with ASD in developing the ability to shift between
perspectives - many of the later items of the TROG are embedded, for example 'the
book the pencil is on is red', requires the child to hold in mind 'the book' whilst
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listening to the rest of the sentence, and then to shift back to the subject in order to
work out what the last clause ('is red') refers to.
In the case of children with ASD, who may have an impaired innate basis for
the understanding of mind, language could provide them with a concrete example of
other perspectives that they can begin to comprehend without necessarily having to
represent mental states in an abstract way. This is because language makes mental
states explicit, and can therefore emphasize the fact that different people have
different perspectives, possibly enabling the person with ASD to form a concrete
representation of what a person says (which could potentially be conceptualised
almost like a speech bubble), rather than having to form an abstract representation of
what they think. They therefore may be able to start constructing their own explicit
theory of ToM, from their experience and learnt rules. This may have implications
for the trajectory of the development of understanding of mind in ASD. In TD young
children, it appears that they may first display implicit social understanding (for
example, looking towards the place where the protagonist will search in a FB task)
before they demonstrate an explicit understanding of mind (for example predicting
correctly where the protagonist will look (e.g. Clements, Rustin, & McCallum, 2000).
It is possible that children with ASD show a very different learning curve, where
mental states have to be made explicit before they can be understood at all, and where
no implicit understanding precedes the explicit demonstration of understanding. This
hypothesis could be tested by developing a range of tests where children with ASD's
responses were monitored in a more implicit way. Study 4 of this thesis started to
look at this, and found that some children with ASD failed an 'implicit' l order FB
task despite passing 2'" order tasks when they were asked explicitly about the
protagonists' belief. Other potential experimental methods might include eye tracking
paradigms, as suggested by Klin, Jones, Schultz et al. (2002). In addition, if children
with ASD have particular problems in the implicit understanding of other minds, they
should continue to have difficulties in certain areas no matter how able they are. One
such area could be reflecting on and reporting back their own mental states. There has
been very little research on the ability to 'read own mind' in individuals with ASD.
Frith and Happé (1999) suggested that self consciousness and the ability to report on
an internal stream of consciousness may be impaired in even high-functioning
individuals with ASD, and that the degree of impairment may be related to
performance on FB tasks. Study 4 of this thesis (with FB passers only) included a task
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that asked children with ASD to reflect on their thoughts, and on which they
performed remarkably badly when compared to the VMA matched MLD group,
despite good performance on FB tasks and other ToM tasks. In the future it would be
useful to extend this finding by comparing FB passers and failers on their ability to
report back their thoughts, as well as developing more tasks that ask high-functioning
individuals with ASD to reflect on their stream of consciousness.
It is possible that the need for mental states to be made explicit in order for
children with ASD to learn about them explains the relative success of the ToM
training programme reported in this thesis (Study 3). The ToM programme made the
concept of differing perspectives and mistaken belief explicit, and provided the
children with a linguistic structure within which to solve FB tasks. The real life
improvement seen in over 50% of the trained children in Study 5 (in contrast to none
of the control children) suggests, tentatively, that training programmes may in some
cases have the potential to lead to genuine changes in the understanding of mind.
Whether this has any lasting impact on the adaptive behaviour of children with ASD
remains to be seen. Longer term intervention programmes are needed, perhaps
carried out by teachers or parents over a period of months, rather than weeks, and
reinforced by talking about the strategy in different contexts. In order to improve the
possibility of generalisation of learning, the training should be repeated across
different contexts (Koegel, Koegel, & Parks, 1995; Schreibman & Koegel, 1996).
The fact that those children with ASD who pass FB tasks do show superior
mentalising abilities in real life when rated by their teachers (Study 5, Fombonne et
al., 1994; Frith et al., 1994) suggests that targeting these abilities explicitly could
potentially be beneficial for real life adaptation.
Findings reported in this thesis suggest that language is not just important
developmentally, but also remains crucially important for performance on ToM tasks
online. Study 4 found that in some advanced ToM tasks high-functioning children
with ASD showed an high degree of competence. Their understanding of mental
states appeared to be accessed more readily through certain, language based routes -
providing a narrative, for example, seemed to make ToM tasks easier for children
with ASD, and tasks which could be answered by learnt rules about mental states also
appeared to be relatively easy. Other studies have found a relationship between
narrative ability and ToM in children with ASD, whilst finding no relationship in
children with MLD (Capps, Losh, & Thurber, 2000), suggesting again that there may
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be a special relationship between the two in AS!). Areas that remained impaired were
reporting back their own mental states, attributing mental states in response to a non-
verbal stimulus, and possibly the attributing of mental states to pictures of people's
eyes. All these are areas in which it is hard to see how a ToM that remains essentially
language bound could help. There was some veiy tentative evidence that verbal
interference tasks may selectively impair performance on FB tasks in children with
ASD, however, this needs to be repeated with a bigger sample and a more difficult
ToM task. In order to examine this effect, it would be useful to develop tasks that look
directly at the effect of narrative of ToM task performance on ASD. In particular, if
identical versions of a videoed task were constructed, one with a voice over narrative,
one without, then the impact of an explicit verbal narrative on performance could be
directly assessed. The prediction would be that it would enhance performance on
ToM in those with ASD, whilst having minimal effect on those with MLD, or
possibly even confusing them and thus impairing performance. Control (non-ToM)
stories would be necessary in case a narrative simply makes all tasks easier. This
might be the case if, for example, explicit narratives helps individuals with ASD to
extract global meaning.
The present study of those individuals with ASD who passed FB tasks
suffered from a number of limitations apart from its small sample size, in particular
the unmatched nature of the MLD and ASD groups. In the future it would be useful
to conduct studies of this type with two control groups, one of which contains
children with MLD (who would be likely to be of lower VMA), and one of TD
individuals who could be matched on verbal age. However, as discussed in chapter 8,
this would present a challenge in terms of age-appropriate task design.
It was not possible in this thesis to compare those with Asperger's Syndrome
with those with autism, since there appeared to be no substantive difference according
to teacher reports between those with the different diagnoses. However, in the future
it would be useful to compare those individuals (matched on present day VMA) who
had a language delay in their early years with those who did not, and to examine the
implications of early language delay for later ToM development in ASD. One
possibility is that early language gives a head start in the development of an
alternative route to ToM, and therefore that participants with Asperger's Syndrome
(as currently defined), will demonstrate significantly better ToM skills when
compared to VMA matched individuals with high-functioning autism.
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Theory
 of Mind in children with MLD
A proportion of children with MLD are almost invariably found to fail FB
tasks (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Charman & Shmueli-Goetz, 1998; Zelazo Ct al.,
1996), and it is not clear whether this indicates a genuine difficulty in understanding
other minds, or whether it is instead due to other, more general difficulties such as EF
deficits. Some authors have suggested that for a child with MLD to pass or fail a FB
task tells us relatively little about their underlying social competence (Frith et al.,
1994; Happé, 1995), whilst others argue that failing these tasks is evidence of genuine
ToM deficits in these groups, and therefore the lack of specificity of a ToM deficit to
autism (e.g. Yirmiya et al., 1998).
Unlike previous work (e.g. Happé, 1995), studies in this thesis found a
relationship between language and ToM in children with MLD (studies 1 and 4). The
nature of this relationship was different to that seen in ASD. Whilst in ASD grammar
appeared to be a significant and independent predictor of ToM, in MLD the
relationship with vocabulaty was as important as that with grammar, and grammar
generally did not predict performance over and above vocabulary. In addition, in
study 4, the non-ToM control tasks were as closely linked to language as the ToM
tasks, indicating that task specific factors, rather than the ToM demands, may account
for the relationship.
Somewhat surprisingly, there was some indication in this thesis that a subset
of children with MLD may indeed have genuine difficulties in representing mental
states. They responded in a very similar way to the children with ASD to the ToM and
EF training programmes, and there was a trend towards those who failed FB tasks
performing worse on ratings of everyday behaviour requiring mental state attributions
than those who passed. In addition, they appeared to find a 'memory of own FB' task
easier than predicting another's FB, even though the non-ToM demands of the tasks
were virtually identical; which indicates that these tests may have been taxing their
mentalising abilities rather than other, more general, skills. However, this thesis also
provided evidence that children with MLD who fail FB tasks are qualitatively
different to children with ASD who fail. For a start, task-specific factors appeared to
be more important in MLD, with a clear hierarchy of difficulty emerging between
different FB tasks (study 1). In addition, even those participants with MLD who
failed FB performed better on a range of ToM tasks than did children with ASD
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(study 2), and were most comparable to those children with ASD who passed FB on
ratings of evely day behaviour requiring mental state attributions (study 5).
Given that it seems possible that a small subset of individuals with MLD have
difficulties in FB which are indicative of some wider problems in ToM, it may be
interesting to speculate on why this might be so. Children with MLD do not have the
qualitative social and communicative impairments characteristic of autism, and we
would assume that they have an intact innate basis for ToM, whatever this might be,
in the same way as ID children. However, they are different to TD children in one
crucial way; they have a low IQ and therefore a lower capacity for learning. All the
major theories of ToM, as well as agreeing that there must be some innate basis for
ToM, allow for the role of experience in the development of a true representational
understanding of mind. By definition, children with MLD have difficulties in
gathering and using information, and it is possible that for some of them this is also
true in the social cognitive domain. Their ability to learn from their experiences may
therefore be seriously delayed in some cases, and it may take much more exposure to
conversations, social interactions, mistaken beliefs, deception and so forth in order for
them to learn enough to pass a FB test. It is also plausible that, due to their slow
development, they do not become ready to learn about representational mental states
until they are much older than TD children. This delay could have serious
implications for their development, since the information available in their
environment when they are ready to learn may be quite different to that which they
would have got as young children. Stories we tell to small children are full of simple
scenarios of mistaken belief and deception (e.g. Red Riding Hood thinking the wolf is
her grandmother, or Cinderella's sisters thinking she is a princess at the ball), and
young children are typically cared for in small groups with lots of adult contact,
giving them a particularly rich opportunity for individual interactions with those who
are more socially sophisticated than themselves, but yet who are keen to instruct them
on social norms and situations. It is possible that, having not been ready to learn
about representational mental states when they were the 'right' age, some children
with MLD never get such a rich environment for learning again. By the time they are
ready to learn they are already at school in larger groups, being taught academic skills
rather than the socio-cognitive understanding typically learnt in early childhood.
Evidence for lack of experience being a potential source of ToM problems in
MLD comes from training studies which provide intensive experience of FB
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situations, and which have generally been successful in children with MLD. Children
with MLD and other non-autistic developmental disorders appear to be quite
effectively trained on ToM, showing better generalisation than those with ASD (Study
3, Swettenham, 1996), maintenance of improvement over time (Study 3, Ashcroft et
a!., 1999) and, in one notable case, improvement on ratings of social skills in
everyday life (Steerneman et a!., 1996). In order to elucidate the true nature of ToM
in children with MLD who fail FB tasks, more measures of everyday life behaviour
would be useful, not just relying on teacher ratings but maybe also observing
behaviour in dyadic interactions or family situations. This is another area where a
clearer understanding of the normal developmental trajectory of the understanding of
mind would be useful, in order to compare if and how those with MLD differ from the
norm, if indeed they do. I would predict that individuals with MLD who fail FB tasks
should be competent in a wide range of social cognitive skills, in a similar way to TD
3-year-olds, despite failing FB tasks. However, they may still display specific
difficulties in some areas - for example in attributing mistaken beliefs that are not
made explicit.
Executive Function and Theory of Mind
The findings from this thesis concerning EF and ToM are mixed. One of the
more puzzling findings was the success of the EF training programme in improving
performance on ToM tasks, whilst not improving performance on EF tasks. As
argued in Study 3, it is unlikely that non-specific training effects accounted for the
improvement on ToM tasks, so it seems that something about the EF training must
have led to the improvement; this is reinforced by the finding that those who
improved on ToM scored more highly on ratings of success during the EF training
than those who did not improve. If the study were to be repeated, it would be useful
to have a wider range of executive tasks, some of which should be aimed at the same
developmental level as FB tasks, and including other EF tasks that are known to be
related to FB in normal development (e.g. the Windows task; (Russell et al., 1991).
Study 2 found no association between EF and ToM in those who failed FB tasks (with
either ASD or MLD), whilst Study 5 found a strong association between real life
ratings and measures of ToM and EF, making the situation potentially even more
puzzling. This is another area (as well as ToM, discussed above) where it would be
useful to have a metric of the normal developmental trajectory of performance on the
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tasks, in order to assess the nature of the difficulties in children with ASD. It would
also have been useful to have included a range of EF tasks in the FB passers study in
this thesis.
The literature to date suggests that there is a strong relationship between
performance on FB tasks and EF tests measuring flexibility and inhibitoiy control
such as card sort tasks (see chapter 4 for a summary). It appears possible that the
relationship between ToM and EF is quite specifically linked to the transition to a
representational understanding of mind. First order FB tasks require children to shift
their perspective from reality to a mental state, whether their own past belief or
another's present belief. It seems plausible that this shifting requires a degree of
cognitive flexibility and working memory - the ability to 'hold in mind' one state of
affairs (e.g. reality or own belief) whilst shifting to another (e.g. the protagonist's
false belief). Findings from typically developing children do indeed show that this
type of task is related to performance on FB tasks between the ages of 3 and 5 (see
chapter 4). This is not to say that the relationship reflects only task specific factors,
since this shifting between perspectives is also necessary in order to consider differing
mental states in everyday life. When designing and carrying out the EF and ToM
training programmes, it became clear how much both the target tasks (FB and Card
Sort) were about shifting - the EF training programme was about shifting between
actions, whilst the ToM programme was about shifting between mental states. The
results of study 3 indicate that training children in cognitive shifting may have
implications for their later ability to pass ToM tasks. The fact that the improvement
seen in the EF trained groups in study 3 was more evident at follow-up suggests that
the relationship between set shifting and ToM is not an immediate, task-specific, one.
The ability to shift between actions (which most of the children were able to learn to
do in the EF training programme) may enable children to begin to shift between
perspectives and thus, through further experience (which may well be linguistically
mediated), be able to develop some representational understanding of differing mental
perspectives. Those who improved on ToM had better grammar at the start than those
who did not, suggesting that grammatical ability and the training may have interacted
in some way. The shifting that is necessary for an improved understanding of mental
states may be quite different to the shifting that is measured in most EF tasks, which
could explain why the children did not improve on the EF tasks.
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It is also possible that the ability to hold in mind is particularly important in
children with ASD, since (as argued above) they may be constructing an alternative
route to ToM, which would probably require more cognitive resources than the
intuitive (possibly modular) route taken in typical development. I would predict that a
certain degree of cognitive flexibility would be necessary but not sufficient for the
development of understanding of mind in ASD, that without some cognitive
flexibility able children with ASD would be unable to made use of the explicit social
experience and language ability that they do have. It is, however, also possible that
without some cognitive flexibility individuals with ASD are not able to gain a good
level of grammar, since, as discussed above, more complicated grammatical structures
often contain embedded phrases and therefore require holding in mind and shifting
between perspectives. One might predict that whilst children with ASD exist who
have relatively good EF but poor ToM (study 2; Baron-Cohen & Robertson, 1995),
the opposite pattern should not exist (poor EF, good ToM). This is only the case for
those with ASD, since other children are assumed to have an intact basis for ToM,
and to therefore be more able to make use of implicit cues, and therefore an explicit,
cognitive strategy is less crucial in the development of their understanding of mind.
This idea is highly speculative, and in order to test it more studies are needed
which compare those who pass and fail FB tasks on EF measures. The results of study
2 suggest that it is possible that there is no relationship between the understanding of
mind and EF in those who fail FB tasks. It is likely that, whatever the pattern of
development, it could be quite different in developmentally delayed groups, certainly
some recent evidence indicates that there may not be a relationship in those with
ADHD (Charman et al., 2001; Pemer et a!., 2002). This supports my earlier argument
that cognitive flexibility may be less crucial in groups who have an innate ToM basis
and who therefore have a more typical route to ToM. If the relationship between EF
and ToM is due to the need to shift between perspectives in both domains, then we
would not expect to see a relationship in those who fail FB tasks (as in fact study 2
found), since a certain level of EF should be necessary, but not sufficient, for a ToM.
In those individuals with ASD who pass FB tasks, I would predict that a relationship
between cognitive flexibility, working memory and ToM should be particularly
evident, since they are hypothesised to be using an alternative strategy for the
understanding of mind, which may require the individual to both 'hold something in
mind' and to shift between different perspectives. In support of this, study 4 (with PB
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passers) found that working memory was related to ToM in individuals with ASD
only. In TD children, and those with non-autistic developmental disorders, I would
predict that the relationship between EF and ToM would be evident over the period of
the transition to FB understanding, when the individual may be learning to shift
between conflicting mental perspectives for the first time. However, once they have
achieved this milestone the shifting between perspectives become more automatic,
and cognitive flexibility and working memory should no longer be crucial in the way
that it remains for children with ASD. An important caveat is that the ability to shift
between different frameworks, and good language ability, are not themselves enough
to ensure that a child with ASD will work out some representational understanding of
mental states; their experience of social interactions, which may be mediated by
motivation, personality and interest, will also be essential.
General conclusions
This thesis has compared the ToM abilities of those with MLD and those with
ASD, and the relationship of ToM to EF and language. The evidence in those with
MLD is tentative, but there was some evidence that passing or failing a FB task is not
simply artefactual in their case, as had been suggested in the past. Language,
particularly grammar, appears to be strongly developmentally implicated in ToM,
particularly in ASD, and suggestions have been made for how and why this might be
the case. In contrast, EF does not appear to be related to ToM in those individuals
with MLD or ASD who failed FB tasks. Training children in ToM was reasonably
effective and showed some generalisation in both ASD and MLD. Training children
in cognitive flexibility and set shifting did not improve their EF, but seemed to
improve their ToM, especially at follow-up. This improvement over time suggests
that the EF training may work indirectly, possibly enabling children to learn more
from social experiences and therefore improve their understanding of mind. It was
suggested that language, cognitive flexibility and working memory may all be crucial
in enabling children with ASD to construct and use a working understanding of mind.
How exactly this process might work, and how language and executive function
might interact is as yet unclear. Passing FB tasks appears to be indicative of a
genuinely better understanding of mind in some children with ASD. The question of
how they achieve this, and whether other children with ASD can be helped to achieve
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I	 APPENDIX I SCRIPTS FOR FALSE BELIEF TASKS
Deceptive box: Smarties Task (self and other)
First, can you tell me the name of a friend ofyours?
I'm going to show you something I've broughL
What do you think is in here?
If child responds "Other" say:
"What do you normally find in here?"
"Okay, let's have a look... Open tube and show child the contents (pencils).
There are pencils in here."
Right, let's put them back
Now ifyour friend (inset friend's name) came in here, what he will think is in here?
Prompt if necessary: What will (friend) think is in here?
Control question: What's really in the tube?
Self question: Before I opened the tube to show you, what did you think was in the
tube?
Unexpected Transfer: Sally-David Story
This is David and this is Sally. David has a bag, and Sally has a bo.t
David has an apple. David puts his apple away in his bag, to keep it safe while he plays
outside. Then David goes out to play.
But look, while David is outside, Sally takes the apple out of David's bag, and she puts
it in her bo here. Then Sally goes outside to play.
David comes in from playing - he's hungry and he'd like to have a bite of his apple.
FB question: Where wiiDavid look for his apple?
Justification: Why?
Reality check control: Where is the apple really?
Memory check control: Where was the apple first of all?
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I	 APPENDIX II QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
(all items were made gender appropriate for the particular child).
Theory of mind scale
Does she draw people's attention to things that might interest them? For example, pointing
out a type of car to someone who is interested in cars.
Does she deliberately try to pretend things, for example that she's ill, to get your sympathy or
to get out of doing things?
Does she recognise when other people are surprised or embarrassed?
Does she sometimes misunderstand what is said to her because she takes it too literally?
Does she sometimes ask strangers embarrassing questions, without realising that they are
embarrassing?
Does she respond to indirect hints to do something, for example to stop talking if the
conversation is boring for the other person?
Can she fill in important missing information if someone else doesn't understand what is
going on e.g. explaining the background of an event to a teacher?
Does she tell white lies? For example, will she say something contrary to what she thinks or
knows in order to spare someone's feelings?
Can she express her ideas in more than one way, for example, if someone doesn't understand,
can she explain things differently?
When talking to another person, does she seem to consider the other person's interests
when deciding what to talk about, or does she pursue her own interests only?
Can she take turns appropriately in a conversation with another person, for example
not constantly interrupting or talking over the other person?
Does she engage in flexible small talk, responding to what the other person says
rather than having a fixed routine?
Can she behave appropriately with different groups of people, for example, behaving
differently with strangers than with familiar people, or with adults or peers?
Is she naïve around people? For example, does she realise when someone is only teasing or
playing a joke on her?
Does she recognise when she has hurt someone else's feelings?
Executive function scale
Is she able to change task in work or play without being prompted to do so?
Does she express realistic plans or ideas (e.g. future goals)?
262
Does she like to have her day organised into set activities?
Does she find it difficult to keep her mind on something, and is easily distracted?
Is she good at keeping track of things she needs to do, for example when working on her
own?
Does she get easily distracted in the middle of a task or game?
Does she have problems following verbal instmctions, even though she is paying attention,
unless they are kept simple and straightforward?
Does she think ahead about what she will need to do activities, rather than leaving things
until the very last minute?
Does she often do something silly, just out of habit (e.g. going to fetch something from where
it used to be, or going to an old classroom)?
Does she fmd it hard to stop saying or doing something once she has started?
Does she tend to be restless, and have problems keeping still for any length of time?
Does she collect together all work or play items before starting a task/game/project?
Does she act on impulse? For example, act without thinking, and do the first thing that comes
to mind?
Is she able to work out sums in her head, for example, can she work out if she has enough
money to buy several things
Does she talk on about things that interest her despite explicit attempts to change the topic of
conversation?
General sociability scale
Does she recognise when other people are happy or sad?
Does she use appropriate table manners?
Will she share things when asked, for example a textbook, or scissors and glue?
Does she initiate conversations with other people?
Does she have a best friend of the same sex?
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APPENDIX III TOM TRAINING PROGRAMME	 I
Training sessions
Stage 1
Before the child arrived, the researcher took photos of the room in which the training
was taking place.
Camera analogy
The child was then shown the Polaroid camera, and the researcher took a photo. The
child and researcher then watched the photo develop together. The researcher then
pointed the camera at different locations in the room and asked the child to choose
(from a pre-prepared range of photos) what the photo would show if it was taken.
Introduction of doll
The child was then introduced to Sarah the doll, and told that when Sarah looks at
something, she has a thought in her head, like a picture of what she sees. Sarah then
'looked' at different locations in the room, and the child was asked to choose the
correct picture from a pre-prepared range. The pictures were slotted into Sarah's
head. This was repeated until the child got three consecutive trials correct.
Transfer to real people
The child was then told that it is the same with real people, but with real people we
can't see the pictures as they are inside the person's head. These pictures are called
thoughts. The researcher then exaggeratedly looked around the room, and asked the
child to chose the photo which showed the correct 'thought-picture' which the
researcher would have in their head given the direction they were looking in. Again,
the child had to get three consecutive trials correct to move on to Stage 2.
The phrase written on the reminder card has some variation due to the input of the
child, but typically said something like 'When people look at things, they get
thoughts in their head like photos.'
Stage 2
Review of last session
The child read their reminder card, or the researcher read it to them, if they weren't
comfortable with reading. Sarah was reintroduced, and the child was asked to choose
the correct thought-pictures when Sarah looked at various objects.
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Thought pictures can stay in people's heads
Sarah then 'looked' at various objects, the child chose the correct thought picture, and
Sarah then left the scene. The child was told that the picture in Sarah's head could
stay there even though she wasn't looking anymore, and was asked what was on
Sarah's thought picture. Sarah then returned, and the child was shown the photo, with
feedback if wrong. After three consecutive correct trials, the child was allowed to
move on.
Thought pictures can be used to look for things
An object (e.g. a small toy) was placed in a box, and the child chose a thought-picture
to show where Sarah thought the object was. Sarah then left the scene, and the child
was asked to describe her thought picture. Sarah then returned, and the child was told
Sarah would use her thought-picture to look for the object. The child was then asked
where Sarah would look for the object. They had to get three consecutive trials
correct to move on to the next stage.
Stories
The child did not have to pass this stage in order to move on to the next stage. This
section was designed to consolidate the ideas involved and improve the likelihood of
generalisation beyond the dolls. The child was told two illustrated stories about
children. An example story is given.
This is Kate. Kate has been reading her book She puts it on the table while she goes
to have supper. Which thought picture of her book does she have in her head? (child
chose from four line drawings). Now Kate goes to have supper. After supper, she
wants to read her book Where does her thought picture show her book? Where will
she look for her book? Where does she think her book is?
Let's look at the picture to see f you 're right. She thinks what is on her thought
picture.
False Belief
A standard unexpected transfer FB task was included at this point to assess
spontaneous use of the photo analogy. An Elmo puppet, two boxes and a marble were
used. Two children passed this task, one child in the MLD group and one in the ASD
group.
The researcher and child then agreed together what should be written on the reminder




Review of previous week
Read reminder card, asked brief recap questions.
Different people can have different thought-pictures in their heads
Another doll - "Jo' - was introduced, also with a slot in her head. The child was
asked to choose thought-pictures for both dolls, as they looked in different directions.
They had to get 3 consecutive trials correct.
Perspective taking with photos
The child was told 'People take pictures in their heads of what they see. They can't
take a picture in their head of things they haven't seen'. The purple cylinder was
placed next to the toy crocodile, so that from one angle it obscured it. The child was
asked to move around the room, and to choose the photos (from a pre-prepared
range) that showed what could be seen from different angles. If they couldn't do this,
they were allowed to use the Polaroid to take photos and they watched the photos
develop. They had to choose the right picture on three consecutive trials to move on.
Thought-picture perspective taking
The child was told 'People are the same. Their thought picture will show what they
can see. If they can't see the toy, the toy won't be on their thought-picture'. Different
toys were placed beside the cylinder, and the dolls were placed at opposite sides. The
child was asked initially to go and stand by the dolls in order to select the correct
thought-picture, and later was asked to do it without moving. Line drawings were
used as well as the photos. They had to get three consecutive trials correct in order to
pass the stage.
Stories
The child did not have to pass this section in order to move on, but responses were
recorded.
The child was shown a picture of two people looking at different objects and was
asked what thought-pictures they had in their heads. No pictures were provided for
them to choose from.
The reminder cards for this stage typically said 'Different people can have different
thought-pictures in their heads'.
Stage 4
Before the child came in, the researcher prepared pictures of the toys in different
locations in the room.
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Review of previous session
Read reminder card, asked recap questions.
Thought pictures can be out of date
This was introduced with the camera. The researcher took a photo of a toy in a box,
and then placed the photo face down on the table. The toy was then moved, and the
child was asked where the toy would be on the photo. The child and researcher then
looked at the photo together, and the researcher said 'Even though we've moved the
toy, when we took the photo the toy was in the box, so the photo still shows the toy in
the box. The photo is out of date now. It doesn't show how things really are. Well,
it's the same with thought pictures in people's heads. Sometimes they can be out of
date'.
A toy was then placed on the table, and the child was asked to choose a thought-
picture for Sarah. The picture was slotted into Sarah's head. Sarah then left the
scene, and the child and researcher moved the toy. The child was then asked 'Did
Sarah see us move the toy? What does Sarah's thought picture show?' This was
repeated until the child had three consecutive trials correct.
Out of date thought pictures make people look in the wrong places
The scenario above was repeated, but this time when Sarah returned, she looked at her
thought-picture and looked in the wrong place. After a demonstration, this was
repeated and the child was asked what was on Sarah's thought picture, and where
Sarah would look for the toy. This was repeated with various toys and locations
around the room until the child answered three consecutive trials correctly. This was
the criterion to finish this stage.
Stories
The child did not need to pass these to move onto the final stage. There were two
illustrated unexpected transfer FB stories, with line drawing 'thought-pictures'.
Reminder cards for this stage typically said 'Sometimes thought-pictures are out-of-
date. Then people look in the wrong places for things'.
Stage 5
Review of previous session
Read reminder card, recap of previous session.
Thoughts are like pictures in your head
Scenarios like those used in stage 4 were repeated, but this time the child was told
'The picture in her head shows what Sarah thinks.' and after each scenario they were
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asked 'So where does Sarah think the object is?'. Thought-pictures were still used
throughout. They had to get three consecutive answers correct in order to finish.
Extension
If the child had passed all the previous stages with no difficulties an extension was
introduced. This involved the idea that thought-pictures could be generated by other
methods than looking - e.g. talking or reading. A doll was blindfolded, and was told
where a toy was. The child then had to chose the correct thought picture. They had to
get three consecutive answers correct to successfully complete the extension. Four
children with MLD and 4 children with ASD passed the extension.
Final discussion
The final discussion consisted of making it clear that real people also had thoughts in
their heads, and of finishing the reminder card, which was given to the child to keep.
A 'thought-picture' of the child was stuck on the back of the card.
268
I i:
Toys used for training
Dolls (with thought-pictures in their heads) used for training
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This stage introduced a scale model CAT truck, which had several removable tools.
The child was told that the truck could do many things because it has different tools
that it could use, and that the tool could be changed to make it do something different.
Some stones, twigs and a plastic car were used. The child was asked to make the
truck pick up the different categories of objects, choosing the correct tool each time
and changing it on the truck. The various tools would only pick up one of the three
objects - i.e. the stones could not be picked up with the implement which lifted the
car, or vice versa. They had to indicate the correct tool on three consecutive trials to
progress to the next section.
Brain tools analogy
The child was then told 'People are like CAT trucks. We can do lots of things and
sometimes we need to change how we do something, just like the truck. Apart from
our arms and legs, we can also use our brain to do things. That's our most flexible
tool. People can change their tools when they do brain work, it's just that we can't
see it'.
They were asked to select brain tools from a pre-prepared range to show what their
brains enabled them do in different situations, for example in P.E. (running around,
playing games), in English lessons (writing, reading), at lunch time (eating) and at
night (sleeping).
Introduction of sorting
The stones, twigs and car were then mixed up, and the truck was made to sort them
out, by using various tools. A 'brain card' was then introduced. This was a cross-
section of a head, with the brain visible. The brain tools were stuck onto the brain
with blu-tack. The child was then told 'We can sort things out using our brains too.
When we sort out the cards by looking at what colour they are, we use our 'Colour'
brain tool.' The child was given a set of cards, and asked to use their colour tool to
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sort them out. They were initially given lots of help, and were given different sets of
cards until they had sorted 10 cards correctly.
They were then told 'Now we're going to change the brain tool to shape. Can you do
it? Sometimes it's very hard to change. We'll take the Colour brain tool off, and
change it to Shape, to remind us. We'll go 'all change' to help us remember.' An 'all
change' procedure was demonstrated, where the researcher put both fingers on her
temples and said 'all change'. The child was encouraged to repeat this each time they
change the tool. Some children spontaneously came up with their own changing
procedure, which was then used instead.
The change between two dimensions was repeated with various cards, until the child
got at least 14/20 right. This was the criterion for moving onto Stage 2.
The reminder card was then completed by the experimenter in consultation with the
child. For stage one it typically said 'People can do lots of different things using
different brain tools'.
Stage 2
Review of last stage
The reminder card was read by the child, or to the child, and a brief recap of the brain
tool concept was carried out, with the child doing a simple change of brain tool.
Sometimes a brain tool gets stuck
The aim of this was to try and enable the child to experience the difficulty involved in
changing a habitual way of doing something.
The truck was used to demonstrate the idea that a tool could get stuck. The child was
told 'Sometimes a tool has been in place for a long time and it gets stuck. It's like the
tool gets rusted on. The truck has been moving stones for a long time and now it has
to pick up this car. Which tool does it need?' (child chooses tool). 'But it's really
hard to take off the old tool because it's got stuck on after such a long time. We have
to pull hard to get it off.'
The child was then shown the brain card again, and told that brain tools also get stuck
sometimes and it's hard to change them. They were reminded of the 'all change'
procedure as a way to help themselves change brain tools.
They then sorted 3 or 4 sets of cards by Colour. After doing this correctly, they were
asked to change the tool to an Animal one, and the researcher said 'Is the old tool a
bit stuck. Let's change it together'. If they failed to get 14/20 correct straight away,
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this was repeated with different tools. If they passed, they were able to progress to the
next stage.
Stories
The child was then told 3 illustrated stories about brain tools getting stuck and being
changed in real life. These stories were about a boy who has to get up early during
the week, but can lie in at the weekends, another boy who goes to his maths classroom
instead of a school trip, because usually he goes to maths first thing every day, and a
girl who has to change the way she will get to school to prevent herself being late.
The child was asked questions about the stories, but these were not assessed, although
the responses were noted. The child was then asked if they themselves ever got
brain tools stuck.
Reminder cards were then completed. They typically said 'Sometimes brain tools get
stuck and it's hard to change them'.
Stage 3
Review of last stage
Read phrase on reminder card and briefly recapped last session.
STOP-CHANGE-GO
Traffic light signals were introduced to help the child change brain tools. When the
red STOP sign was held up, the child stopped, the orange CHANGE one meant they
had to change their brain tool (using the all-change procedure) and the green was the
signal to go. This was initially introduced with the truck.
Some brain tools are easier to use than others
The aim of this stage was to enable the children to experience the difference between
using easier and harder 'brain tools' for themselves.
The child was asked to use their Say what you See tool, and was shown two cards
repeatedly with pictures of a Sun and a Moon. They said 'Sun' on presentation of the
sun, and 'Moon' on presentation of the moon. They were then asked (using the Stop-
Change-Go sequence) to change to the Say the Opposite tool. They were told 'This is
a hard tool to use. You can go slowly to help you'. They had to get 7/10 correct after
the switch to progress to the next stage. This was repeated with girl/boy and
knife/fork cards if they had difficulties.
If they completed this without difficulties, they were encouraged to change without
using the brain tool cards.
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They were then asked to use a Do as I Say brain tool, and to stand up or sit down on
command. After changing brain tool they had to use a Do the Opposite tool, and sit
down when the researcher said stand up and vice versa. They were allowed to correct
themselves, and had to get four in a row right after the change to progress to the next
level. This was repeated with different actions if they had problems. The child was
then asked if they could think of any brain tools that were hard to use, or that were
very easy to use.
The reminder card was then completed, typically it said 'Some brain tools are easy to
use and some are harder. We can use Stop-Change-Go to help us change'.
Stage 4
Review of last stage
Reminder card and recap of last session.
Changing before finishing
This was demonstrated with the truck. The child was asked to move a pile of stones
with the truck, but before they had finished they were told that there had been an
emergency, a tree had fallen across the road and the truck needed to change and move
the tree. The Stop-Change-Go was used to help them to change.
They were then told 'We can do just the same thing with our brain tools'. They sorted
out a set of cards by the animal on them, and half way through were stopped (with the
'Stop' sign) and asked to change to the number brain tool. This was repeated with
different sets of cards until the child got in a row correct immediately after a
change. This was the criterion for progression to the final stage.
Stories
The child was told 2 stories about children who had to change what they were doing
before finishing. An example story is given:
James was doing some writing at school. He was really enjoying writing a story.
Which tool was he using?
Before James had finished, the bell rang. It was time for maths. James had to change
his tool even though he hadn 'tfinished. Which tool does he need?
James found it hard to change because he was in the middle of writing his story, hut
he had to do maths instead, so he changed his tool. He went 'all change' and went to
do his maths.
The reminder card was then completed. It typically said 'Sometimes we have to
change our brain tools before we finish doing something'.
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Stage 5
People have to decide for themselves which brain tools they will use
This stage was included to encourage the children to generate some brain tools
themselves, and to try to generalise to more real life settings.
Initially the children were given familiar sets of cards (which had been used in earlier
stages of the training) and asked what brain tools they could use to sort the cards Out.
A blank set of brain tools were used, and the child or the researcher wrote/drew on
them. To pass this stage, the child had to generate at least 3 different brain tools, 2 of
which had to be for the same set of cards. If they had difficulties with this, they were
told, 'Remember, we need different tools to do different jobs. If the truck had only
one tool, it could only move sand, it couldn't move logs or cars. With the tool you've
made, we could sort the cards by ______. What else could we sort them by? If I say
'all change', what tool could you change to?'
Extension
If the child completed the above section without difficulty, a novel set of cards was
introduced (which varied along at least 3 dimensions) and the child was asked to
generate brain tools to sort those cards. All the children except one (who had ASD)
were able to progress to this stage.
Stories.
The child was told, 'People have to do this all the time. They have to decide all the
different ways they could do something and then decide which to do. Sometimes they
have to change.' They were told a story about a girl who had to think about all the
ways she could get to her friend's house. They were then given a picture and asked to
generate brain tools about it. For example:
Bob wants to cross a lake to go to his house on the other side. He has d(fferent ways
he could do it. What tools might he use? What would he do (fit's a rainy day?
What should he do (fit was winter?
Their responses were noted down.
Finally they were asked about themselves, and what brain tools they could use when
they get home after school. These responses were also noted down.
The reminder card was then finished, a typical phrase for this stage was 'Sometimes
we have to decide for ourselves what brain tool we will use'. A 'Stop-Change-Go'
picture was then stuck on the other side of the card, and it was given to the child to
keep.
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Toy truck with removable tools









Example reminder card, front and back
277
APPENIMX V NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN EACH TRAINED
GROUP PASSING EACH ToM TASK AT EACH TIMEPOINT
Table V.1 Number of children in the ASD group passing each task at each
timepoint
Task	 ToM	 EF	 Controls
_________ (N=1O)	 ______ (N=1O)____ ______	 7)____ ______
Pre- Post Follow- Pre- Post Follow- Pre Post Follow-
test	 -test up
	 test	 -test up	 -	 -test up
_____________ ______ ______ _________ ______ ______ _________ test ______ _________
Unexpected 2
	 9	 8	 3	 4	 3	 1	 3	 2
transfer____ ____ ______ ____ ____ ______	 ____ ______
Deceptive	 2	 3	 3	 1	 2	 4	 1	 4	 1
box-other _____ _____ _______ _____ _____ _______	 _____ _______
Deceptive	 5	 6	 3	 3	 4	 7	 3	 1	 1
box-self	 ______ _____ ________ _____ _____ ________ 	 _____ ________
Penny-	 1	 6	 N/A	 0	 5	 N/A	 1	 3	 N/A
Hiding_____ _____ _______ _____ _____ _______	 _____ _______
Seeing-	 8	 N/A 9
	 6	 N/A 10	 5 N/A 5
Knowing_____ _____ _______ _____ _____ _______ 	 _____ _______
Know-	 4	 N/A 6
	 4	 N/A 6
	 3 N/A 2
guess-other ______ _____ ________ ______ _____ ________ 	 _____ ________
Know-	 2	 N/A 3
	 4	 N/A 1
	 2 N/A 2
guess-self ______ _____ ________ ______ _____ ________	 _____ ________
Table V.11 Number of children in the MLD group passing each task at each
timepoint
Task	 ToM	 EF	 Controls
_________ (N=6)
	 ______ (N=7 ____ ______ (N=8 ____ ______
Pre- Post- Follow- Pre- Post- Follow- Pre- Post- Follow-
_____________ test test
	 up	 test test	 up	 test test	 up
Unexpected 0
	 5	 4	 2	 2	 0	 6	 5
transfer	 1
Deceptive 2
	 6	 5	 2	 4	 3	 5	 7	 6
box-other ____ _____ _______ ____ _____ _______ ____ _____ _______
Deceptive 4
	 6	 4	 3	 5	 5	 7	 6	 7
box-self	 _____ _____ _______ _____ _____ _______ ____ _____ ________
Penny-	 0	 3	 N/A	 2	 3	 N/A	 1	 6	 N/A
Hiding_____ _____ _______ _____ _____ _______ ____ _____ _______
Seeing-	 6	 N/A 4	 6	 N/A 7	 7	 N/A 8
Knowing_____ _____ _______ _____ _____ ________ ____ _____ _______
Know-	 5	 N/A 5	 4	 N/A 6	 7 N/A 6
guess-other _____ ______ ________ _____ ______ ________ _____ _____ ________
Know-	 3	 N/A 3	 3	 N/A 5	 6 N/A 6
guess-self _____ ______ _________ ______ ______ _________ _____ ______ _________
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APPENDIX VI ADVANCED THEORY OF MIND TASKS	 I
Second order false belief task - the Chocolate Story
This is Mary and her brother John.
Their Grandad has given them some chocolate to share.
"Put it away now," says Grandad "You can have it when Mum says so"
John and Mary go inside and put the chocolate in the fridge.
Then they go out to play in the garden.
Later, John comes in for a glass of water.
He goes to the fridge and sees the chocolate.
He wants to keep the chocolate all for himself!
So he takes the chocolate out of the fridge and puts it in his bag.
1' order PB: Where does Mary think the chocolate is?
Reality control: Where has John put the chocolate really?
But, oh look, Mary is playing by the window now and she can see everything that John is doing!
She sees him put the chocolate in his bag!
John is so busy hiding the chocolate that he doesn't see Mary watching him through the
window!
Later, Mum comes to call John and Mary in for tea.
She says they can have some of the chocolate now.
John and Mary come running into the kitchen.
21 order PB: Where does John think Mary will look for the chocolate?
Justification: Why does John think that?
Reality control: Did John see Mary watching him through the window?
Reality control: Where is the chocolate really?
Memory check: Where was the chocolate first of all?
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Examples of the Children's Strange Stories
Theory of mind story
Simon is a big liar. Simon's brother Jim knows this, he knows that Simon never tells
the truth! Now yesterday Simon stole Jim's ping-pong paddle, and Jim knows Simon
has hidden it somewhere, though he can't find it. He's very cross. So he finds Simon
and he says, "Where is my ping-pong paddle? You must have hidden it either in the
cupboard or under your bed, because I've looked everywhere else. Where is it, in the
cupboard or under your bed?" Simon tells him the paddle is under his bed. Jim goes
straight to the cupboard.
Question: Why does Jim look there?
Physical story
A burglar is about to break into a jewellers' shop. He skilfully picks the lock on the
shop door. Carefully he crawls under the electronic detector beam. If he breaks this
beam it will set off the alarm. Quietly he opens the door of the store-room and sees
the gems glittering. As he reaches out, however, he steps on something soft. He
hears a screech and something small and furry runs out past him, towards the shop
door. Immediately the alarm sounds.







The target sentences are in italics. Half the children were presented with one emotion
for each story, whilst the other half were presented with the other emotion.
Positive expectation. negative reality
Expected
Jane was waiting to go out to the cinema with her dad. They were going to see the
new Pokemon film. They were going to go at half past three. Then her dad came in
and said that he was sorry, but Jane had to go to the dentist's instead. Her dad told
her to get her coat and put her shoes on. As Jane put her shoes on, she thought about
the film and watched her dad getting ready to go. She felt happy OR She felt sad.
They left the house together.
Expected
Lucy was going to go to a theme park. She had been looking forward to it for ages.
She was going with her whole family and her friend Sandra. They were going to set
off early on Saturday. On Friday Lucy and Sandra saw on TV that there were floods
at the theme park. It would be closed all weekend. On Saturday Lucy woke up early.
She thought about the theme park. She felt happy OR She felt sad. Then she got out
of bed.
Unexpected
Jack was going to stay the night with Chris after school. They had been planning it for
a long time. Jack had often visited Chris's house before and they always had fun.
This was the first time he was actually going to stay the night. Outside school, Jack
met Chris's mum. She didn't have time to tell Jack that Chris's cousins were coming
to stay and so Jack couldn't come round today. As Jack went into his classroom, he
saw Chris sitting at the table. He felt happy OR He felt sad. He went over to sit
down.
Unexpected
Anne had entered a special competition. She had designed a poster telling people to
recycle their rubbish. She had worked on her poster for a long time and it looked
really good. Today in assembly they were going to announce the results. Before
school, Anne met her teacher. She decided not to tell Anne that a girl in Class 8 had
won the competition. On her way to assembly Anne thought about her poster and the
competition. She felt happy OR She felt sad. She went into assembly.
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Negative expectation, positive reality
Expected
Simon was having a hard time at his new school. He was finding the work difficult
and he didn't have many friends. Yesterday, his teacher Mrs. Green had told him off
because he had been very slow. This morning, the headteacher asked him to come
and see her after lunch. Later, Mrs. Green said that the headteacher had seen a poem
that Simon had written. She had been very impressed with it. During lunch, Simon
thought about the headteacher and school. He felt happy OR He felt sad. Then he
went to her office.
Expected
Steven had a very important test to do at school. It was a maths test, and he had
always found maths difficult. He had been studying for a long time the night before.
He still wasn't sure he would know how to do all the problems. Maths was the first
lesson in the morning. In the corridor, he met his friend Ben, who told him that the
maths teacher was ill and so the test had been cancelled. As he entered the school, he
thought about the maths test. He felt happy OR He felt sad. He went to the maths
classroom.
Unexpected
Anita was going to the doctor. She had to have an injection to stop her getting ill.
She didn't like having needles stuck into her. At the doctor's, Anita and her mother
sat in the waiting room. Anita played with the toys and her mother read a magazine.
No one explained to Anita that there wouldn't be a needle. Instead, Anita would be
given the medicine on a sugar lump. Anita thought about going in to see the doctor.
She felt happy OR She felt sad. Then the doctor called her name.
Unexpected
Neil had to go to the supermarket with his dad. It was Saturday morning. He really
didn't like going to the supermarket. It always took a long time and they never
bought anything interesting. His dad hadn't told Neil yet that his friend Joe had
invited him round. He could spend the morning there instead of shopping. Neil
thought about his Saturday morning. He felt happy OR He felt sad. Then he went
out to the car with his dad.
(LCt
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